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“[I]t will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous 
amendments to the Constitution . . . [E]very amendment to the 
Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might 
be brought forward singly.  There would then be no necessity for 
management or compromise, in relation to any other point, no giving nor 
taking.  The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to 
a decisive issue.” 
—Alexander Hamilton, 17881 
 
“The States are now so numerous that I despair of ever seeing another 
amendment to the Constitution, although the innovations of time will 
certainly call, and now already call, for some.” 
—Thomas Jefferson, 18232 
 
“[N]o impulse short of the impulse of self-preservation, no force less 
than the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to move the 
cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article Five.” 
—Woodrow Wilson, 18853 
INTRODUCTION 
“Easy.” “Difficult.”4 
                                                          
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (1823), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 265 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892-99) [hereinafter Letter to George Hay], 
available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/foley.  That view contrasts 
starkly with Jefferson’s convention era thinking:  “We must be content to accept [the 
Constitution’s] good and to cure what is evil in it hereafter.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to John Brown (1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (Paul L. Ford ed., 
1892-99) [hereinafter Letter to John Brown], available at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/foley.  
 3. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 163 (Meridian Books 1956) 
(1885). 
 4. The ultimate inquiry in which I engage goes deeper than the simple conclusion that 
our constitution is “difficult” to amend because it has been amended far less frequently than 
most others.  See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. 
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Explicit commentary on how amendable—through the Article V 
process—the American Constitution has been rarely exceeds such 
unsophisticated labels.5  Even the recent flurry of Article V-centered 
literature reaches only sweeping generalizations about the level of 
difficulty in the formal process.  Most authors recite such simple glosses as 
mere prelude to histories of, or normative speculation about, non-formal or 
extra-Article V amendment.6 
This Article addresses the varying level of difficulty of formal 
constitutional change, focusing primarily on pre-“modern” times.  As 
developed in this Article, the pre-modern age runs through the first century 
and a half of the Constitution of 1788 and it is little understood.  Today, by 
contrast and regardless of the descriptive terms we use, we share at least a 
general understanding of the impediments to, and likelihood of success of, 
contemporary constitutional amendments.  Some say amendment is hard to 
achieve, others that it is easy, depending on normative perspectives; but all 
speak of the same generally-known conditions.  This Article also explores 
the amendability question in earlier eras, where those contemporary 
commonplaces cannot reach. 
The full historical record dwarfs the limited range of materials 
considered by almost all prior studies that have touched on the 
amendability question.7  The relevant record includes not just the vast, 
elusive set of indicia of some sort of historically-varying “amendment 
need” and the ratification process surrounding the few proposals Congress 
actually has put to the states for consideration, but also includes the history 
surrounding each of the over eleven thousand amendment proposals that 
have been introduced in Congress.8  Admittedly, then, the relevant 
historical record is too far-flung to engage in a single article through a 
direct historical analysis. 
                                                          
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 365 (1994) (citing comparative data that the U.S. Constitution is the 
second most-difficult to amend).  Rather, I consider the degree to which our amendability 
has matched our expectations or normative views as a varying matter across our history.  
Moreover, since, as detailed below, it is the congressional gate-keeping stage of the process, 
and not the states’ ratification stage, where the history of amendment difficulty most resides, 
I do not focus on ratification difficulty.  Other writers have addressed the historically-
increasing, theoretical difficulty for popular supermajorities to ratify amendments and ease 
for miniscule minorities to block them, due to the addition of states and accompanying 
demographic shifts.  See, e.g., Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional 
Amendments:  Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409 (1986-87) 
(arguing, based on a rich empirical study, that the delicate balance between federalism and 
democracy interests embodied in Article V has been sharply skewed towards federalism by 
demographic patterns the framers did not anticipate). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (presenting the history of the implementation of 
amendments and discussing literature pertaining to the amendment process). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B (reviewing major works on the amendability 
question and analyzing prior studies on this issue). 
 8. See infra Part II.B.2 (providing a historical background of the amendment process). 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
2005] HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY 149 
But I propose we can quickly distill at least a useful overview of the full 
amendability history using indirect means.  To do so, I capitalize on one 
particular benefit of the record’s large size:  that significant patterns 
sometimes can be drawn from large data aggregations with quantifiable 
characteristics, using numerical methods.  Here, I first seize on the 
particularly-accessible tallies of amendments proposed in each Congress.  
Using that data as a beginning framework, I then speculate on the macro-
level historical evolution of the “difficulty” of amendment. 
The methodological lynchpin of this experiment in glimpsing the big 
picture of amendability is my attempt to explain a simple but surprising 
empirical observation.  On first looking at the congressional side of the 
amendability question, I was struck by the number of amendment proposals 
that had been formally introduced, over eleven thousand, compared to the 
very few of those proposals that had passed both houses with the requisite 
two-thirds majority, thirty-three.9  What is more, the total numbers of 
amendments proposed in each Congress did not merely increase over 
congressional history with the size of Congress; there was wide fluctuation 
in numbers from term to term—with a low of just one in the 4th Congress 
(1795-97) and historical high of 773 in the 91st Congress (1969-70). 
Those preliminary empirical observations led immediately to two further 
empirical questions:  Did the total numbers of general bills introduced also 
fluctuate from Congress to Congress so unpredictably?  And if so, were 
there overlapping causes of the erratic patterns of numbers of proposed 
amendments and bills such that their totals, over time, in fact correlated (in 
a statistically significant way)? 
Surprisingly, yes.  Bills, also erratic in frequency, had totals indeed 
related to those for proposed amendments.  That led me to speculations on 
the causes of that phenomenon that, in turn, produced a preliminary theory:  
seven discrete eras of “amendability,” or at least of the history of Congress 
                                                          
 9. The contrast is even starker if we exclude the Bill of Rights and the two initially 
unratified amendments Congress proposed to the states with it (the now Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment and a proposal on the size of the House), since several states had made their 
ratifications of the original Constitution contingent on the immediate adoption of a bill of 
rights.  On that view, the Congress has produced only twenty-three amendments by the 
formal process.  By contrast, the states have exhibited a comparatively-high rate of 
ratification.  Of the thirty-three amendments Congress proposed, the states ratified twenty-
seven. The six left on the table were proposals to control the growth of the size of the House 
of Representatives in a manner more detailed than the Constitution provides (1789), to strip 
citizenship from those receiving foreign titles of nobility (1810), to effectively 
constitutionalize the institution of slavery (the “Corwin Amendment,” 1861), to give 
Congress explicit power to ban child labor (1924), to explicitly extend equal rights to 
women (ERA, 1972), and to confer on the District of Columbia attributes of statehood, 
including representation in the House (1978).  3 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 1787-2001, 1718-19 (John R. Vile ed., 2003) [hereinafter PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS].  For convenience, I have appended a table detailing the dates and subjects of 
the thirty-three amendments proposed by Congress.  See infra App. A. 
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in its amendment gate-keeping capacity. 
For convenience (and roughly related to contemporary political events) I 
call the seven eras the Founding (1791-1812), Antebellum (1813–1858), 
Civil War–Early Reconstruction (1859-1868), Latter Reconstruction–
Gilded Age (1869-1886), Populist–Progressive (1887-1916), Suffrage–
Prohibition (1917-1930), and Modern (1931-2004). 
An idealized graphic may clarify what I have just described.  That is, the 
empirical core of this article explores how one should interpret an 
observation like the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: 
Simplified Correlation Illustration 
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Again, the above graph is idealized to make clear the basic point.  In 
fact, the real variation in the intensities of bill proposing and amendment 
proposing activity from Congress to Congress is not as precisely matched 
as this illustration.  But the real numbers do tend to a close, statistically 
significant match over the entire history of Congress.  What is more, the 
match is strikingly close in particular historical eras and distinctly non-
existent or negative in others. 
My question is why this correlation?  Why, when (1) general 
congressional legislation and proposed amendments are introduced by 
different procedural vehicles (bills and joint resolutions, respectively);10 (2) 
the ranges of topics addressed by bills and proposed amendments overlap 
only partially;11 (3) the general likelihood of success of the two historically 
has varied significantly (if for no other reason than the majority versus two-
thirds vote requirements); and (4) though perceptions of each have changed 
substantially, bills and proposed amendments have always been regarded as 
distinctly different from each other?12  Given all those factors suggesting 
independence between those two spheres of congressional activity, what 
drives the wide variations in total quantities of bills and proposed 
amendments from Congress to Congress to be in sync with each other 
much of the time, but abruptly not so in distinct eras? 
                                                          
 10. See infra Part II.C (discussing the historical evolution of bill introduction 
procedures and the process of joint resolution as the means for proposing amendments). 
 11. See infra Part III.B (characterizing congressional attitude towards the amendment 
process). 
 12. See infra Parts II.A, II.B (presenting the available literature and modern theoretical 
work discussing the amendment process). 
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There had to be some common motivation that could drive members of 
Congress both to introduce bills and to propose amendments, independent 
of their substantive topics, and that when present to a higher degree among 
a significant number of members, unrestrained by prudence or procedure, 
would result in a higher number of bills or proposed amendments and vice 
versa.  I believe the motivation is “grandstanding,” “credit-seeking,” or, in 
the terminology of the political scientist, “careerism.” And the impact of 
careerism on the relationship between bill and amendment proposing 
appears to vary across the seven eras I identify.13 
True, it is suspect to construct this speculation around aggregate 
characteristics, the mere rates at which amendments have been proposed 
from historical Congress to historical Congress.  I do not deny that it is the 
substantive content, legislative history, social goals, and political 
motivations of particular proposals that ultimately will yield a sophisticated 
understanding of the history of attempted formal constitutional change.  
But any manageable study first demands some principled means by which 
researchers can select particular subsets of the proposed amendment data 
for investigating those underlying characteristics. 
That is, the apparent evolution in amendment-proposing history this 
Article infers from a macrospective view may offer points of departure for 
more-particularized future studies.  Here, I (i) examine amendment-
proposing rates over time in comparison with the corresponding rates of 
introduction of general legislation; from which I (ii) distinguish the seven 
distinct historical eras of congressional amendment proposing; and then 
(iii) engage and survey a range of empirical and theoretical sources, in 
history, political science, and legal scholarship that contextualize the 
analysis.  Though my seven-era framework will likely be proved too 
precocious in a later, more-thorough analysis, it is a first vehicle for 
speculation about the empirical evidence.  In essence, this Article is primer 
for the legal scholar on the interdisciplinary and empirical landscape 
framing the amendability analysis.  It knits together relevant but diverse 
sources of data and fields of research. 
Part I briefly overviews (A) the broader theoretical motivations and 
potential implications of the amendability analysis and (B) the numerical 
analysis through which I distinguish seven historical eras of amendment 
proposing.  Part II, on existing literature, then reviews the present 
background of interdisciplinary scholarship from which the analysis 
proceeds.  Part III next develops a theory of the cause of the bill 
introduction–amendment proposing correlation, and Part IV reports the raw 
numerical analysis that “tests” that theory.  That sets the stage for the heart 
                                                          
 13. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing careerism and its effect on congressional behavior). 
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of the article, Part V’s contextual analysis of the seven-era structure yielded 
by that raw numerical analysis.  Alongside the speculations on what the 
numerical analysis says about the evolving character of amendment 
proposing in relation to normal legislation, I include even less grounded 
speculations about a general, mass-psychological congressional attitude 
towards the amendment process in each of the seven congressional eras—
the evolving “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress.”  Finally, after some 
tentative inferences from that analysis in Part VI, the Article concludes 
with recommendations for future researchers including on operationalizing 
“amendment need” and micro-analysis of congressional activity to 
determine and assess responsiveness to that need, or “amendability.” 
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR AMENDABILITY ANALYSIS 
A. Overview of the Broad Theoretical Problematic:  Operationalizing 
“Amendability,” Partially, in Terms of Congressional Gate-Keeping 
This numerical analysis of amendment proposing offers the project of 
constitutional scholarship a framework for exploring a historical question 
most theoretical stances seem to ask, even if only implicitly.14  That is, 
using the patterns and transition points identified here, we can begin to 
evaluate Congress’s fulfillment of the formal gate- keeping role assigned to 
it (in co-tenancy with the inchoate convention process of Article V) by the 
Constitution. 
Congressional gate-keeping, with its two-thirds supermajority threshold, 
was one component of the 1788 adopters’ attempt to temper their own and 
future generations’ immediate popular will.  Itself an “unconstitutional” yet 
necessary act, the Constitution of 1788 sought to remedy the virtual 
immutability of the Articles of Confederation that proceeded it.15  The 
primary mechanism for constitutional change divided the process into two 
stages:  first, congressional approval of a proposed change; then, states’ 
ratification.16 Accordingly, the adopters must have expected the change 
                                                          
 14. See infra Part II.B.3 (providing the arguments made by modern theorists on the role 
of Congress in the amendment-proposal process). 
 15. The Articles of Confederation required unanimity of the states for change.  
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777) (“[No] alteration at any time hereafter [shall] 
be made in any of [the Articles of Confederation]; unless such alteration be agreed to in a 
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every 
State.”). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. V states: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
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mechanism’s first stage, the congressional gate keeping function, to allow 
change proposals to pass to the second stage, decision by the states when 
actually needed.17 
At the same time, the adopters expected that Congress as gatekeeper 
would be responsive to something.  I call that thing “amendment need.”  
Amendment need probably should signify some significant aggregate level 
of desire for change by “the people,” perhaps filtered by congressional 
judgment.18 And it is the level of responsiveness to amendment need, both 
through congressional gate keeping and post-Congress ratification that I 
define here to be the Constitution’s “amendability.” 
Hence, the whole “amendability” question is much broader in scope than 
the focus of this Article.  Not only do I give short shrift to the eleven 
thousand proposed amendments (with each of their full legislative 
histories) as individual entities, only considering their tallies and most-
common subjects; but I also defer theorizing and assessing amendment 
need.19 Ultimately, even amendability is only a part of and draws its 
relevance from a broader theoretical question:  How closely, over history, 
has the amendability quotient matched expectations or demands deemed 
relevant by political theory (and which political theory is important)? 
A few quick assumptions, easily discredited for their simplicity, 
nonetheless illustrate the relationship among the components raised by that 
broadest question:  Suppose (i) amendment need is determined by the 
                                                          
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that 
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
I focus on the first alternative for proposing amendments—Congress—since the convention 
method has never been invoked. The convention method was, however, close to invocation 
in the 1960s in response to Supreme Court reapportionment decisions and more recently to 
call for a national balanced budget amendment.  John R. Vile, American Views of the 
Constitutional Amending Process:  An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 44, 63 (1991).  But a fear of a potentially unwieldy and unlimited process has inspired 
writers to argue against the convention method throughout our history.  See id. at 54, 56-57, 
63-65 (presenting arguments made by different writers, including judges, senators, and law 
professors, pertaining to the failure to adopt constitutional changes through conventions). 
 17. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that there was no expectation that congressional gate 
keeping would be a significant impediment to constitutional change). 
 18. In one sense, the supermajority rules of the gate keeping role suggest that Congress 
was not intended to be a simple conduit of raw popular will.  However, the parallel 
provision for an amending convention to arise from the call of two thirds of the states 
suggests that the intent may have been just that. 
 19. The era-by-era, contextual historical analysis of Part V infra does, however, 
acknowledge at least the most obvious arguable indicia of amendment need, those very few 
instances that gave rise to amendment proposals that succeeded in Congress.  More difficult 
to theorize are criteria to identify amendment need in other circumstances.  Probably the 
most popular candidate for a particular instance of that is the Supreme Court’s initial 
resistance to New Deal legislation, discussed in the Modern era analysis.  See infra Part 
V.G. 
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understanding of it by the adopters,20 whose thinking was uniform with the 
thinking of, say, Alexander Hamilton; (ii) Hamilton thought that any time a 
majority of the voting citizenry in each of three-fourths of the states 
supported a constitutional change,21 Congress would present them with a 
proposed amendment;22 (iii) throughout our history, there had been several 
hundred instances rising to that level of popular support for constitutional 
change on discrete topics; and (iv) Congress had, nonetheless, proposed 
only thirty-three amendments. Then Congress would have been not very 
responsive to amendment need, hence making amendability low, which 
would be contrary to the adopters’ expectations of high amendability. 
Again, the extent to which that hypothetical represents the best theory of 
amendment need, the actual understanding and expectations of the ratifiers, 
the actual subsequent history of popular support for change, and, perhaps 
most importantly, the relevance of ratifiers’ expectations compared to those 
of subsequent political entities defines areas for deeper research and 
theory.23 
B.  Overview of the Numerical Analysis:                                                      
Seven Eras of Amendment Proposing Distinguished 
The justification for my methodology in this initial look towards 
amendability is this:  having first concluded that any reckoning of the 
difficultly of formal amendment must compare the hard-to-operationalize 
quality of amendment need with the corresponding response under Article 
V, I next assume that some initial analysis of Article V activity in general 
will likely provide insights into what that activity is responding to, and 
hence, how to later operationalize amendment need itself.  The 
congressional role, rather than the chronologically, and causally-precedent 
circumstances to which these proposals in Congress respond, is the more 
empirically-accessible at the outset.24 
While the more than eleven thousand amendments proposed to the 
United States Constitution have evaded comprehensive analysis at any 
level, I conclude that a macrospective view of them can yield the type of 
useful insights that often inhere in large data aggregations.  What emerges 
here are discernible patterns in the history of congressional attitudes on the 
                                                          
 20. Alone, this is a controversial and originalist assumption. 
 21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 22. Article V, in turn, on this view then provided some wiggle room:  only two-thirds, 
not three-fourths, of each house of Congress had to pass the proposed amendment. 
 23. I also do not take a position here on the relevance of such a determination to 
constitutional theory, if any. 
 24. The focus here is primarily on congressional activity because that is where almost 
all the Article V action lies, since there have been no amendment proposals through the 
Article V alternative convention proposing mechanism that bypasses Congress. 
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practice of amendment-proposing. 
As detailed in Part III, I posit that responsiveness to amendment need 
can be operationalized in terms of congressional use of the amendment 
process as a political or policy tool; that, in turn, can be evidenced in part 
by the relationship between the aggregate character of normal legislative 
bill proposing, on the one hand, and the aggregate character of amendment 
proposing activity (via “joint resolutions” similar to bills), on the other.  
Then, using the number of amendment attempts for each Congress, I 
outline an evolution of the independence of the aggregate level of 
enthusiasm for amendment proposing from Congress’s level of enthusiasm 
for more-general legislative activity.  I call that concept “motivation 
independence,” for now.25  Its converse, which emerges in the Latter 
Reconstruction–Gilded Age era and dominates in the Modern era, I call 
“promiscuous careerism.”  Finally, I examine how patterns and variability 
in motivation independence versus promiscuous careerism relate to 
contextual historical data that will likely bear most on the amendability 
question. 
Again, the way I explore motivation independence in these data may 
seem far too superficial.  I merely compare trends in quantity of 
amendments proposed from Congress to Congress numerically with trends 
in quantity of general legislative bills proposed during those Congresses.  
Any congressional fool can (now26) toss a bill in the hopper, some might 
say, so why should these aggregate numbers matter? 
But the value of bill sponsorship quantities as an indicator of the 
character of legislative motivation already has currency in political science.  
For instance, Wendy Schiller argued the relevance of these data in a 1995 
study of the Senate: 
Because so few bills actually become law, one might question the worth 
of any study of bill sponsorship.  In contrast to the vast amount of 
knowledge that exists about legislators and roll-call voting . . ., few 
works seek to explain the choices legislators make when building their 
agendas.  Unlike roll-call voting, where senators face a predetermined 
set of alternatives they had no part in shaping, bill sponsorship is under 
the control of the individual legislator.  As such, a study of bill 
sponsorship provides a rich source of information about how legislators 
interact with their institutions when there appears to be few rules to limit 
their behavior.27 
                                                          
 25. In this Article, I use loose, tentative definitions for discussion.  Later in the 
development of this theory, the definitions will become more analytic. 
 26. But see infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the difficulty of member bill introduction in 
earlier historical eras). 
 27. Wendy J. Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs:  Using Bill Sponsorship to 
Shape Legislative Agendas, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 186-87 (1995) (omitting Schillers’s 
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And the value of my much broader—that is, collective (aggregate), 
longitudinal, bicameral, and comparative,28 use of quantitative sponsorship 
data is the identification of what seem to be seven qualitatively distinct eras 
of amendment proposing activity spanning the history of Congress (at least 
for purpose of discussing a problematic). 
Artificial as it may seem on its own, this empirical analysis may provide 
an important counterbalance to our current, generally non-empirical 
(though sometimes narratively and theoretically rich) understandings.  For 
the period following the Founding and through the early twentieth century, 
we generally have only sparse sources of information about several 
important variables in the amendability equation.  Those variables include, 
for instance, (i) the general motivations and decision calculus of 
congresspersons in the sponsorship of and voting on proposed 
amendments, (ii) their perceptions of amendment need and likelihood of 
amendment success, and (iii) their views of constitutional meaning and the 
role of the amendment process.29  Our understanding is limited to 
(i) statements by individual congresspersons of either their own 
perspectives or their assessments of the views of their colleagues and (ii) 
limited, contemporary assessments by historians or political partisans.30  
Those sources are problematic not only in the potential that they are not 
sufficiently representative, but also because human beings, even experts 
drawing conclusions in their specific fields of study, are notoriously bad in 
assessing patterns and relationships and making appropriate inferences.  
Studies since the 1960s have empirically verified a pervasive tendency of 
the human mind both to fail to recognize existing associative relationships 
in data sets and to believe in the existence of relationships that do not, in 
fact, exist.31  (This is not indictment of the sophisticated, systematic 
                                                          
footnote one: “In the 99th Congress, only 236 of 2,638 public bills became law. In the 100th 
Congress, only 300 of 2,772 public bills became law.”). 
 28. By contrast, Schiller’s study looks at individual member bill totals, over just two 
Congresses, for just the Senate, and not compared to sponsorship of legislative devices other 
than bills.  Id. at 187 n.2. 
 29. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Parts II.A, II.B (describing the limited works produced in this area). 
 31. See generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 97 (1980) (providing, in more technical terms, the 
findings of several empirical psychological studies where “reported covariation was shown 
to reflect true covariation far less than it reflected theories or preconceptions of the nature of 
the associations that ‘ought’ to exist.  Unexpected, true covariations can sometimes be 
detected, but they will be underestimated and are likely to be noticed only when the 
covariation is very strong, and the relevant data set excludes ‘decoy features’ that bring into 
play popular but incorrect theories.”).  Nisbett and Ross explain that those phenomena owe 
to a variety of limitations in the human observational and inferential faculties:  “Objects or 
events are judged as frequent, probable, or casually efficacious to the extent that they are 
readily ‘available’ in memory . . . . By default, more vivid information is more likely to 
enter inferential processes than is less vivid information . . . [ which is] dangerous because 
the vividness of information is normally related only obliquely at best to its true value as 
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techniques of modern historians and political scientists but, rather, a 
recognition of the potential unreliability of some of the sources upon which 
they must rely.)  Hence, the potential value of examining the amendability 
data systematically:  it may either reveal the existence of large-scale 
patterns that have gone unobserved or unreported or debunk as false some 
general perceptions and claims about what was going on at various points 
in our history. 
In brief, from that empirical analysis I preliminarily conclude that if the 
oscillation between motivation independence and promiscuous careerism 
over the seven eras hints at any broad trend, it is that amendment proposing 
activity has gone from a generally “seriousminded,” policy-oriented 
approach in the Founding era to a norm of grandstanding in the present 
Modern era (beginning around 1931), through a series of distinct 
intervening historical stages with anomalies that independently merit 
further study. 
Moreover, combining additional numerical data with historians’ 
assessments of typical or aggregate psychological attitudes in Congress, 
concerning the likelihood of success of proposed amendments or prudential 
reverence towards the Constitution and the process itself, I am able to 
speculate about the evolution of the Zeitgeist of amendability32 in 
Congress. 
It seems the Founding and Modern eras represent opposite extremes in 
the Zeitgeist of amendability; but the path between them was not a steady 
descent.  In the Founding era (1791-1812), there was a high degree of 
optimism about the likelihood of success of amendments combined with a 
strong prudential reverence for the amendment process that suppressed the 
                                                          
evidence.”  Id. at 7-8.  Moreover, “[p]reexisting knowledge structures influence unduly, and 
often without the individual’s awareness, the characterization of the event.  [And] [i]n 
characterizing samples, the lay scientist usually is at the mercy of the sample of events that 
can be retrieved from memory.” Id. at 9.  Finally, in attempting to generalize from 
observations in the sample to the population as a whole, individuals often have little 
understanding of the importance of the sample size and its freedom from bias.  Id.; see also 
Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and The Law of Torts:  The 
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 627 (1988) (“More than two 
decades of research establishes that people making decisions—whether laymen or 
scientists—consistently make gross errors in evaluating objective information.”).  The 
general defects in human inference documented by those modern studies have long been 
observed anecdotally:  “It is evident that when the instances on one side of a question are 
more likely to be remembered and recorded than those on the other, especially if there be 
any strong motive to preserve the memory of the first, but not of the latter, these last are 
likely to be over-looked, and escape the observations of the mass of mankind.”  JOHN 
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC:  RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 585 (People’s ed., 
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1896) (1843).  “[P]opular induction depends upon the emotional 
interest of the instances, not upon their number.”  BERTRAND RUSSELL, PHILOSOPHY 269 
(1927). 
 32. See infra Part III.B (setting forth the theory of the Zeitgeist of amendability in 
Congress). 
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pace of amendment proposing.33  There is little evidence of abuse of the 
amendment process for purely credit-seeking purposes at that time.34  
Moving into the Antebellum era (1813-1858), both the perceived likelihood 
of success and the reverence for the process diminish, to some degree, 
though they persist at moderate levels relative to the entire congressional 
history.35  The path of diminution then continues through and beyond the 
(sui generis) Civil War era into the Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age era 
(1869-1886).36  Aided by the great easing of procedural constraints on 
individual bill proposing, that era, like the Modern era, is marked by both a 
dim assessment of the likelihood of success of amendments and a low 
degree of reverence for the amendment process.  Here as well, an easing of 
constraints on individual bill sponsorship allows credit seeking to first 
emerge in full form, creating a prominent culture of “promiscuous 
careerism” in Congress.37 
But the dual decline in assessment of success and reverence for the 
process abates for a time.  On the one hand, due to the century-long gap in 
amendments by the normal (non-Civil-War) means, the view of likelihood 
of success does continue its own decline and reach a historical low in the 
next, Populist–Progressive era (1887-1916).  However, reverence for the 
amendment process substantially revives in that era.  Moreover, credit 
seeking remits, so that bill and amendment proposing return to more 
independent and serious-minded endeavors.  Then, with the rapid 
congressional-passage and ratification successes of a number of 
amendments, the Suffrage-Prohibition era (1917-1930) sees a peak in the 
assessment of likelihood of success of amendments, though the reverence 
for the process begins to decline again.38 
Ultimately, though, with the Modern era (1931-present), the pessimistic 
irreverence first seen in the Latter Reconstruction, Gilded Age era 
reemerges in full force and congeals into what appears to be the current, 
seemingly-permanent, static Zeitgeist of amendability, of which I presume 
most readers have a general sense. 
                                                          
 33. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part V.A (discussing the likelihood of careerist motivations in the 
amendment process during the Founding and Modern eras). 
 35. See infra Part V.B (examining court decisions that serve as evidence of the lack of 
promiscuous careerism). 
 36. See discussion infra Part V.C (explaining that the short duration of this era 
contributed to motivation independence in the amendment process). 
 37. See infra Part V.D (asserting that promiscuous careerism appeared in this era 
mainly due to the lesser impediments in bill introduction and the topic overlap in 
amendment proposals). 
 38. See infra Part V.F (concluding that this era demonstrates that motivation 
independence may dominate a congressional era even after the historical emergence of 
promiscuous careerism). 
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II.  THE SPARSE EXISTING LITERATURE RELATED TO AMENDABILITY 
My analysis places the numerical findings into the context of our current 
multi-disciplinary understanding of the amendability of the Constitution.  
Amendability has not comprehensively been addressed by any single 
discipline or line of analysis, but, rather, has been touched on in different 
ways from several scholarly perspectives.  Two categories of scholarship 
directly implicate amendability:  (1) proposed amendment scholarship and (2) 
constitutional theory.  A third category, the analysis of Congress done by 
political scientists, explains the character of and identifies trends in the 
general congressional data that this Article compares with amendment-
proposing activity.  Though law, history, and political science in the 
aggregate have already produced a substantial body of work on amendment 
proposing activity that implicates amendability, scholars in those 
disciplines have not considered the macro-level analysis derived from the 
variations in the frequency of attempts to amend the Constitution over time 
I present here. 
While I draw from proposed amendment scholarship, congressional 
analysis, and legal theory separately, all three are critical to the 
amendability question.  Each provides unique insights as well as defects 
remedied by the others.  For instance, the dispersion of expertise finds that 
the two most prominent modern proposed amendment scholars are a 
political scientist, John Vile, and a historian, David Kyvig.39  By contrast, 
while there has been a recent flurry of activity in legal commentary 
regarding the amending process, legal scholars virtually ignore the 
proposed amendment history.  They focus, rather, on the successful 
amendments and alternatives to the formal amendment process, Bruce 
Ackerman and Akhil Amar being representative of the alternative-forms-
of-amendment camp.40 
To assess amendability in its full scope, however, the three disciplines 
(and perhaps more) must be codependent.  Legal scholarship, to the extent 
it has touched on the area, lacks several analytical components:  (i) a 
historical narrative of the type Kyvig provides, (ii) understanding of 
Congress as a sophisticated institution and of the primary sources of 
proposed amendments, general congressional activity, and the non-judicial 
indicia of amendment need, and (iii) savvy with the numerical methods 
routinely employed by political scientists.  And while this inquiry is 
                                                          
 39. See infra Part II.A (presenting in detail the work of these two scholars). 
 40. See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend:  Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 155 (1996-97) (providing an extensive comparative summary and critique of 
Ackerman’s, Amar’s, and others’ non-formal amendment theories through the mid-1990s).  
In opposing the lack of reverence for the formal amending process espoused by those 
current legal theorists, Vile and Kyvig are monolithic in their conservatism.  In this Article, 
I attempt to be more agnostic. 
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historical at its core, history also tends to lack the understanding of the 
behavior of Congress as a political institution on the micro and macro level 
and sophistication of inquiry into the quantitative data known to the 
political scientist.  Finally, completing the circle, political science and 
history often seem less suited to framing the inquiry into amendability 
demanded by constitutional theory as deftly as the legal scholar.41 
A.  Proposed Amendment Scholarship 
Proposed amendment scholarship is comprised mostly by the work of 
just three scholars:  two historians and a political scientist.  At least until 
David Kyvig’s 1996 treatise on the history of attempted amendment,42 
modern proposed amendment scholarship was sparse and eclectic at best.  
The limited nature of the canon in this area has probably derived from the 
limitations of the data sources for proposed amendments themselves.43  As 
law librarian Thomas E. Heard lamented in 1992, except for some rare 
exceptions where scholars have compiled proposed amendments in a small 
subject area, “[a]s long as proposed amendments remain scattered through 
the vast and unwieldy compilations of House and Senate bills and are 
accessible only through relatively obscure indexes of varying quality, it 
will be difficult to determine accurately their utility as tools in legal, 
historical, and social sciences research.”44  The analysis of this Article 
provides some structure for determining which portions of that difficult 
data set most merit further examination. 
Prior to Kyvig, Ohio State University Professor Herman V.  Ames’s 
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 1789-
188945 had been the standard in proposed amendment scholarship, and 
several scholars had attempted to extend his project into contemporary 
times.46  In addition to cataloguing the approximately 1700 proposed 
amendments introduced in Congress during its first 100 years, amendment 
                                                          
 41. For example, in his review of Kyvig’s 1996 book, DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND 
AUTHENTIC ACTS:  AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 (1996), Professor 
Chemerinsky uses the deep insights and historical knowledge he acknowledges Kyvig 
provides to more-directly frame the type of theoretical questions that motivate this article.  
Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561 (1998) (book 
review).  See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 42. KYVIG, supra note 41. 
 43. See Thomas E. Heard, Proposed Constitutional Amendments as a Research Tool:  
The Example of Prohibition, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 499 (1992) (discussing the format and 
availability of proposed amendments and using the national prohibition as an example). 
 44. Id. at 508. 
 45. HERMAN V. AMES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1889 (1897) (originally published as 2 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1896, having been awarded the best monograph prize by the 
association in 1895). 
 46. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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by amendment, Ames wrote about the broader trends and eras he observed.  
Specifically, he determined that amendment proposals in the first 100 years 
of the Constitution naturally fell into four distinct periods:  (1) 1789-1803:  
perfecting the details;47 (2) 1803-1860:  general alterations;48 (3) 1860-
1870:  slavery and reconstruction;49 and (4) 1870-1889:  general 
emendations.50 
Reviewing the full span of the first 100 years, Ames observed:  “The 
prospect of almost certain failure does not seem to have diminished the 
number of amendments offered.  In recent years there has been a gradual 
increase in the number presented.”51 Specifically, “[d]uring the fourth 
period there were over four hundred distinct propositions introduced, and in 
the 50th Congress forty-eight resolutions, proposing amendments on 
twenty different subjects, were presented.”52  Ames charged future 
generations of scholars with the study of proposed amendments as a 
window to contemporary popular feeling and political theory that will 
enhance our understanding of constitutional history.53 
                                                          
 47. Ames described the Bill of Rights as a response to “the spirit of dissatisfaction” 
expressed by the 124 amendments proposed immediately following ratification and general 
demand to further limit the power of federal government over the states.  The other thrust of 
proposals focused on correcting minor problems regarding the judiciary and electoral 
system, exemplified by the 11th and 12th amendments.  AMES, supra note 45, at 19. 
 48. In the next period, General Alterations (1804-1860), spanning more than half the 
100 years he studied, Ames identified the most numerous propositions to be changes in the 
election, term, removal, compensation, and duties of members of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial departments.  Id. at 19-22. 
Other common amendment topics during this time were presidential election, term and 
veto power and abolition of slavery. But other than the slavery issue, there were very few 
amendments dealing with relationship between federal government and individuals; Ames 
attributes that to dissatisfaction in this area having been allayed by Bill of Rights.  Id. at 10-
22. 
 49. The third period of Slavery and Reconstruction (1860) saw a reversal:  after the 
war, “amendments relating to the legal status of individuals, which had previously been of 
the least, now became of the greatest importance.”  Id. at 23. 
 50. In the last two decades of the first century, Ames notes that proposed amendment 
activity lapsed back into the generality of the beginning of our constitutional government.  
Two significant classes of proposals dominated:  changes in the form of government and 
government powers.  Changes in the form of government included the choice, term, 
composition, and duties of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  Powers of 
government proposals in Ames’s mind evinced a drift toward paternalism, limiting powers 
of Congress, protecting the civil and political rights of the individual, and correcting social 
and political abuses.  Id. at 24. 
 51. Id. at 25. 
 52. Id. 
 53.  
The detailed examination of the proposed amendments which follows shows that 
the importance of these propositions does not lie in their influence in effecting 
actual changes within the Constitution merely, but that they are indices of the 
movements to effect a change, and to a large degree show the waves of popular 
feeling and reflect the political theories of the time.  It is believed that a study of 
the efforts to amend the Constitution will contribute to a fuller and clearer 
understanding of our history, both constitutional and political. 
Id. at 25 . 
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But no one since Ames had matched his model with all its 
comprehensiveness, depth, and detail.  Rather, a series of scholars 
continued the counting and cataloguing, to some degree, for the period after 
the Constitution of 1788’s first hundred years.54 
In recent years, political scientist John Vile had been the most pure 
chronicler, in the Ames model, of proposed amendments.  His Encyclopedia 
of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendment, and Amending Issues, 
1789-200255 contains a great deal of data tabulated in the appendices, upon 
which, along with his article on intellectual history56 and other writings, I 
have relied substantially for this Article. 
Kyvig’s subsequent work, however, provided a powerful historical 
narrative beyond all that preceded it.  As legal historian Kermit Hall has 
observed, 
[i]t covers the sweep of the American constitutional experience, treating 
not only the history of the twenty-seven amendments made to the 
nation’s organic law but the most important of the more than 10,000 
proposed amendments.  Kyvig is sensitive to the politics of constitutional 
amendment without reducing its history to a simple narrative of political 
wrangling.  The result is a study that fits the Article V amending process 
to issues of federalism, popular sovereignty, and, to a lessor extent, 
separation of powers.57 
A primary weakness of Kyvig’s work for my purposes, however, is found 
in the emphasized portion of Hall’s critique above:  Kyvig is selective, 
focusing “only on those unratified amending proposals that he thinks had 
widespread congressional support.”58 And despite (or perhaps because of) 
my extensive reliance on Kyvig for this Article, I add two criticisms. 
First, he seems to blur the distinction between gate keeping and 
ratification in his assessments of how easy or hard it was to attain 
amendments at various points in our history.  He often skips past the gate 
                                                          
 54. For instance, M.A. Mussmano expressly stated he was furthering Ames’s work, but 
does not attempt the scope of Ames’s general observations or narrative.  M.A. MUSMANNO, 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1928 (1929) 
(subtitled “A Monograph on the Resolutions Introduced in Congress Proposing 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America”).  Other compilation 
contributions covering 1889 through 2001—published as House, Senate, or Congressional 
Research Service documents and at most providing a few words of topical description but 
not a narrative in the vein of Ames—are reprinted in the three volume compendium edited 
by Professor Vile.  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 9. 
 55. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002 (2003). 
 56. Vile, supra note 16. 
 57. Kermit L. Hall & David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts:  Amending the U.S. 
Constitution, 1776-1995, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 487, 487 (1997) (book review) (emphasis 
added). 
 58. John Vile, Explicit and Authentic Acts, By David Kyvig, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 416, 
419 (1997) (book review). 
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keeping issue and discusses the difficulty of ratification.  But with only 
thirty-three proposals coming out of Congress, it is very difficult to say 
what would not have been ratifiable.  Only six in over two hundred years 
have failed to be ratified, for a 27/33 ratification rate, which seems fairly 
high compared to, for instance the 33/11,000 passage rate of Congress.  
Moreover, even the few proposals approved by Congress have yielded 
some real ratification surprises, such as the quick ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment authorizing the income tax and the failure of the 
Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”). 
Second, it is not clear by what standard Kyvig operationalizes 
amendment need.  Kyvig’s historical narrative may be the key and perhaps 
even the core to understanding the need for amendments at various points 
in our history, but it is certainly not the end of the story.  For instance, what 
is the popular will component of amendment need?  While not addressing it 
comprehensively, Kyvig does periodically refer to it.  For example, he 
observes that in the 1960s, “direct election [e.g., abolition of the electoral 
college], according to public opinion surveys, was the most widely 
approved amendment proposal of the era.”59 
I discuss the operationalization of amendment need further at the end of 
the Article. 
B.  Constitutional Theory 
A thorough exposition of original understandings, the intellectual history 
of Article V, and modern constitutional theory both exceed the constraints 
of a single article and are well covered elsewhere in comparison to the core 
of my analysis here.  Accordingly, I make only brief observations about the 
high amendability expectations of the adopters, examples of evolving 
perspectives in the intervening intellectual history, and the scant direct 
attention to the issues I raise in modern theoretical works. 
1.  Adopters 
The amending process was not much discussed in the Convention itself, 
and Article V embodies compromise on the central debate concerning it; 
whether the Congress or the states were best to propose amendments.60 
A major selling point to the ratifying conventions, in order to forestall 
the opponents’ attempts to invoke changes to the plan of the convention 
                                                          
 59. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 393. 
 60. See Vile, supra note 16, at 48 (affirming that the topic of amending the Constitution 
was not discussed extensively at the Constitutional Convention); see also U.S. CONST. art. V 
(providing that “[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments . . . .”). 
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prior to ratification (or previous amendments), was that subsequent 
amendments could easily be attained under Article V if particular aspects 
of the scheme proved unworkable or undesirable.  For example, in 
attempting to convince the New York delegation, Hamilton wrote:  
“whenever . . . ten states [i.e., three-fourths of the original thirteen] were 
united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must 
infallibly take place.”61  That suggests (i) there was no expectation that 
congressional gate keeping would be a significant impediment to 
constitutional change; (ii) at least in the Constitution’s early years, 
proposed amendments would frequently issue from Congress for states’ 
ratification; and (iii) a requisite three-fourths of states frequently would 
ratify amendments proposed by Congress.  That congressional gate keeping 
was not expected to be an impediment is seen in the Anti-Federalist 
argument that the process would be too difficult, focusing on the difficulty 
in getting three-fourths of the states to ratify.62 
It would then seem that history has disappointed the expectations of the 
adopters with regard to congressional gate keeping at least in the early 
years.  On the other hand, the states have indeed frequently ratified the 
proposals they have received from Congress.63 
To be clear, to suggest that Congress’s gate keeping role has been far 
more stringent than expected is not to conclude the adopters also expected 
reckless constitutional mutation.  Certainly Madison’s goal in offering the 
structure of Article V was to achieve a process with some restraint.64  But 
an assessment of the degree to which the ratifiers shared that view of the 
meaning of the language used is, again, complicated by the fact that some 
were selling the new Constitution as acceptable because it was easy to 
amend. 
                                                          
 61. FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).  Similarly, a delegate to the Connecticut 
convention assuaged concerns about particular problems in the Constitution by noting that 
Article V “proves a remedy for whatever defects it may have . . . .  This is an easy and 
peaceable way of amending any parts of the Constitution which may be found inconvenient 
in practice.”  DEBATES OF THE CONNECTICUT CONVENTION (Jan. 9, 1788) (statement of 
Delegate Richard Law), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 200 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836-1845). 
 62. See Vile, supra note 16, at 49 (citing a speech by Patrick Henry to the Virginia 
ratifying convention). 
 63. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions:  The Legality and Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 262 (1996) (contrasting 
the over seventy percent ratification rate for amendments sent from Congress to the states 
with the arguably much more difficult, preceding stage in the process—“getting the 
amendment off Capitol Hill”). 
 64. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 40, at 158 (arguing that “efficiency, if it means ‘easy’ 
change, was not a goal of Article V’s principle architect, James Madison.  Rather, this 
formal amending process was meant [by Madison] to ensure that constitutional changes are 
imbued with stability and legitimacy”). 
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2.  Intervening intellectual history 
Professor Vile’s article on intellectual history65 discusses evolving 
historical views on a variety of Article V topics.  He chronicles writings 
and statements from the colonial to modern periods on normative aspects of 
amendability, the efficacy of Article V, constitutional interpretation as an 
alternative to formal change, revision of Article V itself, proposed 
amendment topics and movements, proposals to rewrite the entire 
Constitution, and most prominently, the convention alternative for 
proposing amendments.66  Drawing from Vile and other sources, I focus 
here on evolving views of amendment difficulty in particular and the 
degree to which the discourse has divided that question into separate 
consideration of its components:  amendment need, congressional gate 
keeping, and ratification.  In sum, after the Founding era and through the 
Modern era, the sparse commentary relevant to amendability seems to track 
the generally declining path of the perceived likelihood of success of 
proposed amendments.  From a high point in the Founding Era (described 
above), perceptions of likelihood of success declined to a low point in the 
Populist-Progressive era, briefly and dramatically reversed following the 
success of amendments in the Suffrage-Prohibition era, and then declined 
again to the present pessimism.67 
As early as 1803, Justice Marshall seems to have viewed amendment as 
particularly difficult, but appropriately so and justification for broad 
judicial construction.68  And his view of amendment difficulty had perhaps 
deepened thirty years later when he would describe the “unwieldy and 
cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of 
congress, and the assent of three-fourths of [the] states . . . .”69 
That Marshallian sense of amendment difficulty became increasingly 
widespread as the nineteenth century wore on with no amendment 
production from Congress or invocation of the convention method.  
Following the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 180470 and the 
passage of the Titles of Nobility amendment by Congress in 1810,71 no 
amendments were proposed by Congress or ratified by the states until the 
Corwin Amendment was proposed in 1861.72  And already in 1823, 
                                                          
 65. Vile, supra note 16. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See infra Part V (discussing the relevant congressional eras). 
 68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The exercise of this original right [of 
the people to establish principles of government that ‘conduce to their happiness’] is a very 
great exertion, nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.”). 
 69. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). 
 70. See App. A (providing a table of all the amendments provided by Congress for 
ratification). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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Jefferson would lament that “[t]he States are now so numerous that I 
despair of ever seeing another amendment to the Constitution, although 
innovations of time will certainly call and already call, for some.”73 
Perhaps owing both to the fifty-year drought of amendment proposals 
and the single-issue polarization of congressional politics, by the time of 
the Civil War a preference for trying the convention over the congressional 
method was expressed in diverse corners.  It was preferred by as divergent 
parties as Lincoln, who argued for it in his first inaugural address, and the 
Confederacy, whose constitution called for state conventions to propose 
amendments.74  Reflecting the apparent view that Article V posed too high 
a bar for amendment proposing, the Confederate Constitution required only 
three states to require its Congress to call a convention for proposing 
amendments (which would become effective upon ratification by only two-
thirds of the states).75  But following the reconstitution of the political 
dynamics in Congress and the success of the Civil War Amendments—by 
the congressional method, favor for the convention method gave way to the 
more prevalent fear of its open-ended nature. 
The Civil War Amendments, however, were generally viewed as sui 
generis and did not rehabilitate the perceived unlikelihood of success of 
other formal constitutional reforms.76 
A more potent intellectual phenomenon, however, arose at that time:  the 
intensification of popular and scholarly interest in constitutionalism in 
general surrounding the centennials, in the 1870s and 1880s, of American 
independence and the Constitution of 1788.77  That, coupled with the 
successful and serious experience with amendment proposals in the Civil 
War Amendments, fed a revival of reverence for the Constitution and 
amendment process.78 
But even as the glow of constitutional reverence peaked towards its 
centennial, attention turned toward the extreme difficulty of amendment79 
and remained there through the early twentieth century.  This sense 
                                                          
 73. Letter to George Hay, supra note 2. 
 74. Vile, supra note 16, at 54-55. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 55 (asserting that the existing constitutional structure at the time of the Civil 
War could not have effected the needed constitutional changes). 
 77. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 188 (“Americans referred to the Constitution as ‘the 
Ark of the Covenant,’ Independence Hall as ‘the holiest spot of American earth,’ and 
visitors to it as ‘pilgrims’ . . . .”). 
 78. See id. (“Reconstruction left many Americans believing that all major constitutional 
problems had been solved. Moreover, the emergency worshipful attitude toward the 
Constitution fostered resistance to any notion that it might deserve further reform.”). 
 79. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 3, at 242 (“It would seem that no impulse short of 
self-preservation; no force less than the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to 
move the cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article V.  That must be a 
tremendous movement which can sway two-thirds of each house of Congress and the people 
of three-fourths the states.”). 
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prompted academic discussion of the propriety of constitutional change by 
judicial interpretation, such as Christopher Tiedman’s 1890 The Unwritten 
Constitution of the United States, though Tiedman’s more particular goal 
seems to have been to ensure “judges do their best to read laissez-faire 
economic doctrines into the Constitution and to assure the protection of 
capitalistic rights under the broad rubric of substantive due process.”80  
Along with advocacy of expansive judicial interpretation came calls to 
formally amend Article V itself.  Typical81 was Herbert Croly’s advocacy, 
in a 1914 book, for the adoption of a plan by Senator La Follete where 
amendments proposed only by a majority of both houses of Congress, or by 
one-fourth of the states, would be adopted by ratification of only a majority 
of the states.82 
Fighting such calls to alter Article V, a 1915 article by Joseph Long83 
exhibits the still-high intellectual reverence for the process at a major 
transition point in the congressional dynamic, when optimism about 
success is about to make its upswing.84  Long’s acknowledged target in the 
article was the movement to amend Article V to make the amendment 
process easier.  His main argument was that the recent success of the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth amendments had overcome the longstanding 
opinion that amendments had become “practically impossible under 
ordinary circumstances . . . .”85  But why, if the Constitution in fact was 
relatively easy to amend, had there been no amendment through the normal 
(non-Civil War) process in a century?  Long suggests that amendment need 
was low and amendment proposing consisted mainly of imprudent credit-
seeking:  many of the proposals introduced in Congress were merely 
repetitious of other topics; many of those topics were not serious and of a 
trivial character better left to general legislation; and for those reasons, very 
few of the proposals had sufficient merit to reach a vote in Congress.86  
                                                          
 80. Vile, supra note 16, at 58 (citing CHRISTOPHER TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON THE 
LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1971 reprint of 1886 ed.)). 
 81. Id. at 59. 
 82. HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 231 (The Macmillan Co. 1914) (1909). 
 83. Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573 (1915). 
 84. See id. at 578 (concluding that the Constitution can be peaceably amended in the 
constitutional process). 
 85. Id. at 576 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 62 
(1912)).  Also noting Woodrow Wilson’s 1885 lament about Article V, Long observes that 
“[t]hese expressions are fairly representative of the opinion of students of constitutional 
history a few years ago.”  Id. 
 86. Id. at 578-79.  Writing at the end of the Populist–Progressive era when the 
frequency of general legislation introduced in Congress reached its historical peak, see infra 
tbl.5, Long notes surprise at the comparatively low number of amendments being proposed 
at that time.  Long, supra note 83, at 574.  As set forth in Part V.E, infra, I conclude that 
may have been due to the relatively-high degree of “prudential reverence” in the 
congressional Zeitgeist of amendability at that time, which Long may not have been able to 
see from his perspective. 
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While there had been periods of unrest suggesting apparent amendment 
need, after those “temporary conditions” disappeared the Constitution was 
found “adequate as it stood.”87 
As a normative matter for Long, the relative stability of the federal 
Constitution was a happy contrast to the mutability and increasing prolixity 
of state constitutions, which had “long since ceased to be constitutions in a 
true sense.”88  Long gushed his reverence for the federal constitution, 
“justly regarded as the greatest government ever ordained by man,” and set 
a high threshold of amendment need:  absolute necessity, meaning the end 
could not be accomplished by other means.89  Amendments were especially 
unnecessary if they could be accomplished by state action or if they dealt in 
code-like, legislative details, in contrast to the Constitution, which spoke in 
“generals.”90  Among the ends better suited to state action were two 
contemporarily-prominent proposed amendment topics (that perhaps were 
the secondary target of Long’s article):  women’s suffrage and 
prohibition.91  Perhaps because he considered the degree of difficulty of 
constitutional amendment to be appropriate, nothing in Long’s work 
suggests the existence or legitimacy of non-formal constitutional change. 
Long’s analysis of amendability suffers from the same failing I have 
noted in the work of some modern scholars:  it does not sufficiently 
scrutinize Congress’s gatekeeping role.  In judging responsiveness to 
amendment need, Long notes that both the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Amendments had been ratified very quickly after passing Congress, within 
four years and twelve months, respectively.92  By contrast, it had taken 
Congress fourteen years to propose the Sixteenth Amendment to the states, 
following the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the income tax in 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,93 and eighty-seven years for the 
Seventeenth amendment since direct election of Senators was first 
proposed in Congress.94  But Long is dismissive of those delays:  “time is 
inevitably required to develop a sentiment in favor of a proposed change.”95 
As I conclude in Part V, though optimism about likelihood of success of 
amendments peaked during the next era, Suffrage-Prohibition (1917-1930), 
                                                          
 87. Long, supra note 83, at 579. 
 88. Id. at 580. 
 89. Id. at 581. 
 90. See id. (conjecturing that a constitution’s permanence is indispensable to garner 
respect as fundamental law). 
 91. See id. at 581-82 (finding such amendments objectionable when they result in a loss 
of state sovereignty without any proportionate benefit). 
 92. See id. at 578 (noting that proposed amendments seldom represent the public will 
and, instead, embody the individual opinion of the proposing congressman). 
 93. 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI. 
 94. Long, supra note 83, at 587-88. 
 95. Id. at 587. 
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with the adoption of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 
reverence for the process takes its final plunge at this time and optimism 
ultimately follows.  It seems likely the Prohibition debacle at least partially 
caused this.96  As chronicled by Kyvig, the damage began even before 
Prohibition went into effect.  For instance, anti-prohibition forces in Ohio, 
fearing the state legislature to be too much under the influence of 
prohibition lobbyists, succeeded in persuading the citizens to pass (by a 
wide margin) a change of the state constitution to allow referendums on 
federal amendments.97  Then, following ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment by the Ohio General Assembly, the new referendum process 
was invoked and led to a vote by Ohio citizens that rejected the 
amendment.98  However, in the Hawke v. Smith decisions,99 the Supreme 
Court upheld the Ohio General Assembly’s ratifications of not only the 
Eighteenth Amendment, but also the Nineteenth Amendment.100  The Court 
rejected Ohio’s attempt, though a state constitutional amendment, to allow 
popular referendums to undo the effect of a positive vote for ratification of 
a proposed federal amendment by the body selected by Congress for that 
purpose, the state legislature.101  As Kyvig observes, 
[r]egardless of logic and legal soundness, Hawke v. Smith left a large and 
lasting impression that the Article V amending process denied 
democratic choice in the case of national prohibition . . . . [And] [t]he 
New York Times, no enthusiast for referendums, called the Hawke v. 
Smith decision a ‘shocking’ failure to represent the will of the people of 
Ohio.102 
The quick ratifications of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and 
Nineteenth amendments and the imbroglio over the Eighteenth seem to 
have led to a temporary shift in congressional views of Article V.  In a 
1926 article, Amendment of the Constitution:  Should It Be Made More 
Difficult?, Professor Justin Miller observes that prior to the 1925 
Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution in Congress, most of the proposals to 
change Article V were introduced to simplify the amendment process.103  
                                                          
 96. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 225 (describing Congress’s adoption of the Volstead 
Act, a strict interpretation of the Eighteenth Amendment that sweepingly defined 
“intoxicating beverages” as those that contained more than one-half percent of alcohol, 
contrary to popular anticipation). 
 97. See id. at 242 (adding that voters utilized the referendum to address woman 
suffrage). 
 98. Id. 
 99. (Hawke I), 253 U.S. 221 (1920); (Hawke II), 253 U.S. 231 (1920). 
 100. Hawke I, 253 U.S. at 231 (upholding ratification of Eighteenth Amendment); 
Hawke II, 253 U.S. at 232 (upholding ratification of Nineteenth Amendment). 
 101. Hawke I, 253 U.S. at 231. 
 102. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 245-46. 
 103. Justin Miller, Amendment of the Federal Constitution:  Should It Be Made More 
Difficult?, 10 MINN. L. REV. 185, 196 (1926); see Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution, S.J. Res. 
4, 68th Cong. (1925) (seeking to endow States with more power over ratification). 
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The Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution of 1925, however, sought to make 
amendment more difficult in three ways:  it would have (1) required the 
members of at least one house of the legislature of any ratifying state to 
have been elected after the amendment had been proposed, (2) allowed any 
state to require that ratification by its legislature be subjected to 
confirmation by popular vote, and (3) allowed any state to change its vote 
on ratification until either three-fourths the states had ratified or one-fourth 
had rejected the proposed amendment.104 
That the Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution would have left unchanged the 
congressional gatekeeping stage of the Article V process while making 
ratification substantially more difficult shows recognition of the 
comparatively high threshold of congressional gatekeeping.  Miller 
answered no to the question posed by the title of his article.105  Even after 
the recent amendment successes, he agreed with those who characterized 
“the process of amending the Constitution [as] already so difficult that 
people must be practically in a state of revolution before they can secure an 
amendment.”106  “Putting additional handicaps in the way of 
amendment . . . in a crisis would constitute an invitation to impatient 
people to adopt violence as a method instead of the slow, quiet processes of 
today.”107  Any greater hardships in the process might jeopardize the outlet 
it provides for “groups of people [brought] to the explosion point” by the 
continuing limits of “outlets for such accumulation of human energy” 
brought by urbanization and industrialization.108 
By the 1933 repeal of Prohibition, it seems that the ratification 
rollercoaster of 1913 to 1920 had derailed and widespread enthusiasm for 
amendments as a policy tool evaporated.  As set forth in Part V of this 
Article, this is the point in history where I conclude that the character of the 
congressional gatekeeping component of the amendment process moves 
into the current Modern era.  The country had been chastened both by the 
increasingly obvious failure of Prohibition and by the process questions 
that had arisen during the recent ratification experiences.109  So in 1932, 
Professor Hugh Willis wrote The Doctrine of the Amendability of the 
United States Constitution,110 but focused on process issues such as the 
                                                          
 104. Wadsworth-Garrett Resolution, S.J. Res. 4, 68th Cong. (1925). 
 105. See Miller, supra note 103, at 205-06 (concluding that making the amendments 
process more difficult, coupled with the increasing density of population and general 
education, will result in an “explosion point”). 
 106. Id. at 205. 
 107. Id. at 205-06. 
 108. Id. at 206. 
 109. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 240 (asserting that the adoption of the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments occurred during tumultuous World War I years, which cultivated a 
sense of abandonment of traditional constitutional boundaries). 
 110. Hugh Evander Willis, The Doctrine of the Amendability of the United States 
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ratification questions, the convention method alternative, and arguments for 
implied limits on amendment subjects.111  The growing sense of resignation 
to low-amendability is particularly stark in Roosevelt’s decision not to 
pursue the amendment process to validate his New Deal programs.112  The 
Supreme Court’s acquiescence to the constitutionality of those programs 
beginning, in earnest, in 1937, only furthered the decline in interest in 
amendments, and a lull in intellectual attention to the subject, which 
continued until the Brown v. Board decision in 1954.113 
While Brown showed the potential substantial social impact of an 
amendment, touched off much scholarly discourse on constitutional 
interpretation, and inspired a new round of reactionary amendment 
proposals in Congress, the basic conception of amendability under Article 
V does not seem to change.  Though the quasi-revolutionary conditions of 
the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War protests did produce 
proposals from Congress on D.C. electors for president, the poll tax ban, 
voting rights for eighteen-year-olds, equal rights for women, and D.C. 
representation in Congress, the three of those that were ratified were of 
relatively-limited consequence.114  And while Congress’s purported three-
year extension of time for ratification of the ERA, as well as a strong 
movement of state petitions for invoking the convention method for 
proposing amendments (to introduce a balanced-budget amendment), did 
induce waves of scholarly attention in the late 1970s and 1980s, that 
discourse is primarily limited to those particular nuances.115  The other 
amendments ratified in this last stage, the Twenty-Fifth (presidential 
succession) and Twenty-Seventh (banning pay raises applicable to the then 
sitting Congress) have no direct significance for the amendability 
discourse, though the two-hundred year delay between congressional 
passage and final ratification for the Twenty-Seventh Amendment did 
spark increased scholarly interest in amendments in general and the 
                                                          
Constitution, 7 IND. L.J. 457 (1932). 
 111. See id. at 460-64 (discussing the argument for a repeal of Article V and its 
implications on States’ equal representation). 
 112. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 289-323 (noting some evidence that Roosevelt viewed 
the amending process as a politically-difficult, in addition to unwise or unnecessary, means 
of resolving his clash with the Supreme Court over congressional power). 
 113. See id. at 347-48 (recalling the Supreme Court’s announcement that constitutional 
amendments have consequences that the states must recognize (citing Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954))). 
 114. See Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the “Statutory Constitution,” 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 254-55 (1993) (comparing the anticipation of amendments in 
response to crises with the actual result).  For example, since 1939, every Congress had 
proposed a poll tax ban, and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment that proscribed poll taxes came 
into effect in the 1960s.  Id.  By 1964, however, only five states still had active poll taxes, 
thus rendering the Twenty-Fourth Amendment largely inconsequential.  Id. 
 115. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing Walter Dellinger’s work 
in those areas). 
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delayed-ratification issue in particular.116 
In the final stage of intellectual history leading to contemporary thought, 
it seems that the pessimism and irreverence that characterize the Modern 
era sow the seeds of theories of non-formal constitutional change which 
abound today. 
3.  Modern theorists 
The following section attempts to engage the modern scholarship that 
most-directly touches on the historical amendability questions with which 
this article is concerned.  But the works that more tangentially or implicitly 
address amendability are too many to comprehensively canvas here.  
Hence, I discuss only a representative sampling of them. 
Of all the modern legal scholars, Walter Dellinger probably has the most 
substantial amendment-process oeuvre.  But it is his focus on process that 
makes the majority of Dellinger’s work not directly relevant here.  In 
general, his writings respond to two political phenomena contemporary 
with them:  (1) the question of using the Article V convention alternative to 
call a constitutional convention limited to just one particular topic, in this 
case a balanced budget amendment117 and (2) the debates surrounding the 
ERA, which raised the validity of states’ purported rescissions of earlier 
ratifications, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of Congress’s extension 
of the original seven-year ratification period for the ERA by three years, on 
the other.118  On those questions, Dellinger argues, for instance, that (1) 
constitutional conventions under Article V cannot constitutionally be 
limited to single issues or be controlled by Congress or prior mandates of 
state legislatures once convened119 and (2) the Court should resolve ERA 
                                                          
 116. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V:  The 
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1993) 
(endorsing the concurrent legislation model, whereby a proposed amendment is treated like 
a statute that must be enacted by Congress in concurrence with States’ ratification); Richard 
B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes:  The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 497 (1992) (examining the controversies over 
congressional compensation in American history). 
 117. See Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the “Limited” Constitutional 
Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 (1979) [hereinafter Dellinger, Recurring Question] 
(arguing that a constitutional convention must have authority to consider and propose to the 
states whatever amendments it deems fit); Walter E. Dellinger, Who Controls a 
Constitutional Convention?—A Response, 28 DUKE L.J. 999, 999 (1979) [hereinafter 
Dellinger, Who Controls] (dispelling the notion that state legislatures control the text of 
proposed amendments at constitutional conventions). 
 118. See Walter E. Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:  Rethinking the 
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 386 (1983) [hereinafter Dellinger, Legitimacy] 
(developing a model of judicial review of amendment process issues); Walter E. Dellinger, 
Constitutional Politics:  A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446, 446-47 (1983) [hereinafter 
Dellinger, Constitutional Politics] (criticizing the view that Congress should have the final 
word in constitutional issues pertaining to amendment adoption). 
 119. Dellinger, Recurring Question, supra note 117, at 1630. 
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issues by following the Article V formula more faithfully. That is, 
Dellinger argued the Court should discard its Coleman v. Miller120 
precedent and return to the business of determining amendment-ratification 
issues itself, rather than viewing them as nonjusticiable and giving 
Congress discretion to decide as “promulgator” of ratified amendments.121 
Despite his primary focus on those process issues, Dellinger does engage 
the amendment difficultly question.122  He notes that implicit in the stance 
of those arguing for states’ authority to rescind ratifications and preclude 
congressional extension of time for ratification (or long periods under the 
“contemporaneous consensus” doctrine) is the suggestion that the 
expressly-stated requirements of Article V make the amendment process 
“too easy.”123  His response notes that there are a very large number of 
proposed amendments compared to adopted amendments over our entire 
history, that the several then recently-adopted amendments addressed only 
minor matters, and that the decision of Roosevelt and his advisors not to 
pursue the amendment option for validating his New Deal programs was a 
particularly strong example of at least a perception of amendment 
difficulty.124  Ultimately, though, Dellinger’s assessment of historical 
difficulty is general, and he concludes that “[w]hether amending the 
Constitution is too easy remains a question for individual judgment.”125 
Most of the other modern theorists assess the historical degree of the 
difficulty of formal Article V amendment in even more general terms.126  
                                                          
 120. 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (denying writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Senate 
of the State of Kansas to erase an endorsement on the Kansas Senate’s resolution ratifying 
the Child Labor Amendment—holding the question nonjusticiable and, by implication, to be 
finally determined by Congress’s decision whether to promulgate the amendment as 
ratified). 
 121. Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 389-405. 
 122. Id. at 427. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 427-29. 
 125. Id. at 430.  Two additional articles round out Dellinger’s amendment process 
oeuvre.  See Walter E. Dellinger, Amending Process, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 72-75 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000) (noting that all the 
amendments but three have fallen into four historical clusters:  1789-1804; 1866-1870; 
1913-1933; and 1961-1978); Walter E. Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the 
United States:  A Comparative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1982) 
(describing, for instance, how other than the provision for Senate representation, the delicate 
federal-state balance of authority to propose and ratify amendments in Article V is the most 
pronounced exhibition of the federal character of the Constitution). 
 126. Unelaborated assertions of the present “difficulty” of amendment are common.  See, 
e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 987 (2002) 
(“Given the difficulty of the constitutional amendment process, the People will typically 
only resort to it in addressing questions of value on which there is an unusual degree of 
consensus.”); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional 
Amendments:  A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 274 (2002) (“[T]he 
requirements of Article V that make formal amendments difficult ensure that changes to the 
fundamental law are legitimate.”); Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is . . . Article V, 12 
CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 (1995) (“By making it difficult to change the Constitution, the 
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Those generalizations appear in three categories of works, which vary by 
their degree of directness in engaging the amendability question:  (a) 
discussions of the normative attractiveness of our Constitution’s current 
“obduracy”;127 (b) normative critiques of the difficulty of obtaining a 
particular class of amendments relative to obtaining amendments in 
general;128 and (c) the implied descriptive assessments of the Constitution’s 
general difficulty of amendment, across all categories of topics, that can be 
inferred from various general theories of interpretation.129 
Though a gross oversimplification as applied to any particular 
interpretative theory, the implied descriptive assessments might be thought 
to range from a strict originalist presumption of relative amendment ease to 
a highly non-documentarian assumption of the great difficulty of formal 
amendment.  Chemerinsky has described the necessary “balance between 
entrenchment and flexibility” that creates that theoretical continuum:  “If a 
constitution makes change too difficult, it will obstruct necessary and 
desirable social reforms.  Revolution will become the only way of altering 
the government.  But if change is too easy, then a constitution fails to 
achieve its objective of protecting society’s most cherished values from 
majoritarian control.”130 
After discussing the three general categories of tangentially-relevant 
constitutional scholarship, I conclude this overview by demonstrating how 
David Strauss’s recent “irrelevance” thesis131 is itself irrelevant for the 
particular question addressed in this Article. 
                                                          
Framers forced a significant amount of constitutional change off the books and thus limited 
the ability of the Constitution to structure political outcomes.  To the extent that we believe 
that constitutionalism should play this role, we should favor making change through Article 
V easier.”). 
 127. See infra notes 132-147 and accompanying text (comparing works by John 
Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager and by William Forbath regarding the general normative 
debate). 
 128. See infra notes 135-166 and accompanying text (analyzing commentators’ 
criticisms of Congress’s institutional self-interests). 
 129. See infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text (focusing on the assumptions 
behind constitutional amendment). 
 130. Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1563-64; see also Elai Katz, On Amending 
Constitutions:  The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 254-55 (1996) (“The amending process helps maintain the delicate 
balance between democracy and limited government . . . . If it is too difficult to change the 
constitution, the people may become frustrated and resort to extra-legal behavior . . . . Thus, 
the particulars of the amending clause of any given constitution affect the stability and 
durability of that constitution and of constitutionalism in that society.”) . 
 131. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2001) (concluding that a formal amendment process was 
inconsequential to the establishment of America’s constitutional order). 
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a.  Direct normative perspectives on the general degree of difficulty of 
amendment under Article V 
A recent exchange between John Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager, on the 
one hand,132 and William Forbath, on the other133 illustrates the general 
normative debate.  Ferejohn and Sager argue that the Constitution’s 
obduracy to Article V change “conduces to the realization of the 
Constitution’s liberty-bearing provisions.”134  First, because the 
supermajoritarian rules demand “broad popular support,” a “diversity of 
perspective” and “generality of consensus” to pass an amendment,135 
drafters and ratifiers gravitate towards “propositions of general or abstract 
value” that account for the potential interests of future generations.136  
Next, the fact that “the internal commitments represented by the liberty-
bearing provisions of the Constitution” are “set forth in abstract moral 
terms” requires that the Supreme Court provide the normative detail.137  
But the difficulty of amendment under Article V discourages “anything like 
close popular oversight of the process of constitutional enforcement,” 
which insulates the Court from popular review138 and the process from 
“blatant majoritarian expropriation.”139 
But Forbath laments that “obduracy on the order of the U.S.  
Constitution may actually erode and thwart a nation’s capacity for realizing 
many of its deepest constitutional commitments.”140  Rather than seeing 
“popular oversight” as a threat to the constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement, he concludes that “popular constitutional politics have been 
the central source of the judicial interpretations Ferejohn and Sager most 
prize.”141 Moreover, “[m]ovements to amend . . . are a central, generative 
form of such politics, and a constitution too obdurate often stifles them.”142 
Focusing more on political theory, Ferejohn and Sager’s generalizations 
on amendment difficultly do not purport to describe any particular era of 
our history; but Forbath, focusing on the twentieth century, touches on 
something like the declining “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress” I 
articulate in Part V.  In particular, he notes that the Progressive Era in the 
                                                          
 132. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1929 (2003). 
 133. William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design:  Obduracy and 
Amendability—A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965 (2003). 
 134. Id. at 1968. 
 135. Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 132, at 1957. 
 136. Id. at 1958-59. 
 137. Id. at 1960. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1930. 
 140. Forbath, supra note 133, at 1965. 
 141. Id. at 1966. 
 142. Id. 
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first part of the twentieth century “saw the only serious efforts in U.S. 
history to amend Article V.”143  The extreme obduracy of the Constitution 
was widely recognized, and the most influential lawmakers and politicians, 
including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, supported 
liberalizing the amendment rules.144  “But the era ended before [the 
forbearers of the New Deal in the Progressive Era] turned their 
considerable constitutional-political energies to that task.”145  Hence, two 
decades later, “[t]he overbearing obduracy of the unamended Article V 
diminished the jurisgenerative politics of the New Deal moment, and 
deprived us of new constitutional texts- texts on which citizens and courts 
could have rested claims to extend and deepen our constitutional 
commitments in ways we would prize.”146 
b.  Normative perspectives on the relative difficulty of amendment for 
particular constitutional subjects 
While normative views of scholars like Ferejohn, Sager, and Forbath 
lament or praise a degree of amendment difficulty that is uniform across all 
categories of amendment topics, some writers have decried a practical non-
uniformity when it comes to amendment topics that negatively impact the 
self-interest of members of Congress:  namely, that as a practical matter 
Congress already makes obtaining amendments in that category more 
difficult than in others.147  Those commentators criticize Article V’s grant 
of authority to block amendments to the extent that it enables Congress to 
impose a de facto higher barrier for, and defeat, measures that threaten its 
own institutional interests and power.148  That critique is the more 
sophisticated and relevant to my analysis, since it addresses the 
congressional gatekeeping role, though the commentary on undue 
uniformity carries some threads of amendability-thinking meriting brief 
mention here as well. 
One critic of the higher barrier to change erected by Congress’s 
institutional self-interest focuses on the Progressive Era’s pragmatic 
remedy for the intransigence of congressional stakeholders.149  Kris Kobach 
                                                          
 143. Id. at 1976. 
 144. Id.; see KYVIG, supra note 41, at 473 (viewing the difficulty of the amendment 
process as a tool for “antidemocratic motivations of an economic elite that had designed the 
Constitution”). 
 145. Forbath, supra note 133, at 1982. 
 146. Id. at 1979-80. 
 147. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V:  Term Limits and the Seventeenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1974 (1994) (asserting that the 
amendment process exposes Congress’s “inherent structural interest in prolonging the tenure 
of its sitting members”). 
 148. See id. at 1973 (proposing that the primary motivation that drives Congress in 
adopting the amendment process stems from hostility at the idea of term limits). 
 149. Id. at 1974. 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
178 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:145 
observes an alternative, incremental path to Article V amendment that 
“emerged to overcome an overwhelming structural barrier to amending the 
Constitution in a way that conflicts with the inherent self-interest of 
members of Congress.”150  That is, state-level activity in the years 
preceding the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments showed how  
states can one by one adopt changes that alter the political structure of 
Congress until it is induced to act.151 
Donald Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard arrive at a similar criticism of 
congressional self interest under an economic analysis.152  They argue that 
“Congressional control over the agenda of constitutional amendment 
restricts the ability of the people to control Congress effectively through the 
Constitution.”153  They suggest amending Article V to provide for direct 
petition by the people to propose amendments, but pessimistically argue 
that such an Amendment will likely fail anyway because it would threaten 
the interests of Congress.154  They contend that the only successful 
amendments to limit the power of the federal government, the Bill of 
Rights, were able to pass merely because the federal government had not 
yet effectively organized itself as an interest group to protect its own 
power.155 
And Mark Tushnet focuses on how that government entrenchment has 
become a particular impediment to structural representation changes.156  He 
argues that a less difficult Article V amendment process might ease the 
weight of existing constitutional structure and allow creative thinking to 
remedy the inherent defects of the constitutionally sanctioned two-party 
system.157  Greater ease of amendment could then lead to a parliamentary 
                                                          
 150. Id. at 1999. 
 151. Id. at 1977-84.  The popular election of senators was brought about by individual 
states one by one allowing citizens to influence the state legislature’s choice of senator.  Id. 
at 1977.  Only after the composition of the Senate was significantly weighted with 
representatives chosen under this system was the Seventeenth Amendment able to overcome 
the Senate’s resistance to its own change.  Id. at 1977-78.  Similarly, the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s massive electorate shift was resisted as a threat to sitting congressmen until 
state by state extension of the franchise to women incrementally transformed the structure of 
Congress and eventually compelled the federal system to follow suit.  Id. at 1978-79.  
Koback argues congressional term limit amendment may be following a similar path.  Id. at 
1979. 
 152. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution:  An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amending Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 
(1993) (constructing a model to predict when interest groups choose between the 
amendment process and statutory change). 
 153. Id. at 160. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 140 (“Today, because of the presence of a strong federal government, the 
Bill of Rights could not have been enacted via Article V.”). 
 156. Mark Tushnet, The Whole Thing, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (1995). 
 157. Id. at 225 (“There may be room . . . between the desire to avoid creating an 
amendment process that is too easy to use, and sticking with the present strong super-
majority requirements of Article V.”). 
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system of representation.158 
While Kobach, Boudreaux, Pritchard, and Tushnet lament that 
amendment difficulty in practice varies with the degree of congressional 
self-interest, a second group of normative critiques also decries the textual 
uniformity of Article V amendment difficulty across varying classes of 
amendment topics.  But they posit that changes in fundamental rights 
should be more difficult to achieve than other types of amendments.159  
That group, however, divides on whether the trouble with present 
uniformity is that it makes amending in the current undifferentiated regime 
too easy, and hence open to unwise fundamental change, or too hard, and 
therefore too resistant to needed non-fundamental alterations.160 
For example, Sanford Levinson believes that fundamental rights 
amendment should be more difficult than other forms of amendment, but 
suggests that ordinary amendment is too difficult in general.161  He 
advocates changing Article V to make amendment easier by lessening the 
ability of small states to block amendments, at least for amendments 
involving term limits and other structural features of the Constitution.162 
At least one scholar goes the other way, however, and argues that the 
congressional method of Article V amendment may be too easy in certain 
circumstances.163  Noting that over seventy percent of the amendments sent 
from Congress to the states have been ratified, Elai Katz posits that a 
“maverick Congress could propose an unwise amendment, which the states 
are likely to ratify.”164  He suggests that the more difficult convention 
method of Article V is superior to the easier congressional method because 
it is likely to be a more publicized and deliberative process.165  He argues 
                                                          
 158. See id. at 224 (observing that arguments for proportional representation are more 
prevalent than constitutionalists believe). 
 159. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 107, 107-09 (1996) (considering two types of written constitutions:  one that sets 
out political structures and governmental authority and limitations that can be changed by 
ordinary legislation and the second that is impervious to change); Katz, supra note 130, at 
254 (lauding the amendment process, which characterizes certain rights as inalienable while 
allowing for constitutional evolution alongside changes in political values). 
 160. Compare Levinson, supra note 159, at 199 (declining to adopt the view that states 
have the right to change their minds regarding ratification), with Katz, supra note 130, at 
287 (opining that the framers rightly rejected an amending clause containing numerous 
unalterable provisions). 
 161. Levinson, supra note 159, at 120-23 (“I can think of no good reasons to support the 
formal stasis engendered by Article V . . . . I can think of no defense for the present rules of 
this particular game unless one is committed simply to making it extremely difficult to 
engage in formal amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 
 162. Id. at 120 (“How can anyone seriously defend, in 1995, the present system that in 
essence allows one house of 13 states to block the desires of the remaining public?”). 
 163. Katz, supra note 130, at 262. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 287 (noting that public awareness of a proposed issue may arise only after 
the legislature has already been elected). 
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that the more difficult route should be required when attempting to alter 
fundamental rights such as First Amendment freedoms.166 
These normative critiques all share a specificity in framing the ultimate 
question not present in the problematic outlined in this Article:  they all 
assert the amendment process is too hard or too easy in reference to some 
specific normative goal.  My project is not to put forward any normative 
goal against which the effectiveness of Article V can be judged, but rather 
it is to inform that assessment of effectiveness in any relevant theoretical 
context.  While that may test the assumptions of some normative critiques 
of Article V, it more directly applies to the following descriptive 
assumptions contained within general interpretive theories. 
c.  Descriptive assumptions about amendability in general, implicit in 
interpretive theories 
Implicit in articulations of general theories of constitutional 
interpretation are descriptive assumptions or assessments that amending the 
Constitution is either easy, seen in some strong originalist theories, or 
difficult, seen in nondocumentarian or evolutionary theories. 
Appeals to original intent often imply a belief that amendment is easy 
enough and need not be supplemented by dubious judicial activism.167  
Moreover, arguments against non-Article V change imply a belief that 
Article V is adequate to keep the Constitution up to date.168  For instance, 
Henry Paul Monaghan argues that Article V amendment is only as difficult 
as it needs to be.169  In defending Article V as the exclusive mode of 
amendment he cautions against the potential of unrestrained 
majoritarianism to be exclusionary170 and warns that easier amendment will 
likely weaken the Constitution by allowing ideologized amendments.171  
                                                          
 166. See id. at 288-90 (approaching the issue of amending the First Amendment in a 
prudential way rather than considering the legal necessity). 
 167. See, e.g., ROBERT F. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 171 (1990) (“We remain 
entirely free to create all the additional freedoms we want by constitutional amendment or 
by simple legislation, and the nation has done so frequently.”); Raoul Berger, Lawrence 
Church on the Scope of Judicial Review and Original Intention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 113, 132-
33 (1991) (“‘Cumbersomeness’ affords no dispensation to the judiciary to ignore the Article 
V reservation of amendment to the people.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 167, at 122 (“To be sure, the capacity to adapt to 
changing substantive policy needs is . . . a basic goal; but where does the Constitution make 
the courts the instrument of change?”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 169. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and 
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 144 (1996) (“Nothing is ‘easy’ about 
the processes described by Article V.  This was the constitutional design.”). 
 170. Id. at 175 (“Whereas in the past, popular sovereignty became a battle cry for those 
expressing yearnings for inclusion into the political and social order, in the hands of current 
powerholders ‘We the People’ seems likely to justify exclusion, defining what ‘Real 
Americans’ stand for.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 171. See id. (admonishing that a move from normal politics to politics of constitutional 
amendment would compromise safeguards for individual liberty and minority rights). 
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The undemocratic nature of Article V that troubles Bruce Ackerman and 
Akhil Amar poses no problem for him.172 
Proponents of a non-interpretivist approach, on the other hand, proceed 
on the premise that the formal amendment process is too difficult and 
unresponsive to the changing needs of democracy.173  Most of these 
scholars do not advocate an easier amendment process, but rather justify 
the creative interpretation that has arisen to supplement an imperfect 
Article V.174  Bruce Ackerman, however, does make the normative 
argument for easing the amendment process for all types of amendment 
proposals because of the pernicious results of such robust interpretive 
theories.175  He proposes amending Article V to allow a second-term 
president to propose amendments of any type176 in response to the 
emerging trend of attempting to transform the constitution through 
presidential appointments to the Supreme Court.177  Implicit in his belief 
that transformative appointments may be too easy because they can be 
abused by Presidents without substantial mandates for fundamental 
change,178 is the descriptive assessment that congressional gatekeeping, in 
                                                          
 172. See id. at 144-45 (claiming that in the debate over congressional authority, Article 
V was viewed as the exclusive mode of amendment). 
 173. See, e.g., Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990 
WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (1990) (commenting that Article V “process is too cumbersome 
and erratic to serve as the sole vehicle for constitutional development in a complex and 
rapidly changing society”).  But see Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 386 (urging 
that Article V should not be made any more difficult by unclear rules, while not explicitly 
stating that Article V is too difficult).  Dellinger takes issue with the Political Question 
doctrine and the policy goal of “contemporary consensus” espoused in Coleman v. Miller,  
307 U.S. 433 (1939) (determining timeliness of ratification requires determination of 
contemporaneous consensus and that Congress is better suited than the Court to answer 
political questions).  He believes leaving amendment issues in Congress’s hands invites 
uncertainty.  Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118, at 427-30.  Furthermore, Dellinger 
argues that prior rejection, subsequent rescission, and passage of time should not nullify 
state ratification of amendments.  Id. at 419.  Such requirements reflect an assumption that 
amendment is too easy and “additional hurdles should supplement the expressly stated 
requirements of article V.”  Id. at 427.  He recommends that Article V be interpreted as a 
series of formalities with which strict compliance ensures legitimacy; nothing more should 
be read into it.  Id. at 419.  “Attention to these formalities is more likely to provide clear 
answers than is a search for the result that best advances an imputed ‘policy’ of 
‘contemporaneous consensus.’“  Id. at 418. 
 174. See Church, supra note 173, at 1073-74 (calling for the rejection of extreme 
positions, namely the complete adherence to or abandonment of the founders’ view of the 
courts’ roles in the amendment process). 
 175. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1164 (1988) (assessing strengths and weaknesses of alternative modes of constitutional 
transformation). 
 176. See id. at 1182 (adding that proposed amendments must be approved by two-thirds 
of both houses of Congress and three-fifths of voters in two successive presidential 
elections). 
 177. See id. (comparing presidentially-led proposals to the Founders’ assembly-led 
systems). 
 178. Id. at 1181 (arguing that Roosevelt’s New Deal was a result of such transformative 
appointments and that Reagan attempted another such transformation through the rejected 
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practice, has been too unresponsive. 
Finally, some writers appear to fall in the middle of the spectrum.  
Stephen Presser, for instance, has argued that amendment should not be 
made more difficult or limited in his criticism of the Guidelines for 
Constitutional Amendments.179  In 1999, a group called Citizens for 
Constitutional Change published a report entitled “‘Great and 
Extraordinary Occasions’:  Developing Guidelines for Constitutional 
Change,” which sets forth eight “Guidelines for Constitutional 
Amendment.”180  The Guidelines propose a set of abstract principles for 
determining whether amendment is appropriate.  These abstract principles 
were intended to curb the recent proclivity to constitutionalize policies the 
authors see as less than Constitution-worthy.  Presser argues that Article 
V’s supermajority requirements already provide the necessary restraint.181  
Therefore, he concludes that amendments “are not some dangerous threat 
to our democratic Republic,” and that while amendment is a “solemn” 
exercise of democracy, “it is not one that should be discouraged in the 
manner that the authors of Great and Extraordinary Occasions seek to 
do.”182  Presser, however, is in the distinct minority183 in arguing that the 
historical degree of amendability under Article V has been just right. 
d.  The general irrelevance of Strauss’s “irrelevance” thesis 
In his 2001 article, David Strauss argues that “our constitutional order 
would look little different if a formal amendment process did not exist,” 
because “[a]t least since the first few decades of the Republic, 
constitutional amendments have not been an important means by which the 
Constitution, in practice, has changed.”184  As evidence for this thesis, 
                                                          
appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court). 
 179. See Stephen B. Presser, Constitutional Amendments:  Dangerous Threat or 
Democracy in Action?, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 209, 217 (2000) (proposing that the Founders 
intended for constitutional change to be a tool for democratic action). 
 180. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS:  
DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7 (1999), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/cai/guidelines/index.html (considering whether:  (1) the 
proposed amendment addresses matters that are of lasting concern; (2) the proposed 
amendment makes the system more politically responsive; (3) there are obstacles to the 
achievement of the proposed amendment’s objectives by other means; (4) the proposed 
amendment is consistent with related constitutional doctrine; (5) the proposed amendment 
embodies enforceable standards; (6) the proponents of the proposed amendment 
contemplated the consequences of their proposal; (7) there has been debate on the proposed 
amendment’s merits; and (8) Congress has provided for a set States-ratification deadline to 
ensure a concurrent consensus by Congress and the states). 
 181. Presser, supra note 179, at 217. 
 182. Id. at 224-25. 
 183. See Denning & Vile, supra note 126, at 251-52 (distinguishing Presser’s thesis from 
the more generally accepted sentiment that provisions for formal amendment to the 
Constitution are indeed relevant). 
 184. Strauss, supra note 131, at 1457. 
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Strauss cites four phenomena:  (1) many constitutional changes have 
occurred without formal amendment; (2) despite the rejection of some 
particular amendments, the constitution has changed; (3) several 
amendments initially thought important had little effect until society later 
changed by other means; and (4) some amendments merely ratified 
changes that had already occurred through other means.185  Strauss provides 
two qualifications to his general thesis.  First, he limits the claim about 
irrelevance to the context of a “mature democratic society.”186  
Amendments in “fledging constitutional order,” by contrast, may play a 
significant role in the initial establishment of the constitutional regime.187  
Second, amendments have served the two ancillary functions of 
establishing the rules of the road on uncontroversial issues that must be 
settled (such as presidential disability through the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment) and suppressing outliers by turning “all-but-unanimity into 
unanimity” on a particular issue (such as the abolishing of poll taxes 
through the Twenty-fourth Amendment).188 
The validity of Strauss’s thesis aside,189 it does not claim that the factual 
degree of difficulty of formal constitutional amendment is irrelevant.  
Rather, Strauss at least implicitly suggests that low amendability may 
legitimate informal means of constitutional change.190  And, by extension, 
the degree of amendability may determine the degree of legitimacy of the 
practice.191 
But, as my primary purpose is to provide an unbiased account of the very 
interesting empirical data on large-scale patterns in amendment-proposing 
history, I will remain neutral on the theoretical implications of that 
empirical evidence.  I will, however, return to Strauss in my speculations 
on operationalizing amendment need in Part VII.B. 
C.  Scholarship on Congress 
Political scientists rarely address proposed amendments directly.  Rather, 
                                                          
 185. Id. at 1459. 
 186. Id. at 1460. 
 187. Id. at 1460-61.  Strauss notes that though the first twelve amendments to the 
American constitution may have played a significant role in establishing the American 
constitutional regime, more likely they did not. 
 188. Id. at 1461. 
 189. See, e.g., Denning & Vile, supra note 126, at 252 (critiquing Strauss for his general 
historical characterizations); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 951, 987 (2002) (contesting the general theoretical implications of Strauss’s 
argument); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest:  Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001) (using the examples of the 
Nineteenth Amendment and the failed ERA to demonstrate the relevance of amendments 
and proposed amendments). 
 190. Strauss, supra note 131, at 1457. 
 191. Id. at 1467. 
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they focus on the process and motivations for introducing normal 
legislation in Congress.  My analysis relies directly on their work for the 
theory of bill introductions and expands on their theories for my paradigm 
of amendment proposing. 
The analyses in Parts III through V focuses more on the introduction of 
bills by individual congresspersons than on introduction by committees.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, over ninety percent of public bills 
were introduced by individual members,192 and that dominance continues to 
present Congresses.193  And while at the beginning of Congress the 
opposite was true, with virtually all public bills in the House introduced by 
committees and well over half introduced by committees in the Senate,194 
joint resolutions that are used to introduce proposed amendments have been 
almost exclusively introduced by individuals from the inception of 
Congress. 
The following sets forth (1) the historical evolution of bill introduction 
procedure; (2) the less-storied process of the joint resolution, the vehicle 
for proposing amendments; and (3) research on the general motivations for 
bill sponsorship over the history of Congress.  These understandings of 
current and historical congressional dynamics provide the foundations for 
my theorizing the potential cause of the bill–proposed amendment totals 
correlation. 
1.  Evolution of bill introduction procedure:  From difficulty to trivial ease 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, bill introduction in both 
houses had largely evolved to the current form of relatively free 
introduction by individual members.  Political science studies of the 
incremental historical development of procedures that led to this modern 
form explain that the House and Senate did not arrive at free introduction in 
the same way, nor do they have similar legislative environments even 
today.  Rather, the speed and character of the change differed in the two 
chambers.  The House not only took longer to reach the norm of 
introduction by individual members, but came to it only through ceding 
control to standing committees and rules and sacrificing floor introduction; 
                                                          
 192. See Joseph Cooper & Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyzing Institutional Change:  Bill 
Introduction In the Nineteenth-Century Senate, in U.S. SENATE EXCEPTIONALISM 182, 199 
(Bruce Oppenheimer ed., 2002) (demonstrating that the majority of bills are now introduced 
by individuals whereas before the mid-eighteen-hundreds, the majority of bills were 
introduced by committees). 
 193. See id. at 193 (describing that the growth of member bills introduced on the floor 
continues to this day due to changes in congressional rules regarding standing committees, 
access to the floor, and debate and amendment on the floor, though the changes in the House 
and the Senate have been different). 
 194. See id. (noting that historically, House committees introduced virtually all public 
bills, and Senate committees introduced well over half of public bills). 
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the Senate, by contrast, to this day retains much more autonomy and floor 
access for its members.195 
Joseph Cooper and Elizabeth Rybicki designate three stages in the 
nineteenth-century evolution of bill introduction procedure focusing 
primarily on the Senate.196  They distinguish:197  (1) 1789 to 1825, which 
saw the right of individual by individual members arise in the Senate, but 
not the House;198 (2) 1825 to 1861, which saw the frequency of individual 
bill sponsorship in the House slowly develop, equaling that in the Senate by 
end of this era;199 and (3) 1861 to 1897, which saw the emergence of the 
modern regime of free individual introduction in both houses, though a 
stark split in member access to the floor and procedural control between the 
two chambers.200 
                                                          
 195. See id. (distinguishing the Senate from the House for changing more rapidly by 
taking pains to “limit the monopoly power of committees, to preserve the access of 
members to the floor, and to protect freedom of debate and amendment on the floor,” 
resulting in Senators being able to introduce bills on the floor without loss of power to 
standing committees); see also Joseph Cooper & Cheryl D. Young, Bill Introduction in the 
Nineteenth Century:  A Study of Institutional Change, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 67, 68 (1989) 
(focusing an analysis on bill introduction in the House and excluding discussion of the 
Senate to understand better institutional change in a more detailed, but older, study).  
Though relying on these two studies produces two over-generalizations, neither undermines 
the general understanding of the legislative process necessary for my analysis:  (1) Both 
studies focus on public bills.  Thus, even though the bill totals I use include both public and 
private bills, the similarities in the evolution of their introduction process are sufficient for 
my exploratory purposes; (2) I rely more on the House than the Senate for characterizing the 
evolution of bill introduction procedure for my analysis.  This is because though 
amendments have been proposed in both houses, the House has generally carried 
significantly greater proposal numbers and has almost always introduced substantially more 
bills.  Since the only proposed amendment totals presently tabulated for many Congresses 
do not distinguish between the bodies, I generally default to the assumption that House 
procedure dominates the process I examine. 
 196. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 183. 
 197. Id. at 183; see also Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 71-98 (focusing on the 
House alone).  In his earlier study, Cooper, with Young, divides the approximately 100 year 
period over which the present system of free and unrestricted bill introduction by individual 
members evolved into two distinct stages and subdivides the second stage into four phases.  
In the first stage (1789 to 1821), the House as a whole exercised stricter and more detailed 
control over decision making on subjects and introduction of bills.  In the second stage 
(1821-1891), the House moved away from that strictness to the present openness though 
four phases:  Phase 1 (1821-1837) characterized by confusion in the introduction process, 
Phase 2 (1837-1861) where member bills where permitted but chaos reigned in the 
procedure by the late 1850s, Phase 3 (1861-1881) where the clarity of the procedure 
improved, and Phase 4 (1881-1891) where member bills achieved their present domination. 
 198. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 183.  This first stage includes the growth and 
decline of the first political party system and the emergence of standing committee systems 
in both bodies. 
 199. Id. at 186.  This second stage includes the rise and fall of the second party system 
and the period in which the Senate replaced the House as the premier legislative institution. 
 200. Id. at 188.  This final stage is the era of our third party system which resulted in 
party leaders in both houses of Congress having an unprecedented degree of control. 
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a.  Stage I:  Early Decades, 1789-1825 
While the House did not begin accepting bills from individual members 
until the 1830s,201 a qualified right of individual introduction existed in the 
Senate from 1789 and strengthened quickly.202  The qualification stemmed 
from an initial two-part conception of bill introduction:  (1) general 
principles of policy should be settled by the legislative body as a whole 
(legislative body of either the House or Senate) “before the business was 
sent to smaller committees” and (2) bills should be introduced only with 
permission of the whole.203  Accordingly, subjects were introduced in the 
form of resolutions, petitions, and messages; important areas of policy were 
first discussed on the floor or in a Committee of the Whole before being 
referred to committee; and both houses required permission of the whole 
body for a bill to be introduced.204  But even at the outset, the House rules 
on introduction were stricter, requiring that even when a member’s motion 
for leave to bring in a bill was approved, the issue “be sent to a smaller 
committee to frame and bring in the actual bill.”205 
The whole body’s control over initial consideration eroded, however, as 
initial floor consideration became a mere mechanism for committee 
reference.  In each body, though, the decline of the role of the whole and 
the development of standing committees occurred at different rates.206  
While by 1820, both houses gave standing committees power to propose 
bills on subjects referred to them, and committee bills were the dominant 
vehicle for advancing public legislation, House members continued to rely 
exclusively on resolution of inquiry to refer public bills to committees.207  
                                                          
 201. See Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 70 (explaining that a bill was permitted 
only when the House approved its introduction, and any bill so approved was not to be 
introduced by an individual member, but was referred to a committee for drafting and 
introduction).  Cooper and Young conclude that “the legislative process was seen as one 
which began with the consideration of subjects that might or might not lead to actual bills.”  
Id. at 70. 
 202. See Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 184 (clarifying that though the rules 
allowed an individual member to introduce a bill, “bills were seen as ‘inchoate law’ and 
therefore not properly introducible solely on the authority of an individual member or 
committee”). 
 203. Id. at 183-84; see also Lauros G. McConachie, Congressional Committees, in 15 
LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 127 (Richard T. Ely ed., 1973) (1898) (explaining 
that the small committees have existed since the first House which has always retained the 
power to choose the size and number of committees). 
 204. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 184. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 183-84 (expounding that by 1809, small committees in both houses 
functioned far more as advisors to the whole than as its instructed agents and by 1817, 
standing committees dominated select committees in receipt of business from the floor); see 
also JOSEPH COOPER, CONGRESS AND ITS COMMITTEES 51 (1988) (describing the change in 
attitude towards committees becoming more positive as the number of standing committees 
increased). 
 207. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 185. 
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In the Senate, by contrast, member public bills were present from the start, 
attained sizeable proportions even before the advent of the standing 
committee system, and rose to even greater proportions once the standing 
committee system had emerged and been given bill power.208 
Member autonomy as the primary distinction between the House and 
Senate in their procedural evolution is also seen in the much greater 
strictness of the House in the level of control of business and debate on the 
floor.209  Beginning in 1811 the House started turning the previous question 
into an effective method of cloture, adopted a general germaneness rule in 
place of the limited germaneness provision in its original rules, and began 
to define an order of business in its rules.210  “In contrast, the Senate 
eliminated its previous-question rule, did not adopt a general germaneness 
rule, and declined to write the rudimentary order of business it followed in 
practice into its rules.”211 
b.  Stage II:  The Growth of Member Bills, 1825-1861 
Member bills became the primary mode of introduction in the Senate 
and, more slowly, the House in the next phase (while the disparity in 
member control over introduced legislation widened).212  Beginning in the 
mid-1820s, member bills quickly rose to prominence in the Senate, with the 
House lagging behind for several decades and not matching Senate 
procedure until the Civil War.213  In the Senate, the percentage of bills 
introduced by individual members at first increased steadily from 1820s 
levels, fell back briefly in mid-1840s, but then resumed an upward climb.214  
“[B]y the mid-1850s, seventy percent of public legislation was introduced 
by members, not committees.”215 
In the House, interest in member bills began intensifying in the late 
1820s and 1830s and led to two important rule changes:  (1) The 1837 
House reformulated its original bill introduction rule to clarify authority of 
members to introduce bills they drafted “once the permission of the House 
had been secured and to protect the authority of standing committees to 
                                                          
 208. See id. (noting that even in this Senate there were restrictions on individual bill 
introduction of permission and a day’s notice to introduce a bill, and members were 
occasionally challenged when attempting to circumvent those requirements). 
 209. Id. at 186. 
 210. Id.; see also McConachie, supra note 203, at 124 (explaining that at least 350 select 
committees existed in the 3rd Congress for every petty claim, but that the number of 
committees fell to ten by 1810, but increased back to fifty by 1893). 
 211. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186; see McConachie, supra note 203, at 260 
(describing the Senate as “tortoise-like” with respect to changing its rules and lagging far 
behind the House). 
 212. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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receive such bills” once introduced216 and (2) “[i]n 1838 a second rules 
change provided additional time in the order of business for members to 
introduce bills.”217  Following those changes, the percentage of member 
bills accelerated, so that by 1861 House member bills matched the Senate 
at seventy-one percent.218 
But the houses diverged further on options and procedure once a bill was 
introduced.  “The House continued to outpace the Senate in elaborating its 
rules regarding the conduct of business.”219  The Senate neither addressed 
the filibuster, which became a problem for the first time, nor the problem of 
germaneness.220  The Senate finally did incorporate an order of business, 
though a less rigorous one than that of the House.221  Cooper and Rybicki 
note that “[a]s a consequence [of such resistance to change], the power of 
individual members remained strong in the Senate.”222 
c.  Stage III:  The Triumph of Member Bills, 1861-1897 
The final period of evolution in legislative process cemented not only 
member bill introduction as the norm, but also the disparity between strong 
control of activity on and access to the floor by individual members in the 
House and the stark relative freedoms for Senators.223  By the 1880s, 
virtually all public bills were member bills in both the House and Senate.224  
“In the House the 1880 rules changes removed the historic requirements for 
permission and one day’s notice [which had long been mere formalities] 
but also totally barred debate on referral of bills.”225  Then, with the 1890 
rules changes, introduction and reference were taken off the floor (so there 
was no chance to challenge reference) and the basic framework of modern 
practice was established.226 
Senate procedural change did not go nearly so far.  The Senate resisted 
the House model for standing committees, which defined their jurisdictions 
in the rules from the beginning and in 1880 made reference of legislation to 
them in line with these jurisdictions mandatory.227  In the Senate, rather, 
                                                          
 216. Id. 
 217. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 186 (citing Cooper & Young, supra note 195, 
at 70). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 187.  Accord McConachie, supra note 203, at 37 (describing the growth of the 
House’s rules from a “small series of simple resolutions” to “an intricate, logically arranged 
code . . .”). 
 220. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187; see also McConachie, supra note 203, at 
115 (attributing the use of filibuster by the minority group as a source of power). 
 221. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187. 
 222. Id. at 187-88. 
 223. Id. at 188-89. 
 224. Id. at 188. 
 225. Id. at 189. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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jurisdictions continued not to be formally defined but entirely controlled by 
precedent and reference to committees remained subject to the discretion of 
the Senate as a whole.228  Senators could still (1) “object to the reference of 
bills and place them directly on the calendar,” (2) “debate and add 
instructions to referral motions,” (3) “propose reference to a select 
committee,” and (4) influence which of the more than forty standing 
committees existing in the early 1890s received a bill.229 
In sum, House changes reflected centralization of power in the Speaker 
that occurred after 1870 and especially after 1880.230 The Senate, by 
contrast, “resisted rules changes that would alter its fundamental character 
as a body that worked on the basis of mutual consent and forbearance, even 
as the strength of the party began to rise in the 1880s and 1890s.”231 
d.  Conclusions 
During the nineteenth century, both houses transformed the introduction 
of public legislation from a committee-dominated process to one in which 
introduction was “a hallmark of member prerogative and activity.”232  But 
the pace of change varied substantially, with the Senate far ahead of House 
until the 1850s.233  And while transition to member bills climaxes in the 
House in 1890 by taking introduction and reference off the floor, that floor 
limitation does not occur in the Senate.234 
2.  The comparatively-free introduction procedure, in historical 
congresses, for joint resolutions:  The vehicle for amendment proposing 
Early on, the joint resolution was established as the means of introducing 
proposed amendments in both houses.235  Though functionally equivalent to 
                                                          
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 189-90; see also FLOYD M. RIDDICK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE 315 (1941) 
(explaining the ability of Senators to refer bills to standing committees, for which for the 
76th Congress totaled thirty). 
 230. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 190. 
 231. Id. at 191. 
 232. Id. at 193. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See ASHER C. HINDS, 5 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 7029 n.3 (1907).  Accord Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
378 (1798) (holding that notwithstanding Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a 
joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution passed by two-thirds majorities 
of the House and Senate did not need to be presented to the President and rejecting a 
challenge to the Eleventh Amendment on the grounds that it had not been presented to the 
President).  Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides, 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) 
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall 
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be 
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the 
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the bill in most respects, the joint resolution did not impose the same severe 
restrictions on individual member introduction as bills did for much of the 
nineteenth century.  I selected the House for my brief exploration of joint 
resolution history because House Members have proposed significantly 
more amendments than have Senators, and the procedure for introducing 
bills in the House has undergone substantially more change. 
While the time available for introducing resolutions in the House was 
sparse in early years, members’ personal privilege to introduce resolutions 
was not otherwise restricted.  And though in the rules of the first session of 
the first Congress there was no explicit rule on the order of business,236 
today joint resolutions are codified in House procedure.  They may 
originate in either the House or Senate, not, as is sometimes incorrectly 
assumed, jointly in both Houses.237  But as they differ little in practice from 
a bill, the two forms are often used interchangeably.238  The principle 
differences from bills are that joint resolutions may include a preamble 
preceding the resolving clause and that when a joint resolution is used to 
propose an amendment to the Constitution, it is not then presented to the 
President for approval.239  And, in general, joint resolutions “are used for 
what may be called incidental, unusual, or inferior purposes of 
legislating . . . .”240 
                                                          
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.  Counsel for Hollingsworth et al., arguing the invalidity of the 
amendment, framed the argument in support of the amendment as follows:  “[A]s two thirds 
of both Houses are required to originate the proposition, it would be nugatory to return it 
with the President’s negative, to be repassed by the same number . . . .”  Hollingsworth, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 379.  To that, they replied, “the reasons assigned for his disapprobation 
might be so satisfactory as to reduce the majority below the constitutional proportion. The 
concurrence of the President is required in matters of infinitely less importance . . . .”  Id.  
Attorney General Lee responded “[b]ut has not the same course been pursued relative to all 
the other amendments, that have been adopted?”  Id. at 381.  The Court upheld the validity 
of the Eleventh Amendment despite its not having been presented to the President.  Justice 
Chase asserts “[t]here can, surely, be no necessity to answer [Hollingsworth’s argument].  
The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation:  He has 
nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.”  Id. 
 236. See ASHER C. HINDS, 4 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 3056 (1907) (describing how the current House rules relating to the 
order of business are a substantial change from the rules of the first House). 
 237. CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, S. DOC. NO. 108-93, at 7 (1st 
Sess. 2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html; see also Forms of 
Congressional Action, http://www.house.gov/rules/lphforms.htm#jointres 
ol (setting forth the standard form for presenting a joint resolution). 
 238. JOHNSON, supra note 237. 
 239. Id. 
 240. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ONE HUNDREDTH 
CONGRESS § 397 (annotation on JEFFERSON’S MANUAL portion of the House Manual) 
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES], printed in H.R. DOC. NO. 99-279, at 183 (1987).  Examples of 
the incidental, unusual, or inferior forms of legislation subject to joint resolutions include 
extending the national thanks to individuals, the invitation to La Fayette to visit America, 
notice to a foreign government of the abrogation of a treaty, declaration of intervention in 
Cuba, correction of an error in an existing act of legislation, enlargement of the scope of 
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3.  General motivations for sponsorship of legislation over the history of 
Congress:  Careerism vs. policy orientation 
For working assumptions about the psychology of legislative process 
since the 1st Congress, I marry detailed studies of twentieth century bill 
sponsorship with the more sparse historical scholarship available on earlier 
congressional behavior.  The actions of modern congresspersons are 
viewed as serving one or more of three broad aims—power within the 
legislature, reelection, and policy goals.241 
In variance of that paradigm developed for modern Congresses, 
however, my model of sponsorship activity across the entire congressional 
history focuses on just two opposing categories of motivations:  (1) 
careerism and (2) policy orientation.  Careerism subsumes the modern 
category of reelection but defines a broader concept, as explained below.  
And by policy orientation, I mean a general propensity to pursue policy 
goals, as opposed to other ends, in proposing legislation.  Both are 
questions of degree. 
This careerism–policy orientation dichotomy (and continuum) supplants 
the modern triad:  power within the legislature, reelection, and policy goals 
in this study in order to conform to the historical studies of bill and joint 
resolution sponsorship and the preliminary nature of this analysis.  Power 
within the legislature fades to the background for now because it is 
comparatively more difficult to track and it appears less relevant as we 
move the focus from all congressional activity to motivations for the 
introduction of legislation.242  And I have expanded the reelection factor to 
the broader notion of “careerism” to fully account for the characteristics of 
older, nineteenth century Congresses in a historical analysis. 
While even the extreme cynic would not deny an enduring contribution 
of some sort of “policy orientation,” the proposition that legislation has at 
times been proposed to achieve policy goals, the historical incarnations of 
careerism may not be so familiar.  That and the related complication raised 
by the distinction between constituency-topic and national-topic legislation 
bear some elaboration. 
a.  Nineteenth century versus twentieth century careerism 
The main motivation behind the typical modern congressperson’s 
                                                          
inquiries provided by law, special appropriations for minor and incidental purposes, 
establishing the date for convening of Congress, and extending the termination date for a 
law.  Id. 
 241. See Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 196 (attributing the source of the 
formulation to RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973)). 
 242. See Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 197-98 (“The authority to introduce bills 
at one’s own discretion is not a preeminent source of personal power within a legislative 
body in a separation-of-powers framework . . . .”). 
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proposing legislation is political recognition as a path to reelection.243  
Modern examples of this “reelectioneering” focus of careerism include 
gaining political notoriety by taking a distinct position on an existing issue, 
bringing attention to an issue in the political forum to influence the agenda, 
or improving one’s political reputation as an expert or advocate by prolific 
activity in a particular area.244  Self-interested congresspersons in the 
nineteenth century, by contrast, appear to have had ambitions broader than 
reelection. 
Cooper and Rybicki argue that framing careerism as based only on a 
desire for reelection is insufficient because “members in the House and 
Senate [in the 1800s] did not desire or expect to spend most of their careers 
in Congress.”245  In fact, “[i]n the House, members often chose not to run 
for reelection, and in the Senate, resignations before the end of one’s term 
were common.”246  Future career interests of sitting members of Congress 
were instead broader than continued congressional service:  “They sought 
to use service in Congress as a pathway to state and national offices of a 
variety of types.  If, then, we define careerism in terms of the pursuit of a 
political career, not merely a legislative career, the external form of 
careerist explanation remains applicable.”247 
Cooper and Rybicki tie their findings to the longstanding view that the 
historical “increase in the number of member bills was tied to the desire of 
members to publicize themselves for their own personal and political 
gain.”248  They conclude that “the [most] substantial argument for the 
                                                          
 243. See Schiller, supra note 27, at 188 (identifying congresspersons as calculating 
individuals who weigh the political cost of their decisions). 
 244. See id. at 189-91 (elaborating that legislator as a rational political actor is cautious 
of the effect bill sponsorship will have on his reputation, influence, and chance of 
reelection). 
 245. Id. at 198. 
 246. Id. (citing David Brady et al., The Roots of Careerism in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, in 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 489, 489 (1999); Douglass Price, Careers and 
Committees in the American Congress:  The Problem of Structural Change, in THE HISTORY 
OF PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR (William Ayderlotte ed., 1977); RANDALL RIPLEY, POWER IN 
THE SENATE (1969)).  Brady distinguishes between electoral safety and desire to serve for 
long periods to conclude that they result from different factors, and thus careerism was 
present earlier in history than previously thought.  Brady, supra, at 507. 
 247. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 198.  The reelectionist focus of careerism in 
the Modern Era is thought to embody an emphasis on the delivery of particularistic benefits 
to constituents as the primary means of winning re-election.  Id. at 197 (citing MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, CONGRESS:  KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974)).  And “credit seeking, advertising, and 
position taking were identified as the three prime strategies for members to follow to win 
reelection.”  Id.  Cooper and Rybicki note, however, that position taking suggests that 
something beyond the delivery of particularistic benefits is important in winning reelection.  
Id.  Moreover, Mayhew argues that, in the case of the Senate, position taking is the most 
important of the three.  MAYHEW, supra, at 73. 
 248. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 198 (citing DE ALVA S. ALEXANDER, HISTORY 
AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1916)). 
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power of self interest in explaining the evolution of bill introduction [is] the 
desire of members to advance their careers by using member bills to 
publicize themselves.”249 
Of course, that acquisition of member freedom to introduce bills has also 
proved invaluable to narrower twentieth-century schemes to self-promote 
for retaining a particular office.  But legislation suited to broad careerist 
goals often differs in substantive focus from that suited to narrow 
careerism.  The “national-topic” versus “constituency-topic” distinction in 
legislative type reflects that difference. 
b.  A complication for the theory of cause for the bill–amendment 
proposing correlation:  Constituency-topic vs. national-topic bills 
From the evidence that, to some degree, members of Congress used bill 
introduction to advance their careers from early in the nineteenth century to 
modern times, I assume that careerism has played a role in amendment 
proposing as well.  The analysis of this Article now shifts to the more 
difficult question of the extent to which the same careerist interests that 
motivated general bill sponsorship have also motivated constitutional 
legislation.  This analysis, however, is complicated by the distinction 
between sponsorship of “constituency topic” bills and sponsorship of 
“national topic” bills.  Cooper and Rybicki define constituency topic bills 
in the Senate as those that “confer a highly disproportionate benefit on a 
particular state.”250  I expand that definition to include bills that confer a 
highly disproportionate benefit to a particular congressional district for 
House legislation. 
In the nineteenth century, as members gained the ability to individually 
sponsor legislation, they focused much more on constituency-topic bills 
than did the committees.  For example, looking at member-sponsored bills 
only in a sample of nine Senates from the 12th (1811-13) to the 34th (1855-
57) Congress, there was a roughly equal split between constituency topic 
and national topic bills.251  That contrasts with committee and members 
bills taken together, where constituency-topic bills comprise far less than 
half of all congressional legislation during the same period.252  In fact, 
                                                          
 249. Id. at 198-99. 
 250. Id. at 198.  Cooper and Rybicki note that constituent topic bills include “road and 
harbor repair or construction, railroad construction, incorporation, establishment of 
collection and judicial districts, compensation of judges and other public officials, the time 
and place for holding district court, Indian removal, restoration of civil liberties, settlement 
of private land claims, and grants of land or the right-of-way through public lands.”  Id. at 
199 tbl.10.4. 
 251. Id. at 199 (noting that an average of 50.3% of member bills were a constituency 
topic during this period and thus concluding that the member bills were equally divided 
between constituency and national topic bills). 
 252. See id. at 199 (noting the trend from percentage Member-Introduced Public Bills 
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members introduced approximately sixty-two percent of the constituency 
topic bills during the nine-Senate span.253  As Cooper and Rybicki note, “it 
is clear that members, not committees, were the driving force in the growth 
of constituency topic bills to a far greater degree than with respect to 
national topic bills.”254 
The authors note further that the House data makes an even stronger case 
for the role of constituency pleasing in propelling member bills:  “In the 
House . . . the percentage of member bills that were constituency topic rose 
from 42 percent in the 27th Congress (1841-43), shortly after the rules 
changes of 1837-38, to 70 percent in the 31st Congress (1849-51) and 73 
percent in the 32nd Congress (1851-53),” as member bills in the House 
exploded.255  This finding, however, need not suggest greater careerism in 
the House.  Rather, to the extent national-topic bills are more suited for 
credit claiming in pursuit of national office (e.g., the presidency) than 
reelection to Congress, a stronger percentage of national-topic bills were 
introduced by Senators than by members of the House.256  This is 
consistent with the contemporary understanding of the broader political 
goals of Senators to pursue national offices. 
Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic change in the magnitude, sources, and 
composition of bill introduction that accompanied the easing of procedural 
constraints over a forty-year span in the nineteenth century: 
                                                          
with Constituency Topic column in Table 10.4). 
 253. Id. (averaging the percentage of constituency-topic bills introduced by members 
from Table 10.4). 
 254. Id. at 199. 
 255. Id. at 200-01. 
 256. Id. at 201. 
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FIGURE 2: 
Comparison of Public Bills Only, Between 22nd Congress (1831-33) and 
42nd Congress (1871-73) 
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The theory set forth in Part IV shows how the dramatic shift in the power 
and role of individual members from the early to late nineteenth century 
may have played a crucial role in establishing the dynamic that drives the 
correlation between bill and amendment revealed by the numerical 
analysis. 
c.  Conclusions 
In sum, the theory developed in the next part must acknowledge several 
background conditions governing aggregate bill and amendment 
introduction that have dramatically changed character relative to each other 
between early and modern Congresses:  (1) members of Congress were 
generally motivated by careerism (as the political scientists suggest they 
have been from early on), but the members’ focus shifted from an emphasis 
on acquiring national stature to an emphasis on reelection;257 (2) member 
legislation has generally been weighted towards constituency topics;258 but 
(3) plausible amendment topics were generally national topics;259 (4) joint 
resolutions, the vehicle for proposing amendments, initially differed 
dramatically from bills in the ease of their introduction;260 and (5) the 
proportion of total bills that were sponsored by members rose to over 
ninety percent by the end of the century.261 
III.  FROM GENERAL THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND 
HISTORIES OF PROCEDURE TO A SPECIFIC THEORY OF CORRELATION 
BETWEEN BILL- AND AMENDMENT-SPONSORSHIP ACTIVITY 
Building on the political-scientists’ understanding of Congress, this Part 
(A) presents a general theory of congressional motivation as cause of 
correlations between bill- and amendment-proposing rates and (B) 
speculates on criteria for a “Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress.” 
A.  General Theory of Congressional Motivation as Cause of Correlation 
Between Rates of General Bill and Amendment Proposing 
Attuned to the history of motivations for and procedural constraints on 
bill and amendment proposing, I now return to the question that started this 
Article:  Why might bill and amendment proposing rates be correlated to 
some substantial and significant degree from Congress to Congress? 
                                                          
 257. See Brady, supra note 246, at 490 (explaining the change in patterns of careerism 
throughout the twentieth century and pointing to the wealth of political science literature 
chronicling this change). 
 258. Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 198. 
 259. Id. at 201. 
 260. See HOUSE RULES, supra note 240, § 397. 
 261. Cooper & Rydicki, supra note 192, at 199. 
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First, I concede the threshold limitations of existing political-science 
scholarship.  It does not provide enough insight for my preliminary theory 
of causation to be framed either with scientific precision or with a scope 
that explains all of the relevant legislative activity.  This analysis is 
preliminary and too much data remains inaccessible or un-obtained thus 
far.  (The numerical correlation itself, in contrast with its cause, is 
established with statistical accuracy in Part IV.)  Therefore, I cannot 
proceed in the traditional style of inquiry by stating a concrete theory that 
would give rise to a particularized null hypothesis against it, which the 
subsequent numerical analysis would or would not disprove (within a range 
of statistical error).  Instead, I outline two separate working models of 
causation, each of which points to the same cause for the correlation.  The 
two models embody two alternatives for theorizing with incomplete 
information:  (1) direct generalization from established premises and (2) 
reasoning back to a general outline of likely real conditions from extreme 
cases where the analysis is simplified.  The first approach, in chart form, 
presents reasonable assumptions about the majority of the data and the 
typical aggregate motivations, based on what we already know about 
Congress.  The second approach speculates on the effects were all 
congresspersons to behave at each of two extremes.  It then argues why the 
aggregation of real activity most likely tend towards one of those extremes 
more than towards the other.  The strength of my preliminary theory of 
causation is that both models point to the same conclusion:  a varying 
aggregate enthusiasm for careerism impacts both bill introduction and 
amendment proposing. 
1.  First approach:  general assumptions and typical cases 
For the generalization approach, I begin by deconstructing my earlier 
simplified idealized graph of the correlation phenomenon (Figure 1).  First, 
I assume that the total number of bills and proposed amendments for any 
Congress are composites of (1) introductions caused by factors relatively 
stable in aggregate intensity, and (2) introductions caused by less-stable 
factors.  Based on these assumptions, the otherwise-inexplicable correlation 
between seemingly independent processes is a relationship between the 
unstable factors in bill proposing and amendment proposing, illustrated as 
follows. 
FIGURE 3: 
The Idealized Correlation Illustration Broken Down 
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In Figure 3, I assume that neither bill introduction nor amendment 
proposing is entirely erratic in intensity.  Instead, each phenomenon has at 
its core, activity that is relatively stable in intensity over time and not 
related to the other.  They are, however, similar in the aspect of their 
relative stability.  That is reasonable and consistent with the factors 
inveighing against a relationship between bill and amendment proposing.  
But on top of that core activity is a substantial amount of sponsorship in 
both the normal and constitutional legislation spheres that is highly-
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variable and may share a cause or causes. 
To assist the speculation on what may be the longitudinally-unstable and 
common causes, the next three figures examine the motivations that drive 
most of the sponsorship activity for member bills, committee bills, and 
proposed amendments. 
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FIGURE 4: 
General model of an individual congressperson’s motivation for 
introducing a particular bill.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A member bill is introduced . . . 
to achieve a 
policy result for 
its own sake . . . 
to gain credit for 
the introducer . . . and/or 
for increased 
reelection 
chances . . . 
for 
national  
status. 
via a local 
constituency 
topic arguably 
suited to 
legislation. 
via a national 
topic of 
constituent 
interest arguably 
suited to 
legislation. 
on a national 
topic suited to 
legislation . . . 
and/or 
      and/or 
and/or 
and/or 
on a 
constituent 
topic suited 
to 
legislation. 
evaluated 
generally. 
evaluated in 
line with 
constituency 
perspective. 
*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and 
underlie my theory, are indicated with bolder borders and arrows. 
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FIGURE 5: 
General model of the collective motivation of a majority of a congressional 
committee that votes to introduce a bill.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A committee bill is introduced . . .  
to achieve a 
policy result for 
its own sake . . . 
to gain credit for 
supporting 
committee 
members  . . . 
and/or 
for increased 
reelection 
chances . . . 
for 
national  
status. 
via a local issue 
for a member’s 
constituents 
within com-
mittee juris-
diction and  
suited to 
legislation. 
via a national 
topic of interest 
to multiple 
members’ 
constituencies 
and arguably 
suited to 
legislation. 
on a national 
topic suited to 
legislation . . . and/or 
and/or and/or 
on a local issue 
for a member’s 
constituents 
within com-
mittee juris-
diction and  
suited to 
legislation. 
evaluated 
generally. 
evaluated in line 
with the  
perspectives of 
multiple 
members’ 
constituencies. 
*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and 
underlie my theory, are shown with bolder borders and arrows. 
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FIGURE 6: 
General model of an individual congressperson’s motivation for proposing 
an amendment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following table, I compare side-by-side the two most-likely 
motivation types for member bills, committee bills, and proposed 
amendments which I draw from the three previous figures.  The table then 
examines the likelihood that the aggregation of one or the other of those 
motivation types would produce the bills–proposed amendments 
correlation. 
A constitutional amendment  
is proposed via a joint resolution . . .  
to achieve a policy 
result for its own 
sake . . . 
to gain credit for 
the introducer . . . and/or 
for increased 
reelection 
chances . . . 
for 
national  
status. 
via a national topic of 
constituent interest 
arguably suited to an 
amendment. 
 
on a national topic 
suited to a 
constitutional 
amendment . . . 
and/or
and/or 
evaluated 
generally. 
evaluated in 
line with 
constituency 
perspective. 
*The two paths that indicate the more common forms of motivation, and 
underlie my theory, are shown with bolder borders and arrows. 
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TABLE 1: 
Speculative General Theory of Causes of Correlation between Bill and 
Proposed Amendment (PA) Totals262 
Bills 
Member Committee263 
Proposed 
Amendments 
Likelihood this motivation factor 
caused per-congress bill totals to 
correlate with PA totals over time. 
Most member 
bills are 
introduced . . .  
 
(factor 1) to 
achieve a policy 
result for its 
own sake on a 
national topic 
suited to 
legislation, 
evaluated 
generally,  
 
or  
 
(factor 2) to 
gain credit for 
the introducer 
for increased 
reelection 
chances via a 
local 
constituency 
topic arguably 
suited to 
legislation.   
 
Most committee 
bills are 
introduced . . .  
 
(factor 1) to 
achieve a policy 
result for its own 
sake on a 
national topic 
suited to 
legislation, 
evaluated 
generally,  
 
                         or 
                
(factor 2) to gain 
credit for 
supporting 
committee 
members for 
increased 
reelection 
chances via a 
national topic of 
concern to 
multiple 
members’ 
constituencies 
and arguably 
suited to 
legislation. 
 
Most amendments 
are proposed . . .  
 
(factor 1) to 
achieve a policy 
result for its own 
sake on a national 
topic suited to a 
constitutional 
amendment, 
evaluated 
generally,  
 
or  
 
(factor 2) to gain 
credit for the 
introducer for 
increased 
reelection chances 
via a national topic 
of constituent 
concern, arguably 
suited to an 
amendment. 
 
 
 
 
Probability of correlation on factor 1: 
It is improbable that the quantity of 
independently valuable bills on 
national topics suited to legislation 
would track the quantity of 
independently valuable proposed 
amendments on national topics suited 
to constitutional amendment to such a 
degree and over a sufficient span of 
congresses to produce a statistically 
significant correlation. 
 
Probability of correlation on factor 2: 
It is more likely that what primarily 
causes the substantial variances in the 
magnitudes of sponsorship activity in  
both general and constitutional 
legislation to be similar to each other 
is “promiscuous careerism”:  a 
varying aggregate enthusiasm for 
careerism that impacts both bill and 
PA introductions.  That is, viewed in 
the aggregate, increases or decreases 
in enthusiasm for careerism 
simultaneously translates to both bills 
and PA introductions, though the 
primary constituent concerns targeted 
may be local topics in the former and 
national topics in the latter case. 
 
To summarize, Table 1 concludes that the substantial correlation 
                                                          
 262. I simplify this analysis in the sense that it considers only the most-likely categories 
of motivation for member bills, committee bills, and proposed amendments.  It does not 
contemplate the effect of mixed motivations and it is a general and not era-specific theory 
(though introduction procedures and dynamics varied as they evolved through historical 
eras). 
 263. Again, the contribution of committee bills to the bill totals diminishes substantially 
by the end of the nineteenth century. That is reflected in my era-by-era analysis, set forth, 
infra Part V. 
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between bill and amendment proposing totals over a span of Congresses 
signals that varying intensities of similar careerist motivations have 
determined the intensities of both bill and amendment sponsorship.  I call 
this phenomenon “promiscuous careerism” and will discuss it further in 
Part V.264 
The following will demonstrate how this conclusion is reached by other 
means and then will address the broader contours of this causation theory. 
2.  Alternative approach to causation with similar result:  negative 
implications of an analysis of extreme cases 
I begin this alternative speculation on causes with simple, idealized 
(extreme) conditions and then move to real-world assumptions.  This 
reasoning again leads to my tentative conclusion that the bill–amendment 
proposing correlation is a strong indicator of a predominance of careerism 
in aggregate amendment-proposing activity. The methodological theory 
here is that by first examining the predictable results of absolute or extreme 
types of congressional behavior under extreme or idealized political 
conditions, the potential impacts of that type of behavior are easier to see.  
Each of the factors are considered in the extreme case and actual conditions 
are less extreme; therefore, the impacts are also likely present to a lesser 
degree in reality. 
a.  Idealized, extreme conditions for initial speculation 
I assume that the motivation of an individual congressperson in 
introducing a particular bill, or joint resolution, in reality, ranges 
somewhere between “pure careerist,” which roughly translates into credit 
seeking or grandstanding, and “policy purist,” which represents an 
orientation to achieving some policy end for the independent virtue of that 
end.  To begin developing a model, however, I start by considering the 
simpler cases, either where every member of Congress is a pure careerist or 
where every member is a policy purist.  While not even the worst or the 
best historical congressperson has likely reached the extremes of either 
consistent pure careerism or consistent policy purism those archetypes at 
least provide outer boundary conditions within which to speculate.265 
The second factor I idealize to begin the analysis is the relationship 
between the potential bills and the potential proposed amendments the 
hypothetical congressperson might sponsor.  I assume perfect “topic 
                                                          
 264. See infra Part V.B. 
 265. See HANS VAN DEN DOEL & BEN VAN VELTHOVEN, DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 103 (Brigid Biggins trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1993) (1979) (relating 
the concept of careerists to American politics and the concept of paternalists (what I refer to 
as “policy purists”) to European politics). 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
2005] HISTORICAL AMENDABILITY 205 
overlap,” meaning that for every issue of constituent interest, there are both 
potential general bills and potential proposed amendments, regardless of 
how substantively appropriate or likely to succeed if introduced without 
political repercussions to the congressperson (based on, for example, their 
frivolous or otherwise unsuitable nature).  I refer to those options as 
“plausible” legislation. 
b.  Effects under the extreme conditions 
The idealized circumstances where all congresspersons are pure 
careerists and there is total topic overlap would produce strong, if not 
perfect, correlation in the per-Congress rates of bill sponsorship and 
amendment proposing as follows.266  The range of potential bills or 
proposed amendments the pure careerist considers introducing in each 
Congress would arise from the issues important either to local constituents 
or national constituencies with whom the congressperson seeks to gain a 
favorable reputation.  While pleasing those constituencies most effectively 
would require introducing legislation that becomes law, only a small 
percentage of bills introduced get that far.  So the primary opportunity for 
claiming credit will lie in the ability to claim the mere introduction of 
legislation.267  Now the congressperson can safely assume a low degree of 
voter sophistication with regard to this practice, though he or she cannot 
assume a complete absence of it.  Hence, within the limits of what on its 
face seems plausible—as all options are presumed to be under the perfect 
topic overlap condition—I conclude that the pure careerist will introduce 
both general legislation and amendment-proposing legislation on each topic 
he or she finds politically important to address. 
Under the pure-careerist conditions, perfect correlation arises when each 
issue is always plausibly amenable to exactly the same number of general 
bills and proposed amendments; then we would see exactly the same 
number of both types of legislation in each Congress, and hence a perfect 
correlation of bill and amendment proposing rates throughout history. 
Introducing the reality that the magnitude of total general bills is always 
so much greater than that of proposed amendments, however, would not 
preclude at least a strong correlation under this model.  Even with that 
substantial disparity between the magnitudes of total bills and total 
amendments in each Congress, strong correlation could easily exist in the 
idealized circumstance of pure careerism.  For instance, assuming still the 
                                                          
 266. But see id. (explaining that a politician would need to have a monopoly position to 
truly be purely policy-oriented and that the practical reality of maintaining political power 
requires him to be a careerist). 
 267. See id. at 119 (highlighting that because voters are short-sighted, politicians must 
focus on short-term measures such as bill introduction in order to be politically successful). 
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premise that all issues are amenable to both types of legislation, it may be 
the norm that one proposed amendment is thought to carry the punch of 
multiple general bills.  If that proposed amendment/general bills ratio were 
constant across issues and Congresses, we would still get perfect 
correlation in the rise and fall of rates for each Congress, though the 
absolute numbers of proposed amendments and bills would be quite 
different.  While there is obviously not a constant ratio in reality, some 
significant disparity between the number of proposed amendments and 
general bills deemed amenable to a particular issue seems endemic.  And 
common sense supports the proposition that even pure credit seekers view a 
proposed amendment as a less common act than a general bill. 
On the other hand, while perfect correlation is theoretically possible 
where the polar opposite motivation—policy purism—is present, the 
further assumptions required for that are too artificial to exist to any degree 
in reality.  If all congresspersons were policy purists, perfect correlation 
would have to occur in one of two ways.  First, it could be that from 
Congress to Congress, there is a fixed ratio of (1) topics seriously subject 
to268 general bills to (2) topics seriously subject to proposed amendments.  
What varies is the work load of members in the aggregate, causing a 
variation in the amount of legislative activity.  A second cause could be 
that a rise or fall in the number of topics seriously subject to proposed 
amendments just happens to also correspond to a rise or fall of the same 
magnitude in topics seriously subject to general bills, throughout history.  
Since both those potential causes of correlation in the policy purist model 
likely do not exist to any degree, I will assume their absence and assume 
that policy purism would lead to near-zero correlation.269 
c.  Implications under real-world conditions 
To the extent that sufficient topic overlap is present, then, it is not a far 
stretch from the above analysis to conclude that a substantial, albeit not 
perfect, correlation in the rates over history must imply that some degree of 
careerism has played a substantial role. 
In sum, approaching the question from multiple directions, I conclude it 
is very likely that some substantial degree of careerism is the necessary 
cause of any significant degree of correlation between bill and amendment 
totals.270 
                                                          
 268. “Seriously subject to” is shorthand for the proposition that legislation in the topic 
area could be offered to achieve desirable policy ends, as opposed to only provide a vehicle 
for claiming credit in addressing the topic. 
 269. See VAN DER DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 265, at 103 (concluding that a 
pure paternist, what I term a policy purist, cannot succeed in a two-party system unless he 
has a monopoly position). 
 270. The degree and level of influence of careerism defies precise assessment because of 
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B.  Speculations Beyond Explaining the Correlation:  Congressional 
Attitude Towards the Amendment Process as Group Psychology—the 
“Zeitgeist of Amendability in Congress”271 
Each of Part V’s separate contextual analyses (of each of the seven eras) 
ends with one additional speculation, beyond what has caused the degree of 
correlation between the bill and amendment proposing tallies of the 
particular era.  In those concluding speculations, I characterize the general 
congressional attitude towards the amendment process.  And I frame that 
characterization in terms relevant to the broader quest for understanding 
Congress’s “responsiveness” to amendment need.  Thus, it is an assessment 
of an evolving congressional group psychology. 
                                                          
various difficult-to-track variables.  For instance, the general theory raises the potential 
effect of diminished topic overlap—that is, variability in the earlier assumption that every 
issue of constituent interest is plausibly (though not necessarily seriously) amenable to both 
general and constitutional legislation.  Less than perfect or low topic overlap could have a 
dampening affect on the correlation in the case of pure credit seekers.  That is, the absence 
of the option of a plausible bill on an issue amenable to a proposed amendment or vice versa 
could defeat the correlation effect.  However, to the extent the congressional action is also 
influenced by an alternative credit seeking motivation, that may not occur. Specifically, it 
could be that congresspersons are motivated to record a volume of legislative activity, of 
any type, to a degree that varies from Congress to Congress.  To the extent that motivation 
is also at play the potential dampening affect of low topic overlap would be diminished.  
Nonetheless, the era-by-era analysis of Part V must consider whether comparatively low 
topic overlap is the culprit in eras of comparatively low or no correlation. 
Consider the simple example of a congressperson motivated only by the desire to create a 
record of action on topic X.  The more topic X is at least arguably amenable to both general 
and constitutional legislation, the more likely he or she may be to introduce both a general 
bill and proposed amendment.  For example, assume that today (1) anti-flag burning is a 
policy position reasonably pursuable only through constitutional amendment and (2) 
highway funding is pursuable only through general legislation, but (3) regulation of abortion 
funding could be argued to be pursuable through both (to some degree).  In this example, 
abortion funding regulation exhibits high topic overlap while anti-flag burning and 
highways are low overlap categories of potential legislation.  To the extent legislation in the 
aggregate tends toward the low topic overlap categories, the correlation effect I have 
described above may be dampened. 
The dampening dynamic can be easily seen if one considers how the above three 
legislative topic examples would be addressed in a simple legislative setting.  A 
congressperson in an era where the only issue of interest to his or her constituents is flag 
burning and who, through a careerist motivation, is interested only in doing something of 
record regardless of its likelihood of success, will propose an amendment and not introduce 
a bill. The sample congressperson likewise would introduce only general legislation in 
response to highway issues.  By contrast, that careerism-motivated congressperson in a 
district where abortion funding is on the minds of constituents would propose both an 
amendment and a bill (regardless of the likelihood of success), to maximize the careerist 
benefits of doing something of record.  Though all three situations involve only careerist 
motivations, the effect on legislative activity is translated into a correlation in bill and 
amendment proposing only in the last, where topic overlap is maximized.  In the first two, 
with zero topic overlap, the correlation effect of my Stage I Hypothesis above is completely 
undercut.  Zero topic overlap occurs only in my extremely simplified example and not, as 
will be made plain in the analysis that follows, in the history of Congress. 
 271. My use of “Zeitgeist” does not invoke any technical sense intended by its coiner, 
Hegel, or his followers but only its modern colloquial usage: the “general intellectual and 
moral state or the trend of culture and taste characteristic of an era.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2657 (1993). 
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I derive that “Zeitgeist” primarily from the interrelationship between (1) 
the position of the era on the “promiscuous careerism”—“motivation 
independence” continuum; (2) any evidence of limits on careerist activity 
rooted in a prudential view of the Constitution or amendment process that 
may predominate in that congressional era;272 and (3) the mass view of the 
likelihood of success of proposed amendments for the era.  Before 
continuing the analysis, some terms bear repeating, redefinition, or 
introduction:  (1) “Careerism” generally denotes some sort of focus on 
credit seeking.273  (2) “Promiscuous careerism” signifies a focus on credit 
seeking that does not distinguish between normal and constitutional modes 
of legislation.  Hence, unless handicapped by procedural or other external 
factors, promiscuous careerists will introduce both bills and proposed 
amendments in order to seek credit on topics arguably suited to both modes 
of legislation.274  (3) “Prudential careerists,” by contrast, for prudential or 
other reasons, are less promiscuous and distinguish between normal and 
constitutional modes of legislation.  Hence, they might not always seek 
credit through a proposed amendment every time one would plausibly suit 
a topic also addressed by a bill.  (4) “Motivation independence” is the 
legislative philosophy that treats normal and constitutional legislation as 
distinct, rarely-overlapping tools.  I speculate that most holding this view 
tend towards a non-careerist and policy-purist orientation.  But this class 
could include prudential careerists, to the extent they exist.  (5) Finally 
“policy purism,” again, signifies being purely oriented to achieving some 
policy end solely for the virtue of that end, independent of personal benefit 
to the legislator.  Policy purists introduce legislation, normal or 
constitutional, only that is well-suited to achieving the particular policy end 
and possesses a reasonable possibility of success.  All policy purists are 
motivation independent, though not necessarily vice-versa, since some 
tending towards motivation independence might nonetheless possess a 
degree of careerism in their psychologies. 
To repeat from the preceding Part V.A, the core of each of the seven era-
by-era analyses in Part V first characterizes the era as dominated by either 
motivation independence or promiscuous careerism (or neither), depending 
                                                          
 272. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 273. See also VAN DER DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 265, at 103 (defining a 
careerist as one who “maximizes the number of votes given to himself, to his party or to his 
regular coalition partners”). 
 274. Promiscuous careerism is closely related to but not necessarily synonymous with 
“pure careerism.”  See supra tbl.1.  Most pure careerists probably are promiscuous in this 
regard, though I admit the possibility of a purely self-promoting member of Congress who 
nonetheless distinguishes between the modes of legislation for one reason or another.  At the 
same time, many promiscuous careerists utilizing both modes of legislation whenever 
possible may not be at the extreme in their self-promotion and may have some policy 
orientation in their psychology. 
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on the numerical results (and contextual factors). 
My first move beyond those characterizations, in the quest for 
Congress’s “Zeitgeist of amendability” in each particular era, relates those 
qualities to the perceived likelihood of success of proposed amendments.  I 
hypothesize the combination of (1) a particular mass perception of 
likelihood of success and (2) a dominate character of careerism and its 
relationship to legislation sponsorship in an era would have the following 
effects on the aggregate level of amendment proposing: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Relationship between perceived likelihood of success of proposed 
amendments and their introduction rate, depending on the nature of 
careerism in the era 
 
 Low Perceived 
Likelihood of Success 
High Perceived Likelihood of 
Success 
Promiscuous-Careerism 
Dominated Era 
Likelihood of success is not likely to affect decision to 
propose amendment. 
Motivation-Independence 
Dominated Era 
Fewer proposals. Higher proposal rate, unless 
tempered by prudential view of 
process. 
 
The relationships identified in Table 2 potentially allow some simple 
backward moves from hard data of proposal rates (available to fill the 
interior of the table for each era) to the more elusive quality represented in 
the horizontal axis, the perceived likelihood of proposed amendment 
success.  Those moves, in turn, lead to my looser speculations on the 
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Zeitgeist of a particular congressional era with regard to the amendment 
process. 
For instance, to the extent the causation analysis leads to the conclusion 
that a particular era was dominated by motivation independence, then 
evidence of a relatively heightened rate of amendment proposing in that era 
would, under Table 2, lead to the conclusion that at that time, the 
generalized view was that the likelihood of success of proposed 
amendments was relatively high.  On the other hand, an era dominated by 
motivation independence where there is other persuasive evidence of a 
heightened view of the likelihood of success of amendment proposals, but 
where the proposing rate is nonetheless relatively low, would be evidence 
that a prudential view of the amendment process dominated in that era, 
dampening the rate of amendment proposing. 
In sum, in the more speculative final portions of each of the seven 
subsections of Part V, I use the apparently-necessary relationships of Table 
2 to predict the presence or absence of one of the qualities tracked in the 
table when it is otherwise not known.  Following that, I express the 
Zeitgeist for each congressional era as the sum of three factors:  (1) the 
degree of tendency towards promiscuous careerism instead of motivation 
independence, (2) the perceived likelihood of amendment proposal success, 
and (3) the degree to which the amendment process is viewed prudentially 
(e.g., tends toward prudential careerism). 
Looking at the seven eras together, I tentatively conclude that Congress 
has evolved to the modern era’s Zeitgeist of promiscuous, non-prudential, 
amendability pessimism through a series of intervening, distinct Zeitgeists, 
as detailed in Part V.275 
IV.  THE RAW DATA AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 
AMENDMENT AND BILL TOTALS 
Part IV provides the structure and basis for the contextual analysis of the 
numerical results that follows in Part V.  To do this, I (1) identify the 
specific sources of data and analytical methods used and (2) report the 
numerical results of the correlation analysis.  Since I have begun here with 
a theory of potential causes of a correlation between bill and amendment 
proposing rates, my later numerical confirmation of that correlation 
bolsters the causal premises I have identified as necessary for the 
                                                          
 275. Admittedly, the methodology of these additional speculations is even more 
attenuated than what I use to investigate the cause of the bill–proposed amendment 
correlations.  Survey questions interrogating the thinking of a scientific sampling of 
members of Congress on these issues would be more direct.  But they are not available for 
the historical periods.  I am, however, occasionally able to compare my speculations with 
the closest facsimile to psychological survey data that has come down to us—spontaneous, 
contemporaneous testimonials. 
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correlation to exist. 
A.  Methodology and Sources 
My analysis starts with two sets of numerical data:  (1) the total numbers 
of proposed amendments for each Congress (both houses) and (2) the total 
general bills proposed (as an indicator of overall congressional activity).  I 
first look at trends in the proposed amendment numbers from Congress to 
Congress and compare those trends with trends in the total numbers of bills 
proposed for each Congress.  Next, I compare my numerical conclusions 
with the substantive categories of proposed amendments that predominated 
in the seven historical eras delineated by the numerical analysis.  Finally, I 
compare this analysis with the other contemporary constitutional history,276 
the intellectual history of amendment scholarship, and constitutional 
theory, and the understanding of the legislative process developed in the 
preceding section.  For this study, I consulted numerous sources to compile 
proposed amendment totals for the full life of the Constitution.  Some 
sources overlapped, some were slightly inconsistent, and some I consulted 
merely for verification.  Unlike the bill totals, all the proposed amendment 
total sources are to some degree from secondary sources;277 at no point was 
I compelled to physically count individual proposed amendments.  
Nonetheless, the data are, in general, maddeningly dispersed in the 
literature.  This problem will not be magnified however, because 
contemporaneous year-by-year amendment totals are now added to a single 
Internet source.278 
Bill totals involved more meticulous counting than did the proposed 
amendments, especially in the earliest years.279  And like the proposed 
                                                          
 276. For those prominent amendment topics and relevant contemporary history, I rely 
extensively on VILE, supra note 55, at 540 app. D. 
 277. See infra app. B. 
 278. Congress’s website, thomas.loc.gov, provides full text searches of bills for each 
Congress, currently going back to the 101st Congress.  The proposed amendment data on 
the 104th Congress, for example, come from http://thomas.loc. 
gov/home/search.html, clicking on “Summary and Status Information about Bills and 
Resolutions” within the Advanced Search function, selecting the 104th Congress, and 
searching for proposed amendments.  Specifically, on November 3, 2004, the search 
“proposing amend constitution” in that database, with the options for (1) searching for word 
variants, (2) in all bills, (3) from both houses, and (4) with the outside number of bills to be 
retrieved at 1,000 selected, yielded a set of 166 proposed amendments (after factoring out a 
few bills returned that were not proposed amendments by, for example, scrutinizing any 
items that were not listed as either House or Senate joint resolutions). 
 279. The sources for bill totals are (1) 1st through 15th Congresses:  Senate and House 
Journals.  Hand counting of bills and joint resolutions enumerated in indices at the end of 
each volume.  Since that count was taken for this article, these early journals have been 
placed on Thomas in full-text format.  (2) 16th through 40th Congresses:  House Journal.  
(3) 41st through 80th Congresses:  Congressional Record, Appendices, Histories of Bills 
and Resolutions.  (4) 80th through 108th Congresses:  Congressional Record, Daily Digest.  
In the first issue of the Congressional Record for each new Congress, the “Daily Digest” 
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amendment totals, recent bill totals are now available on the Internet.280  
The table below shows my estimated proposed amendment and bill totals 
through the One-Hundred-Eighth Congress. 
TABLE 3: 
Raw Data 
 
 Congress Bills PAs PAs sent to states 
by Congress 
(sui generis) 1st 1789-91 223 188 12 amendments 
(including 27th) 
sent. 
2nd 1791-93 139 7 Bill of Rights (10 
amendments) 
ratified. 
3rd 1793-95 190 8 11th Amendment 
sent and ratified. 
4th 1795-97 160 1  
5th 1797-99 269 6  
6th 1799-01 201 7  
7th 1801-03 157 15  
8th 1803-05 233 13 12th Amendment 
sent and ratified. 
9th 1805-07 258 11  
10th 1807-09 265 17  
11th 1809-11 337 8 Titles of nobility 
amendment sent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founding 
12th 1811-13 386 6  
13th 1813-15 474 39  
14th 1815-17 537 18  
15th 1817-19 537 25  
16th 1819-21 496 12  
17th 1821-23 508 27  
18th 1823-25 568 18  
19th 1825-27 728 39  
20th 1827-29 678 16  
21st 1829-30 1043 10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22nd 1831-32 1139 19  
                                                          
contains a “Resume of Congressional Activity of the [previous Congress].”  That resume 
contains numerous aggregate legislative statistics, including total numbers of bills 
introduced.  The Resumes of Congressional Activity have recently become available on the 
Internet for Congresses since the 80th (1947-48) at http://thomas.loc.gov/. 
 280. The analysis in this article uses total numbers of bills without distinguishing 
between public and private bills.  While public bills would seem to be much more 
interesting correlates to amendment proposing activities, many of the above sources do not 
separate the public from the private bills in the aggregate totals they provide.  For 
convenience, this article relies on the totals provided in the above sources.  A cursory 
examination suggests that the private bill numbers are minimal in comparison with the 
public bills and do not corrupt the analysis. 
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23rd 1833-34 971 20  
24th 1835-36 1265 26  
25th 1837-38 1965 28  
26th 1839-40 1406 7  
27th 1841-42 1385 25  
28th 1843-44 1127 12  
29th 1845-46 1264 7  
30th 1847-48 1435 5  
31st 1849-50 1078 12  
32nd 1851-52 1076 5  
33rd 1853-54 1666 4  
34th 1855-56 1606 0  
 
 
Antebellum 
35th 1857-58 1691 3  
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36th 1859-60 1741 191  
37th 1861-62 1665 10 Corwin 
Amendment sent. 
38th 1863-64 1608 66  
39th 1865-66 2357 162 13th & 14th 
Amendments sent. 
13th  ratified. 
 
 
 
Civil War–
Early 
Reconstruction 
40th 1867-68 3710 109 14th Amendment 
ratified. 
41st 1869-70 5314 15 15th Amendment 
sent and ratified. 
42nd 1871-72 5943 35  
43rd 1873-74 6434 31  
44th 1875-76 6230 39  
45th 1877-78 8735 41  
46th 1879-80 10067 47  
47th 1881-82 10704 49  
48th 1883-84 11443 60  
49th 1885-86 15002 53  
50th 1887-88 17078 48  
51st 1889-90 19630 51  
52nd 1891-92 5682 64  
53rd 1893-94 12226 46  
54th 1895-96 14585 46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latter 
Reconstruction
–Gilded Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 55th 1897-98 18463 47  
56th 1899-00 20893 70  
57th 1901-02 25460 64  
58th 1903-04 26851 32  
59th 1905-06 34879 46  
60th 1907-08 38388 63  
61st 1909-10 44363 62 16thAmendment 
sent. 
62nd 1911-12 38032 93 17th Amendment 
sent. 
63rd 1913-14 30053 118 16th and 17th 
Amendments 
ratified. 
 
 
 
 
 
Populist–
Progressive 
64th 1915-16 30052 97  
65th 1917-18 22594 92 18th Amendment 
sent. 
66th 1919-20 21967 74 18th Amend. 
ratified. 19th sent 
& ratified. 
67th 1921-22 19889 107  
68th 1923-24 17462 108 Child Labor 
Amendment sent. 
69th 1925-26 23801 54  
70th 1927-28 23897 66  
 
 
 
 
Suffrage–
Prohibition 
71st 1929-30 24453 73  
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72nd 1931-32 21382 172 20th Amendment 
sent. 
73rd 1933-34 14370 75 20th Amend. 
ratified. 21st sent 
& ratified. 
74th 1935-36 18754 98  
75th 1937-38 16156 178  
76th 1939-40 16105 92  
77th 1941-42 11334 53  
78th 1943-44 8334 78  
79th 1945-46 10330 78  
80th 1947-48 10797 87 22nd Amendment 
sent. 
81st 1949-50 14988 75  
82nd 1951-52 12730 104 22nd Amendment 
ratified. 
83rd 1953-54 14952 162  
84th 1955-56 17687 142  
85th 1957-58 19112 179  
86th 1959-60 18261 222 23rd Amendment 
sent. 
87th 1961-62 18376 395 23rd Amendment 
ratified. 24th sent. 
88th 1963-64 17479 525 24th Amendment 
ratified. 
89th 1965-66 24003 499 25th Amendment 
sent. 
90th 1967-68 26460 524 25th Amendment 
ratified. 
91st 1969-70 26303 773  
92nd 1971-72 22969 524 26th Amend.  sent 
& ratified. ERA 
sent.   
93rd 1973-74 23396 382  
94th 1975-76 21096 326  
95th 1977-78 19387 373 DC representation 
amendment sent. 
96th 1979-80 12583 291  
97th 1981-82 11490 221 (Time for ERA 
ratification 
expires) 
98th 1983-84 10559 161  
99th 1985-86 9885 130 (Time for DC rep. 
amend. expires.) 
100th 1987-88 9588 118  
101st 1989-90 10352 184  
102nd 1991-92 12016 151 27th Amendment 
ratified. 
103rd 1993-94 9824 156  
104th 1995-96 6,808 166  
105th 1997-98 7,532 129  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modern 
106th 1999-00 8,968 80  
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107th 2001-02 8,956 86  
108th 2003-04 8,468 83  
Totals   1,200,902 11,165  
B.  Raw Numerical Results 
1.  Data plots 
First, I plotted the proposed amendment and bills introduced totals for 
each Congress as a line graph over time.  Because the total number of bills 
is so much greater than amendments for each Congress, I could not record 
the totals on the same graph and make any sort of comparison of their 
trends. In order to compare the two graphs, I standardized each data set.  
Thus each series was expressed in terms of the distance each data point 
(total for a Congress) was in standard deviations (not absolute numbers) 
from the mean for the whole series (set at zero on the graph).281 
Line graphs produced from this data, first of amendments and then of 
bills and amendments together, standardized for side by side comparison, 
follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 281. See RAND R. WILCOX, APPLYING CONTEMPORARY STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 38 
(2003) (describing the process by which to standardize a data set as subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation).  The purpose of standardizing a data set is to force 
the mean to be zero and the standard deviation to be one so that two different data sets can 
be compared. 
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FIGURE 7: 
Proposed Amendments 
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FIGURE 8: 
Bills/Proposed Amendments Standardized Series 
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Looking at the standardized plots together, I noticed not only what 
visually appeared to be an overall correlation, but also what seemed to be 
distinct eras of correlation, eras of no correlation, and eras of negative 
correlation.  Those visual observations lead to my numerical analysis to 
determine correlation, which in turn produced the breakdown into seven 
historical eras, as described below in Figures 7 and 8. 
2.  Correlation analysis 
In looking for greater precision than what could be visually observed in 
the line graphs, I first calculated the Pearson Correlation Coefficient282 for 
the entire data set, finding a statistically significant correlation of 0.448.  
Then I worked to define the seven distinct eras by trial and error.  I looked 
at correlations from the 3rd Congress to the 23rd Congress (sixty-six years) 
forward from each Congress (in conjunction with graphs of the bill and 
amendment distributions) to identify periods for testing.  I then 
experimented with the end points to identify the following seven eras.  The 
boundaries of the eras are set to capture maximum significant correlations 
in certain eras. 
Table 4, below, summarizes this.  The table includes the correlations for 
each of the seven eras as well as the statistical significance of each 
correlation value and the number of data pairs for each era (that is, the 
number of Congresses covered for each era).283  Finally, for each era I also 
checked for correlations between the number of bills proposed in one 
Congress and the number of amendments proposed in the next, consecutive 
Congress in order to determine whether amendment activity is a delayed 
response to bill proposing activity.  That is labeled “lag one.”  The two 
instances where the lag one correlations were more significant are also 
noted in the table. 
                                                          
 282. See GARY L. TIETJEN, A TOPICAL DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 115 (1986) (defining 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient as “a measure of the linear relationship between x and 
y”). 
 283. See WILCOX, supra note 281, at 142 (explaining that the level of significance is the 
probability of a “Type I error”).  A “Type I error” occurs when the hypothesis is rejected 
under circumstances when in fact the hypothesis was correct.  Id. 
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Analysis Results 
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 As Table 4 records, the correlations shift—non-linearly between low, 
moderate, and high, as well as between positive and negative, over the 
seven eras I defined. 
Those are the primary numerical characteristics for which I seek possible 
explanations from the external historical context in the era-by-era analysis 
that follows in Part IV.  That analysis is also informed by two additional 
quantitative measures:  (1) the evolution in the general magnitude of total 
bills and proposed amendments, on average, from era to era; and (2) the 
per-Congress rate at which Congress had passed proposed amendments to 
be sent on for states ratification, measured at the midpoint of each era.  
Those quantities evolved over the seven eras as follows: 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
222 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:145 
TABLE 5 
Additional Data and Calculations  
Mean Bills284 Per: Mean PAs Per: Amend. Passage Rate Era 
Congres
s Member 
Congres
s 
Membe
r 
Bills/PA 
Ratio 
Historical For Era 
Founding            
(1791–1812) 
344 2.26 9 0.06 38.2 1.63285 1.18286 
Antebellum          
(1813–1858) 
985 3.56 16 0.06 61.6 0.63287 0 
Civil War –     Early 
Recon.          (1859–
1868) 
2216 8 108 0.42 20.5 0.48288 0.6 
Procedural Revolution: Member bills now relatively freely introduced; sharp increase in 
introduction rates. 
Latter Recon.–
Gilded Age      
(1869–1886) 
8875 23.7 41 0.11 216.5 0.4289 0.11 
Populist–
Progressive  (1887–
1916) 
25,109 53.42 63 0.13 398.6 0.32290 0.13 
                                                          
 284. Number of House members for each congress found in Charlie Rose, History of the 
United States House of Representatives, 1789-1994 (1994), available at 
http://www.clerkweb.house.gov/histrecs/househis/lists/divisionh.htm.  Senate figures are 
derived from the United States Senate website, Learning About the Senate, Senate Statistics, 
at http://www.senate.gov/learning/.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2000). 
 285. By the midpoint of the first era, 1802, Congress was in its eighth incarnation and 
had passed thirteen amendments: the Bill of Rights; the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
(addressing congressional pay, passed 1789 but not ratified until 1992); the Eleventh 
Amendment (addressing states’ immunity, passed 1794, ratified 1798); and a Madisonian 
proposal on legislative apportionment, passed in 1789 but never ratified. 
 286. For the amendment passage rate in the Founding era, I am including the activity of 
the First Congress. And each era’s rate is for the entire era, not calculated at the midpoint. 
 287. By the 24th Congress in 1836, Congress had passed only two more amendments, 
the Twelfth (election of president and vice president, passed 1803, ratified 1804) and an 
amendment banning titles of nobility, passed 1810 but never ratified. 
 288. By the 38th Congress in 1864, Congress had passed just two more, the Corwin 
Amendment, passed 1861and never ratified, and the Thirteen Amendment (passed 1864, 
ratified 1865). 
 289. By the 45th Congress in 1878, Congress had passed two more amendments, the 
Fourteenth (passed 1866, ratified 1868) and the Fifteenth (passed 1869, ratified 1870). 
 290. By the 57th Congress in 1902, Congress had not passed any more amendments. 
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Suffrage–
Prohibition (1917–
1930) 
22,009 41.45 82 0.15 268.4 0.34291 0.43 
Modern 
(1931–2004) 14,913 27.88 218 0.41 68.4 0.32
292 0.24 
 
 Most striking in Table 5, besides the high numbers of proposed 
amendments during the Congresses of the Civil War and Modern eras, is 
the dramatic increase in general legislative bills during the Populist-
Progressive era.  That, now century-old, phenomenon persists as a peak in 
legislative activity despite the continued procedural easing that occurred 
after the peak of activity (where bill introduction that started off as a 
burdensome task for individual congresspersons became progressively 
easier) as well as subsequent increases in the size of Congress.  Also 
striking is that, by proportional comparison to general bills, proposed 
amendments were by far the rarest in the Populist-Progressive era. 
The ensuing analysis in this Article (1) compiles the qualitative history 
of the most constitutionally-significant political events, the most pervasive 
proposed amendment topics, the evolving character of the general 
legislative process for each of the seven eras, and indicia of congressional 
motivation and (2) suggests potential causes for the above-described 
quantitative variations, era by era, that may be derived from these compiled 
aspects of external conditions. 
V.  CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE NUMERICAL RESULTS ACROSS THE 
SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL ERAS 
To review, my general model suggests that what has caused the 
substantial variances in the magnitudes of sponsorship activity in both 
general and constitutional legislation to be similar to each other is a varying 
degree of promiscuous careerism (aggregate enthusiasm for careerism that 
impacts both bill and proposed amendment introductions).  That dynamic is 
at play even though the primary constituent concerns targeted by the 
                                                          
 291. Congressional passage picked up with the Progressive era. By the 68th Congress in 
1924, Congress had passed five more amendments: (1) the Sixteenth (authorizing income 
tax, passed 1909, ratified 1913); (2) the Seventeenth (direct election of senators, passed 
1911, ratified 1913); (3) the Eighteenth (Prohibition, passed 1917, ratified 1919); (4) the 
Nineteenth (women’s suffrage, passed 1919, ratified 1920); and (5) an the child labor 
amendment, passed in 1924 but not ratified. 
 292. By the 90th Congress in 1968, Congress had passed another six: (1) the Twentieth 
(terms and succession, passed 1932, ratified 1933); (2) the Twenty-First (repealing 
Prohibition, passed  1933, ratified 1933); (3) the Twenty-Second (limiting the president to 
two terms, passed 1947, ratified 1951); (4) the Twenty-Third (governing electors from the 
District of Columbia, passed 1960, ratified 1961); (5) the Twenty-Fourth (barring poll taxes, 
passed 1962, ratified 1964); and (6) the Twenty-Fifth (presidential succession, passed 1965, 
ratified 1967). 
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careerist impulse may be local topics for bills, and national topics for 
proposed amendments.  Again, the correlation through the Congress ending 
in the year 2004293 of 0.448 carries a statistical significance level of 0.001 
that lends reliability to the conclusion that the correlation reflects a real 
relationship294 over the full history of Congress.  But looking at discrete 
segments of congressional history also reveals the sporadic presence of a 
countervailing tendency.  That is, we sometimes see the converse of the 
phenomenon where this promiscuous careerism holds sway to such a 
degree as to produce a correlation.  It reveals specific eras of relative 
“motivation independence.” 
The main work of this section is to take the causation speculation further 
and consider the contextual reasons why either promiscuous careerism or 
motivation independence would dominate in each of the eras.  I looked for 
those causes in the contemporary conditions of each era, including the 
character of the major topics of proposed amendments, the nature of the 
process of introducing legislation in general, constitutionally significant 
external political events, and anecdotal evidence of the Zeitgeist of 
amendability in Congress. 
The question of whether context explains the dominance of promiscuous 
careerism or motivation independence, or neither, is made additionally 
complex for three of the eras.  In those, I must also address the causes of 
two further nuances in the relationship between bill and amendment 
proposing revealed by the numerical analysis in part IV:  (1) negative 
correlations and (2) lagged correlations.  Regarding negative correlations, 
in the simple causation speculations described in part III, I had conceived 
of promiscuous careerism as a causative third factor, independent of and 
driving both bill introduction and amendment proposing in the eras where it 
is present.  But a negative correlation also suggests a causal 
interrelationship between just bill and amendment proposing, such as trade-
off in energy, resources, or motivation between the two spheres of 
activity.295  Regarding lagged correlations, the numerical results also show 
that the causal phenomenon sometimes first manifests in bill proposing.  
That is, the correlation found to exist in some eras between bills in one 
Congress and proposed amendments in the next Congress—suggesting that 
bill proposing “leads” amendment proposing. 
Putting those predicted and extraordinary numerical findings together, 
the following era-by-era analysis considers that while the Modern era 
shows a consistent, long-term positive correlation between levels of bill 
                                                          
 293. Leaving out the sui generis 1st Congress. 
 294. Even stronger lag one correlation of 0.466, but less significant at 0.10. 
 295. In simple terms, a negative correlation between two variables indicates that when 
one variable is high the other variable is low. 
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and amendment proposing and the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age era 
exhibits an even stronger correlation, the intervening era of Suffrage-
Prohibition strangely shows a very strong negative correlation.  The 
correlation was negative in the Antebellum era as well.  That may reflect a 
time trade off in the Antebellum era due to the procedural difficulty of bill 
introduction in that early part of congressional history.  But in the Suffrage-
Prohibition era, bill introduction had become free and easy, suggesting a 
different cause, perhaps trade off in interest or energy.  Moreover, I 
speculate on that second peculiarity, that in the Antebellum and Populist-
Progressive eras the only significant strong correlation is found not 
between bills and proposed amendment totals in the same Congress but 
between general bill totals in one Congress and proposed amendment totals 
in the next Congress.  In other words, bill proposing “leads” amendment 
proposing in those eras.  Why?  Perhaps there is a longer “gelling period” 
for amendment proposing in those eras.  And because that lagged effect 
dissipates between the Populist–Progressive and Suffrage–Prohibition eras 
while most of the significant factors are similar, except for a diminution in 
reverence for the Constitution, I conclude that reverence for the 
Constitution was a likely cause of the gelling effect or the lag. 
In sum, on the main question of causation for the correlation across all 
the eras, I tentatively conclude that the independence of amendment-
proposing activity from more general careerist motives (promiscuous 
careerism) has diminished significantly since the late nineteenth century, 
with some striking, though perhaps historically-explained, anomalies, and 
has consistently remained very weak in the modern era beginning around 
1930.  Similarly, the congressional Zeitgeist of amendability, as 
summarized in Part I.B, also undergoes an interrupted decline across the 
history of Congress.  Those interruptions reflect varying reverence for the 
amendment process and assessment of the likelihood of success of 
proposed amendments. 
A.  First Era, Founding, 1791 to 1813296 
To some extent, the Founding Era must be treated as sui generis.  If my 
theory of causation is correct, then the severe procedural constraints in the 
House would have precluded a strong correlation at that time.  With 
member introductions so curtailed, the common forces theorized to cause 
bill and proposed-amendment totals to correlate could not get sufficient 
traction.  That is, there was not sufficient freedom of action on the bill 
                                                          
 296. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  -0.087 (effectively zero).  Significance:  0.799 
(not significant).  N:  11. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  344/2.26.  Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  9/0.06.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 1.5; For Era -
1.08. 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
226 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:145 
introduction side for the ebbing and flowing of careerist motivations to 
match what careerism might have been translating to the pace of 
amendment proposing.  On that account, the absence of finding a strong 
correlation here means my theory of what might cause a correlation 
survives to be tested in subsequent eras.297 
At the same time, though, the numerical result of no appreciable 
correlation at all,298 not just the absence of a strong one, may say more than 
just that my basic theory is not defeated.  That is because, the potential 
force of the careerism cause I have theorized is not eliminated by the 
procedural constraints, only weakened.  First, while member introduction 
of bills in the House was barred, it was allowed and being practiced in the 
Senate.  True, that is not enough to facilitate the appearance of a careerism-
driven correlation in the total numbers on its own, since, in this era, less 
than ten percent of the total bill output of Congress came from members.299  
So the more important contribution to careerism being able to drive bill 
introduction at least to some degree is that House members could exert 
their careerist motives through the committees.  That is, though it is a less-
direct conduit for individual careerism than are individual bills, careerism 
could impact aggregate numbers through committee bills in the way 
indicated by the right-hand, primary path of Figure Five:  “to gain credit for 
supporting committing members for national status.” 
Thus, since it seems that careerist motivations, to the extent they existed, 
could have produced at least a moderate correlation in the Founding era, 
the absence of any correlation at least supports the thesis that promiscuous 
careerism had not arisen at all or at least was substantially outweighed by 
motivation independence at this time. 
Indeed, from the combination of (1) the absence of any correlation and 
(2) the historical context, contemporary legislative and political conditions 
and expressed views of the viability of the Article V process, set forth 
below, I tentatively conclude that at least a moderate degree of motivation 
independence, evidencing a serious-mindedness about constitutional 
amendments, prevailed at this time. 
First, the absence of correlation could not result merely from a lack of 
issues to grandstand about.  Rather, the Founding era saw numerous 
                                                          
 297. Since the presence of a strong correlation would suggest a different cause than the 
one I have hypothesized. 
 298. Specifically, since the negligible correlation coefficient of -0.087 is not statistically 
significant, the correlation is effectively zero.  That is not surprising given the small number 
of Congresses examined (eleven). 
 299. See Cooper & Rybicki, supra note 192, at 187 (providing data in Table 10.2 that, as 
late as 1831, when member bills were on the rise, they comprised only ten percent of the 
total number of bills).  That is a speculation warranted by Cooper & Rybicki’s data that, as 
late as 1831, when member bills were on the rise, they comprised only ten percent of the 
total. 
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significant constitutional and political events in a short span.  Those 
include, for example, Chisolm v. Georgia;300 the Alien & Sedition Acts of 
1798;301 congressional control passing from the Federalists to Jefferson’s 
Democratic Republicans; Marbury v. Madison;302 Jefferson imposing an 
embargo to avoid war;303 and the War of 1812 itself.  Though the potential 
for local-constituency-pleasing on some of those issues may be debatable, 
its absence would not be determinative here; any careerist impulses at this 
stage were, in the aggregate, directed more towards general and national 
political positions than towards congressional reelection. 
It is true that, instead of credit-seeking topics related to those ripe 
political conditions, the major categories of proposed amendments 
identified by Ames and Vile are exclusively constitutional subjects not 
amenable to general legislation.304  Those significant categories of 
proposed amendment interest included:  (1) judicial jurisdiction, 
(2) legislative terms, (3) selection of the executive, and (4) titles of 
nobility.305  Notably absent from the prominent proposed amendment 
categories are proposals related to either the War of 1812 or the Alien and 
Sedition Acts; both issues were primary focuses of general legislative 
activity and seemingly ready targets for grandstanding constitutional 
legislation. 
Although we may consider the major categories of proposed amendment 
topics for each era to be presumptive evidence of major categories of 
amendment need, they only inform and do not determine the analysis.  That 
is, to the extent that the major categories of proposed amendment topics 
were topics that would not fit well into normal legislation, the opportunity 
for careerism to manifest in correlation between the aggregate bill and 
proposed amendment numbers is obviously diminished.  However, it does 
not preclude that phenomenon from occurring.  First, the accumulation of a 
                                                          
 300. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (construing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear 
suits brought against states without the states’ consent), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 301. 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (“Alien Act”) (authorizing the President of the United States to 
deport any illegal immigrant if the President considers the immigrant dangerous, even if the 
country was in a time of peace); 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (“Sedition Act”) (making it a crime to 
publish “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” regarding the government or government 
officials). 
 302. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of the constitutionality of 
acts of other branches). 
 303. See Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on Terror:  The Legacy of 
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 126-27 (2003) (discussing 
Jefferson’s belief that an embargo could be used to avoid war). 
 304. The Eleventh Amendment, overturning Chisholm, does not appear on the list of 
frequent proposals probably because Congress passed it the very year after the offensive 
Supreme Court decision. 
 305. See VILE, supra note 55, at 541-42 (listing, by year, the most frequent proposals 
introduced in Congress). 
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sufficient number of minor categories of amendment-need that, by contrast, 
are also bill-amenable may be sufficient.  Second, sufficient fodder for 
promiscuous careerists may also exist among the categories of topics of 
plausible normal legislation in the form of topics also amenable to 
amendments.  As noted above, that seems to hold for the Founding era. 
While Kyvig speaks to this era, suggesting that the germ of 
grandstanding was present in the latter part of the Founding era, his 
evidence is weak.  He observes: 
The fairly even balance between Federalists and Jeffersonian 
Republicans in Congress and state legislative majorities made it unlikely 
that any meaningful amendment could be adopted.  Yet to those people 
who wanted to make the strongest possible declaration of public policy, 
calling for alteration of the Constitution seemed an appropriate 
gesture . . . .306 
Kyvig’s evidence is that the eight amendments proposed by the 
“Hartsfield Federalists” in 1812 to “restore national harmony” following 
the declaration of war against Britain lacked a serious chance of success.307  
But the Hartsfield Federalists’ own apprehension of their impoverished 
chances of success is dubious, given the hubris with which this generation 
had sought change at the Founding itself.308  And while Kyvig also notes 
that the initial feeling at the Founding was that the Bill of Rights had taken 
care of all the problems,309 the observation directly accounts only for the 
low numbers of amendment proposals and does not necessarily establish 
that those proposals had to have been for credit-seeking purposes only. 
In sum, it seems likely that the great majority of both bills and proposed 
amendments in the Founding era were proposed for policy purist ends and 
not merely offered for personal credit, due to the difficulty of bill 
introduction and a serious and optimistic attitude towards the amending 
process.  Though the credit claiming motivation may have begun 
germinating at the outset, it appears to have been far too early in the history 
of Congress for it to have blossomed.  That is, it is likely that the era was 
dominated by motivation independence. 
Moreover, the nascent Zeitgeist of amendability likely was one of 
optimistic reverence.  In other words, a relatively high general sense of the 
likelihood of success of amendments proposed along with a prudential 
reverence towards the Constitutional and amendment process tempered the 
                                                          
 306. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 119. 
 307. Id. at 120-21. 
 308. See id. at 8 (elaborating on the debates taking place around the time of the 
Founding). 
 309. Id. at 85-88 (noting the perception that the Bill of Rights was an example of how the 
amendability of the Constitution provided a method to define, empower and control 
republican government). 
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frequency of amendment proposing.  The extreme cynicism towards 
likelihood of success in the constitutional amendment process that 
Jefferson later expressed310 had not taken hold (though it likely began to 
seep in towards the end of the era).  Rather, the Bill of Rights and two 
additional proposed amendments cleared the congressional hurdle by 1794, 
one of which had been ratified by the states in 1798.  Perhaps the first germ 
of cynicism about the process as a whole had been planted by the failure of 
the states to ratify Congress’s 1789 proposal that would later become the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment.311  But that failure likely would have been 
attributed more to the peculiar substance of the proposed amendment rather 
than the insurmountabilty of the congressional gate-keeping stage.  Given 
that relative optimism about the likelihood of success, then, the relatively 
low level of proposed amendments offered, nine per Congress and 0.06 per 
member per Congress (the lowest of all seven eras), suggests, under the 
dynamic I posit in Table 2, a prudential reverence towards the exceptional 
character of the amendment process. 
B.  Second Era, Antebellum, 1813 to 1858312 
In contrast to the Founding, the next era, Antebellum (1813 to 1858), did 
yield a substantial, significant correlation, albeit a negative one.  Moreover, 
the negative correlation was even stronger and more significant at lag one 
(between bill totals in one Congress and proposed amendment totals in the 
next Congress).313 
While there are no obvious reasons, a hypothesis for the correlation 
being negative is that (1) there was no force tending towards positive 
correlation because promiscuous careerism, minimal at best in the 
Founding era, still had not attained prominence in this Antebellum era; and 
(2) the negative aspect of the correlation arose because the energy or 
political capital required for bill introduction by members of Congress 
made focusing on general legislation versus amendment proposing an 
either/or activity. 
First, the absence of a positive correlation is consistent with the character 
                                                          
 310. See Letter to George Hay, supra note 2 (speculating that the increase in the number 
of states in the Union will curtail future success of constitutional amendments). 
 311. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 461 (discussing the Twenty-Seventh Amendment’s 
original proposal in 1789 and its subsequent history and ratification). 
 312. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  -0.464 (moderate). Significance:  0.026 
(significant).  N:  23.  Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  985/3.56.  Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  16/0.06.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.58; For Era, 
0.  Moreover, the lag one correlation is a strong -.591, with a significance level of 0.003. 
 313. Because the period encompassed twenty-three Congresses, the greater statistical 
significance over the Founding era, which was much shorter, is not surprising.  What holds 
some surprise, however, are both that the correlation is negative and that it is an even higher 
negative correlation of 0.591 at lag one. 
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of the major categories of proposed amendments in this era.  None of the 
major categories of proposed amendments seem very susceptible to 
contemporaneous non-constitutional legislation efforts.  The Antebellum 
era roughly corresponds to Ames’s second period which featured:  
“General Alterations,” featuring proposals directed to the election, 
competence, terms, and duties of the members of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches, abolition, war powers, and executive powers.314  
Ames finds very little individual-rights proposals because the Bill of 
Rights, as Kyvig agrees, had allayed recent concerns.315 
More importantly, evidence that the absence of a correlation corresponds 
to a lack of dominant promiscuous careerism may be found in the series of 
constitutionally significant historical events that frame this era:  (1) 
McCulloch v. Maryland,316 upholding congressional power to create U.S. 
banks through a broad interpretation of Congress’s Necessary and Proper 
Powers while finding a corresponding substantial limit on the states’ power 
to interfere with such federal endeavors (through taxation, in that case); (2) 
the Missouri Compromise of 1820317, establishing Maine as a free and 
Missouri as a slave state and setting the 36’30” parallel as the demarcation 
for the slave status of future states; (3) the emergence of the Monroe 
Doctrine;318 (4) Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,319 holding 
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to states; (5) Luther v. Borden,320 
holding the resolution of a military struggle for control of Rhode Island to 
be a political question outside the competence of judicial review; (6) the 
Compromise of 1850,321 a series of five bills admitting California as free, 
                                                          
 314. See HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 19-22 (Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1897) (describing the proposed amendments to the 
Constitution between 1804 and 1860). 
 315. Though Ames emphasized that this era, more than the other three in the 
Constitution’s first hundred years, was marked by conflict between broad constuctionists 
and strict constuctionists in Constitutional interpretation.  AMES, supra note 314, at 20, 22. 
 316. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 317. See 3 Stat. 545 (1820) (admitting Missouri into the Union as a slave state, admitting 
Maine into the Union as a non-slave state, and prohibiting slavery in certain territories); see 
also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justice in Plaincloths:  
Reflections From History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1425 n.93 (2005) (noting that the 
Missouri Compromise was repealed by Congress and declared unconstitutional in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). 
 318. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 12-24 (1823) (providing President Monroe’s annual address 
to Congress which outlined the United State’s interest in the Western Hemisphere and 
warned European nations to stop colonizing in the area).  This policy later became known as 
the Monroe Doctrine. 
 319. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 320. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 321. See W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty:  Legal, Historical, 
and Related Considerations, 48 HOW. L.J. 1, 33 (2004) (“The Compromise of 1850 
provided that the United States would fulfill the following requests:  admit California as a 
free state; organize the rest of the territories without restrictions on slavery; outlaw the slave 
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establishing the rest of the Mexican session as territories of Utah and New 
Mexico without restrictions on slavery status, settling a border dispute 
between Texas and New Mexico, abolishing slavery in the District of 
Columbia, and adding teeth to the Fugitive Slave Act;322 (7) the Kansas-
Nebraska Act of 1854,323 allowing Kansas and Nebraska to each decide the 
slavery question for itself; and (8) Dred Scott v. Sandford,324 declaring 
blacks to be barred from national citizenship and finding the Missouri 
Compromise to be unconstitutional.  Most of these events provided a 
sufficient base for at least plausible legislation in both normal and 
constitutional spheres. 
The second factor contributing to the negative correlation was  the high 
costs of individual legislation rising from the continuing difficulty and 
confusion surrounding the bill introduction process.  While senators had 
achieved free introduction, the House was still in the latter half of Cooper 
and Young’s Stage I (which ends in 1821),325 with little to no bill 
introduction by members of Congress, and then in Stage II’s “Conflict and 
Confusion over the Introduction of Business.”326 How the difficulty of 
normal legislation related to the activity level for the comparatively 
unencumbered joint resolution process for amendments, of course, is not 
clear.  I speculate that the marshalling of resources to bring general 
legislation was so burdensome that the degree to which it was employed 
produced a deficit in the general resources of motivation predicate to 
initiate legislation in the constitutional arena.327 
                                                          
trade in the Capitol Washington, D.C. (but not slavery itself); and enact a tougher Fugitive 
Slave Act.”). 
 322. See Kaczorowski, supra note 317, at 1426 (explaining that the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1793 was enacted to enforce the constitutional right of slave-owners to recover their 
runaway slaves).  The Fugitive Slave Act was strengthened in 1850 after Congress received 
pressure from southerners.  The Fugitive Slave Acts were later repealed by Congress during 
the Civil War.  Id. at 1428. 
 323. See 10 Stat. 277 (1854) (organizing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas and 
allowing territories west of the Missouri to make their own determination regarding the 
legality of slavery). 
 324. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  This case is commonly referred to as the “Dred 
Scott” case. 
 325. Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 69. 
 326. Specifically, the Antebellum period encompasses the first two phases in Stage II—
Phase One (1821-1837)—and most of Phase Two (1837-1861).  Id. at 71, 75.  Cooper and 
Young note that Stage I saw a slow transition from an exclusive committee of the whole 
method of bill introduction to introduction by standing committees as well.  Id. at 69-71.  
They then label Phase One of Stage II as “Conflict and Confusion over the Introduction of 
Business” because the committee referral process and committee system were not well 
settled and confusion and discord reigned.  Id. at 71-72.  Phase Two, beginning in 1937, 
offered hope for clarity, with the rule changes that made individual member’s introduction 
of bills on leave a realistic option.  Id. at 75-76.  However, “by the late 1850s the conduct of 
business in the House had become chaotic and a source of severe frustrations for members.”  
Id. at 78. 
 327. A more-detailed study, separating Senate bill and amendment totals from House bill 
and amendment totals, however, might prove otherwise. 
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More surprising and mysterious than the negative correlation, though, is 
that the negative correlation is stronger and more significant at lag one.  
Why does there appear to be a stronger relationship between the number of 
bills proposed in one Congress and the number of amendments proposed in 
the next Congress? 
This lagged relationship may provide a more specific understanding of 
the dynamics around what I just hypothesized to be the cause of the 
negative correlation.  Bill activity preceding amendment activity suggests 
that if there is a causal relationship between the two, causation runs from 
bill proposing to amendment proposing, and not vice versa.  It may be that 
the one-congress delay is caused by a larger run up time or “gelling period” 
for amendment proposing.  That is, if bill proposing saps energy away from 
amendment proposing to produce the negative correlation, the effect is 
more strongly seen in the subsequent Congress.  Another cause might be 
reverence for the Constitution and amendment process. 
Finally, regarding the Zeitgeist of amendability, if this era truly falls in 
the bottom sector of Table 2, due to it truly being dominated by motivation 
independence, as the correlation analysis seems to suggest, and if the 
perceived likelihood of amendment success is lower in this era than in the 
Founding era, then we might expect to see fewer amendment proposals 
here.  But we do not.  Rather, the mean proposed amendments per member 
remain the same as that in the Founding (0.6), and the mean proposed 
amendments per Congress nearly double (from nine to sixteen).328  That 
suggests a combination of two things:  (1) at least the germ of promiscuous 
careerism is present (which, though still not strong enough to manifest in 
the correlation analysis, at least is more prominent than in the Founding) 
and (2) on a broad aggregate level, the view of the likelihood of 
amendment success is not quite as dim as anecdotal evidence suggests.  To 
the extent there remains an aggregate view that success is still reasonably 
likely, then, by Table 2, a prudential view of the process tempering the 
number of proposals does not dominate to the same extent present in the 
Founding era.  (On the other hand, the lagged relationship in the negative 
correlation does suggest some reverence.)  In short, compared to the 
Founding era, the Zeitgeist in the Antebellum seems to have become 
somewhat less optimistic and somewhat less reverent. 
A concluding caveat on causation:  the analysis for this era must 
recognize that the closer we moved towards the Civil War, the deeper the 
sectional divisions grew and the more pervasive sectional differences 
became in the dominant political issues of the day.329  Under those 
                                                          
 328. Tbl.5, supra Part IV.B.2. 
 329. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons For an Endangered Movement:  What a Historical 
Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has to Teach 
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circumstances, especially with the carefully maintained near fifty-fifty split 
in the Senate between slave and free states, one would assume the real 
likelihood of success on any amendment proposal to be increasingly low.  
That is, in fact, reflected in the near vanishing of amendment proposing 
activity in the last decade before the Civil War.330  The 32nd to 35th 
Congresses, 1851-1858, introduced just twelve amendment proposals.  That 
contrasts starkly with the 36th Congress, which is the beginning of the next 
era, and had 191 proposed constitutional amendments. 
C.  Third Era, Civil War–Early Reconstruction, 1859 to 1868331 
With this era’s short duration and disrupted Congress, its lack of 
correlation may be sui generis.  It is either so unique a political era that 
amendability patterns are suspended or so short an era that the small 
sample size cannot yield a meaningful statistic. 
In contrast to the ambiguity of this era within the history of 
amendability, one definite and enduring feature of congressional activity 
emerges at this time:  the bill-proposing process is finally clarified at the 
beginning of Cooper and Young’s Phase Three in 1861.332  The newly 
clarified bill-proposing process inaugurates a steady rise in bill-proposing 
all the way through the extreme jump in activity at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries that defines the 
Populist–Progressive era. 
For the amendment-proposing ledger, there is a sharp increase in 
amendment proposing activity just before, during, and just after the Civil 
War.  Ames recognizes that, in this historical era marked by the last days of 
slavery, extreme North-South conflict and concern with state sovereignty, 
federalism, and nationhood, the civil war, emancipation, and the beginning 
of reconstruction, the once-ignored legal status of individuals became 
extremely important.333  Accordingly, amendment proposals during this era 
were dominated by issues of slavery, the executive, apportionment, 
suffrage, and equal rights—culminating with the first two Civil War 
amendments (Thirteenth Amendment, proposed 1864, ratified 1865; 
                                                          
Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 251 (2001) (noting the increase in tension and 
division among the country as the Union moved closer to the Civil War). 
 330. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 134 (“Amendment declined during the antebellum era 
because most other problems could be dealt with by the lesser means of ordinary legislation, 
executive determination, or judicial review; the truly monumental constitutional problem of 
the age could be settled only by revolution.”). 
 331. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  0.191 (effectively zero).  Significance:  0.759 
(not significant).  N:  5. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  2216/8.  Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  108/0.42.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.42; For Era, 
0.8. 
 332. Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 83-91. 
 333. See AMES, supra note 314, at 23 (noting that after 1864 Congress’s focus shifted 
from war measures to the amendability of the Constitution). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, proposed 1866, ratified 1868).334 
Given the volatility of Congress as a functioning institution at this time 
and the short duration marked by this episode in the numerical results, only 
the roughest speculations about amendability can be made.  On one hand, 
the falling of procedural impediments to grandstanding and the absence of 
a correlation between the numbers of proposed amendments and non-
constitutional bills might lead to the conclusion that motivation 
independence continued to dominate in this era over any tendency towards 
promiscuous careerism.  On the other hand, the lack of correlation may 
simply be a result of the small sample size. 
The exceptionalism of the era also obscures the speculations on the 
Zeitgeist of amendability.  For instance, Kyvig notes that at least one 
historian has asserted that the 191 proposal increase in the 36th Congress 
represented grandstanding rather than serious attempts to amend,335 and has 
concluded that there was a near impossibility of amendment during that 
timeframe.336  Kyvig, on the other hand, disputes that assessment by 
pointing to the fact that, during the Articles of Confederation era, all but 
one state had allowed amendments to the Constitution in order to rescue the 
Union.337  The central impediment to understanding the era lies in 
distinguishing the North-South divide from the general amendability 
Zeitgeist.  But it makes sense to do so since, as set forth below, with the 
close of Reconstruction, Congress as an institution reverts at least partially 
to the pre-war evolutionary path of the character of the legislative process. 
D.  Fourth Era, Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age, 1869 to 1886338 
The numbers for the Latter Reconstruction–Gilded Age era show a 
substantial shift from those of the Civil War–Early Reconstruction and 
prior eras.  A very strong and statistically significant 0.826 correlation 
establishes the relationship between bill and amendment proposing that, 
according to my working model, shows that promiscuous careerism 
predominated.  In sum, the dissipation of the conflict of the era that 
preceded the Civil War and streamlining of procedures combined to usher 
                                                          
 334. See VILE, supra note 55, at 544-45 (providing a list of the most frequent proposals 
introduced in Congress). 
 335. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 152 (presenting the argument that supporters of 
constitutional reform “were simply going through motions they knew to be hopeless”). 
 336. Id.; see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 547 (1978) (explaining the many hurdles that would have to 
be overcome in order for a constitutional amendment to take hold). 
 337. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 152.  Thus, even if the success of a constitutional 
amendment would require near unanimity among the states, that level of agreement had 
been reached in the past and could potentially be reached again. 
 338. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  0.826 (high).  Significance:  0.006 (significant).  
N:  9. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  8875/23.7.  Mean Proposed Amendments/Per 
Member:  41/0.11.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.4; For Era, 0. 
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in an era where congresspersons were free to engage in credit seeking 
through both bill introduction and amendment proposing.  The fact that 
levels of activity in each of these categories rose and fell in such substantial 
accord strongly suggests that credit-seeking, rather than conviction, now 
predominated in the proposing of amendments. 
Promiscuous careerism’s first significant appearance in this Latter 
Reconstruction–Gilded Age era is consistent with two factors external to 
the numerical analysis.  First, the impediments to bill introduction are 
finally cleared339 and congressional activity has moved sufficiently beyond 
the immediate institutional anomaly of the Civil War period.  Second, the 
primary categories of proposed amendments in the Latter Reconstruction–
Gilded Age era appear to exhibit a high degree of topic overlap, making 
ideal conditions in which promiscuous careerism may operate.  Ames 
characterized roughly this same time span, 1870-1889, as comprising two 
classes (1) form of government and (2) governmental powers.340  More 
specific is Vile’s list of the most frequent categories of amendment 
proposals during this time, which included:  (1) suffrage; (2) executive 
eligibility, terms, choice; (3) legislative compensation; (4) direct election of 
senators; (5) war claims prohibition; (6) Prohibition; and (7) the item 
veto.341  Of paramount significance is that most of the topics easily could 
have been subject to normal legislation as well.  All but two of the general 
areas embraced by those topics (presidential and senatorial elections) 
invoked constituent interests or policy goals also amenable to bills. 
Unlike the prior three periods, the numerical results for this era do not 
require clarification from the historical context.  The reasonable 
assumptions underlying my working model do not lead to any likely causes 
for a substantial correlation other than promiscuous careerism.  That is not 
to say, however, that in eras that lack the correlation, such as the prior 
three, the converse is proven.  I do not presume the absence of promiscuous 
careerism from the absence of the correlation.  While such is one 
possibility, another hypothesis was that promiscuous careerism dominated 
but its representation in the numerical analysis was dampened by other 
factors.  That was a primary issue for which I examined contextual factors 
                                                          
 339. This era spans the majority of Cooper and Young’s Phase Three of bill introduction 
with its improved clarity, and the first half of Phase Four, where member bills dominated.  
Cooper & Young, supra note 195, at 75, 83.  Rule changes in 1867 and 1872 led to 
improved clarity and member bills on leave increased substantially.  Id. at 83-86.  In fact 
“[b]y the late 1870s the granting of leave had long been automatic and the requirement for 
notice generally ignored.”  Id. at 87.  Then with Phase Four, beginning in 1881, “the 
dominance of member bills was further consolidated” and “the modern procedure for bill 
introduction” emerged.  Id. at 91. 
 340. AMES, supra note 45, at 24. 
 341. See VILE, supra note 55, at 545-46 (listing the most frequently proposed 
constitutional amendments). 
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in the prior three eras. 
In the present era, where there is the correlation, I test the promiscuous 
careerism conclusion against the contextual data only for any reason to 
disbelieve it.  Here, there is none.  The prominent events in constitutional 
history included:  Johnson’s impeachment in 1868,342 the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877,343 the emergence of the National American 
Woman Suffrage Association,344 the emergence of the national Prohibition 
party,345 the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) and Civil Rights Cases (1883),346 
and the emergence of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union.347  Those 
events, independently or together, are not sufficiently skewed towards only 
constitutional or legislative action to preclude promiscuous careerism from 
dominating the flow of legislative activity. 
Also, an expansion of the perceived scope of normal legislation paved 
the way for unrestricted promiscuous careerism to manifest through 
correlation in bill and proposed amendment totals.  As Kyvig notes, the 
Civil War initiated a change in prevailing constitutionalism.348  Instead of 
whether the Constitution specifically authorized an action, the question 
became whether its implied powers were sufficiently broad to condone it.349  
                                                          
 342. See generally CHESTER G. HEARN, THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON (2000) 
(providing background information on the circumstances surrounding Johnson’s 
impeachment). 
 343. ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND BLACK SUFFRAGE:  LOSING THE VOTE 
IN REESE AND CRUIKSHANK 117 (2001). 
 344. See JANE HANNAM, MITZI AUCHTERLONIE & KATHERINE HOLDEN, INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 200-01 (2000) (explaining the formation of the 
Association in 1890 via the merger of the National Woman Suffrage Association and the 
American Woman Suffrage Association). 
 345. See ERNEST H. CHERRINGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA:  A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE LIQUOR PROBLEM AND THE 
TEMPERANCE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENTS TO THE 
CONSUMMATION OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 167 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1920) (noting that 
the national Prohibition party “pioneered the path of political activity for the Prohibition 
movement” and laid the foundation for the eventual passage of the Prohibition 
Amendment).  But see DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 46 (2000) 
(arguing that the Anti-Saloon League was a more effective advocate than the Prohibition 
Party). 
 346. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not grant Congress the ability to prohibit racial discrimination by private 
entities, only state and local actors); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly so that its provisions could not be held to extend to 
further limit states’ rights to legislate its citizens beyond the prohibition of slavery). 
 347. See RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE:  THE QUEST FOR POWER AND 
LIBERTY, 1873-1900 10-11 (1981) (discussing several factors contributing to the 
development of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union including:  the emergence of an 
upper and middle-class in America, the progress of industrialization leading to middle-class 
women devoting themselves to homemaking as a full-time endeavor, the fall of the birthrate 
in the nineteenth century leading to the increase of leisure time for women to devote to 
activism, the influx of immigrants to provide childcare and other domestic services, and the 
increase in educated women). 
 348. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 154. 
 349. Id. 
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In addition to being continuing grist for the proposed amendment mill, 
many government legislative objects previously thought to be beyond 
constitutional powers and thus requiring amendment could now be seen as 
potentially subject to general legislation within the broadly construed 
implied powers granted by the Constitution.350  At the same time, Kyvig 
muses that while Antebellum amendment proposing mostly focused on 
limiting the federal government, the Civil War initiated a shift toward 
amendment proposals that sought to broaden federal power.351 
Turning to the Zeitgeist of amendability, considering all the relevant 
indicators together confirms a lack of reverence for the process (axiomatic 
to an era truly dominated by promiscuous careerism) and pessimism 
towards the likelihood of success of proposed amendments.  If this era truly 
ushers in strong dominance of promiscuous careerism in Congress, then a 
perceived low likelihood of success would not have seriously deterred 
amendment proposing.  Indeed, compared to the Antebellum period, the 
mean proposed amendments per Congress for this era increased by 256% 
and the rate per member nearly doubled.352  That, despite Ames’s 
observation that the proposal faced a “prospect of almost certain failure”353 
(which Kyvig agrees the politicians believed though he disputes whether it 
was true).  The amendment introduction process, Ames notes, merely 
reflected “waves of popular feeling” in the same manner as general 
legislation.354 
E.  Fifth Era, Populist–Progressive, 1887 to 1916355 
The prior era, Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age, appears to have seen 
the emergence of promiscuous careerism as a major factor driving 
amendment proposing rates.  For the Populist-Progressive era, however, a 
substantial shift in the numerical analysis suggests a suspension of the 
prominence of promiscuous careerism as a motivation underlying 
amendment proposing.  Here, the numbers reflect an insignificant 
(effectively zero) 0.345 direct correlation and a significant negative 
correlation of 0.638 at lag one. 
The analysis of whether promiscuous careerism has gone into remission 
must begin with the huge spike in the Populist-Progressive era of the 
                                                          
 350. Id. at 154-55. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Tbl. 5, supra Part IV.B.2. 
 353. AMES, supra note 45, at 25. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  0.345 (effectively zero). Significance:  0.207 (not 
significant).  N:  15. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  25,109/53.42.  Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  63/0.13.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.32; For Era, 
0.13.  Moreover, the lag 1 correlation is a high -0.638, with a significance level of 0.001. 
LATHAM OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:32:14 PM 
238 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:145 
numbers of bills being proposed:  25,109 per Congress (53.42 per member) 
on average.  Even factoring in the addition of new members of Congress, 
that is more than two and a half times the rate of the prior era, Latter 
Reconstruction-Gilded Age, and twenty-times the rate in the Antebellum 
Era. 
That raises the question of why, with such a dramatic increase in the 
volume of legislative activity, the strong and significant correlation 
demonstrated in the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age Era disappears.  
Moreover, why is it instead replaced by a significant negative correlation at 
lag one? 
The potential cause I suggested for the negative correlation at lag one in 
the Antebellum era seems explicative of only half the story in this era.  
While there may also be a “gelling time” for amendments to explain the 
lag,356 the explanation for the negative aspect of the correlation in the 
Antebellum era,  time, energy, or political capital trade off primarily due to 
the procedural difficulties faced by individual legislators, does not hold in 
this new era of unfettered bill introduction.357 
But while there may no longer have been impediments to introducing 
legislation in general, it may be that the focus of legislative energy was 
again an either/or proposition in the Populist–Progressive era.  The nature 
of the amendment proposing interest at this time supports that hypothesis.  
Of the six main categories of significant proposals Vile358 lists—direct 
election of senators, income tax, presidential term length and limits, 
uniform laws for marriage and divorce, women’s suffrage, and dates of 
congressional sessions—four are susceptible only to constitutional, rather 
than general, legislation.359  It suggests that motivation independence 
dominated over promiscuous careerism. 
In addition to the subject matter of the amendment proposals themselves, 
the major historical events of this period suggests a cause for independent 
attention to constitutional legislation:  the Centennial of Constitution; the 
Populist and Progressive movements; the Pollock decision in 1895360 
outlawing income tax; the Spanish-American War; the proposal of what 
would become the Sixteenth Amendment in 1909 and its ratification in 
                                                          
 356. But even if that explanation were so, it only raises the question of why that delay 
only appears in the Antebellum and Populist-Progressive eras. 
 357. There also is a small possibility that this phenomenon is a fluke:  the significance 
level of our negative correlation (0.011) is not nearly as good as in the prior error (0.006), so 
we cannot be as confident that -0.638 gestures at a true relationship.  At minimum, it is clear 
that there has been shift away from the very strong positive correlation we saw in that Latter 
Reconstruction era. 
 358. Now in the second century of the Constitution, we are beyond Ames. 
 359. VILE, supra, note 55, at 546-49.  
 360. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
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1913,361 reinstating the income tax; and the Seventeenth Amendment,362 
bringing direct election of senators, also ratified in 1913.363 
Turning to the amendability Zeitgeist, those factors arguing for serious-
mindedness of congressional amendment proposing must be reconciled 
with Kyvig’s assessment that the era exhibited an unprecedented pessimism 
in popular perception of amendability.  Kyvig cites the turn of the century 
as the high-point in amendability pessimism, noting one scholar’s assertion 
that “[a] constitutional amendment is so remote a possibility as scarcely to 
be worth consideration.”364  This is not a surprising sentiment given that a 
constitutional amendment had not occurred by the normal process since 
1804.  That feeling continued into the second decade of the twentieth 
century when, in 1912, the Progressive Party’s platform called for an 
Article V change to approve amendments by a popular majority of the 
states.365  Not until 1913, with amendments authorizing the income tax 
(Sixteenth)366 and direct election of senators (Seventeenth),367 did 
perceptions begin to change.  In fact, the Sixteenth Amendment was 
proposed by wealthy, conservative Senate Republican leader Nelson 
Aldrich (as part of a strategy for achieving other legislative ends) because 
he was so sure that it could not be ratified.368 
My group-psychological model of Table 2369 dictates that if (1) I am 
correct to conclude the era is dominated by motivation independence with 
regard to the relationship between the intensities of normal and 
constitutional legislation and (2) Kyvig is correct that the perception of 
likelihood of success reached its lowest, then there should be a relatively 
low number of amendments proposed at this time.  In fact, the data bear 
that conclusion out.  Despite the three-fold spike in bill introduction that 
marks the era, amendment proposing increases only by eighteen percent per 
member, allowing the proposed amendments-to-bills ratio to reach its 
lowest by far in the history of the U.S. Congress.370 
While my Table 2 model does not completely determine the Zeitgeist 
                                                          
 361. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 362. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 HARV. L. REV. 200, 
209 (1900). 
 365. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 193 (pointing out that the Progressive Party platform 
offered a more simplistic solution to Article V reform than those proposed by various 
congressmen). 
 366. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 367. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 368. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 202. 
 369. Tbl.2, supra Section III.B. 
 370. See tbl. 5, supra Section IV.B.2.  The Bills/PA Ratio was 398.6.  The second closest 
in size, Suffrage–Prohibition, era is 268.4.  Those numbers are striking compared to those 
for the four eras that preceded this one, 38.2, 61.6, 20.5, and 216.5, respectively, and for the 
Modern era 67.4. 
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when motivation independence dominates and likelihood of success is low, 
Kyvig offers external evidence that enhances the picture.  He argues that, at 
least during times spanning the first half of my Populist–Progressive era, 
there was a substantial constitutional reverence stemming both from the 
feeling that the Civil War Amendments had fixed what was wrong and 
from accolades for the Constitution associated with its centennial.371  It is 
consistent with that assessment that proposed amendments were indeed rare 
when compared with bill proposing rates, which outnumbered proposed 
amendments nearly four hundred to one; a ratio radically higher than in all 
other eras.372  Also consistent with that is the one-Congress lag for the 
negative correlation. 
In sum, it seems this era was marked by an intensely pessimistic view of 
success but reverential view of the process, independence, and serious-
mindedness of legislative action. 
F.  Sixth Era, Suffrage–Prohibition, 1917 to 1930373 
In the preceding Populist–Progressive era, a slip in the strength of a 
positive correlation (from its predecessor era) suggested an increase in 
motivation independence and, by extension, a subsiding of promiscuous 
careerism;374 the Suffrage-Prohibition Era, from 1917 to 1930, seems to 
mark an even stronger shift in that direction. 
The Suffrage-Prohibition era exhibits stronger, less ambiguous 
quantitative indicators:  a very strong negative correlation of 0.850 appears 
and, unlike the Populist-Progressive era, there is no corresponding 
significant lagged correlation.  One conclusion to draw from the diminution 
of the lag factor is that the amendment-proposing “gelling time” I posited 
for the lagged correlations in the Antebellum and Populist-Progressive eras 
has diminished.  And this may have been caused by a diminution in 
reverence for the amendment process.375 
Moreover, the negative correlation is nearly twice as strong as the 
negative correlation that characterized the Antebellum era and 33.2 % 
stronger than the negative correlation of 0.638 at lag one of the Populist-
Progressive era.  Why so strong a negative correlation?  Perhaps the trade-
off between general legislative and amendment proposing energy of the last 
                                                          
 371. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 188. 
 372. Table 5, supra Part IV.B.2. 
 373. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  -0.850 (high). Significance:  0.015 (significant). 
N:  7. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  22,009/41.45. Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  82/0.15. Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.34; For Era, 
0.71. 
 374. Without taking into account the lag factor. 
 375. Cf. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 214-15 (relating the post-Antebellum era’s increase in 
amendment activity to the fact that the issues were no longer critical to the survival of the 
nation, but those of modernizing the government to suit the progressive era). 
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era continues to this era, but is even more prominent.  And maybe it is 
stronger due to an increased emphasis on amendment proposing—an 
emphasis that plays out in the increased passage rate of seventy-one percent 
for this era. 
That trade-off explanation is consistent with a cursory glance at the 
significant categories of amendment proposals for this time:  women’s 
suffrage; treaty ratification; presidential disability; amendment ratification 
procedure (associated with Prohibition’s passage and repeal); child labor; 
income tax; and the dates and terms of the office of presidents and 
members of Congress.376 
Almost all are exclusively the province of constitutional, rather than 
normal, legislation.  That focus conforms to the maintenance of 
amendment-proposing levels while normal legislative activity dropped 
significantly from that of the prior era. 
The above makes clear the one characteristic of the congressional 
dynamic relevant both to the broader path of the general–constitutional 
legislation relationship across congressional history and to speculations on 
the Amendability Zeitgeist:  motivation independence may dominate a 
congressional era even after the historical emergence of promiscuous 
careerisms as a pervasive motivating force and after the freeing of members 
to act on their motivations without procedural restraints. 
Finally, additional evidence of congressional attitude during this era 
suggests a new development in the congressional Zeigeist of amendability.  
Kyvig notes a resuscitation of the perception of likelihood of amendment 
success ignited by the ratifications of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Amendments and a corresponding spike in amendment proposing.377  
Indeed, he observes that 1920 “marked a high point of progressive 
enthusiasm about achieving fundamental change through explicit and 
authentic acts of constitutional amendment.”378  Now, the mass-
psychological model of Table 2 suggests that a higher perceived likelihood 
of success in a motivation-independent era should produce higher levels of 
amendment proposing—unless the motivation for more amendment 
proposals is dampened by a prudential views of the process.  Here, the 
increase in proposals suggests the absence of any dampening affect from a 
prudential view of the process.  That conclusion may be related to the 
                                                          
 376. See generally KYVIG, supra note 41, at 62, 324-26, 367, 460-61, 469-70, 548-51 
(correlating the proposed amendment categories to the major historical events of the era, 
including World War I (suffrage, treaty ratification, income tax), President Wilson’s stroke 
(presidential disability, date and term limits), Wilson’s inability to get the Senate to ratify 
the Treaty of Versailles (treaty ratification), Prohibition (amendment ratification, child 
labor), Suffrage, and Congress’s proposal of a child labor amendment in 1924). 
 377. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 214. 
 378. Id. at 239. 
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change in the nature of the causation from the prior era to this one, namely 
the demise of the one-Congress lag, or “gelling period,” for the energy 
trade-off in bill proposing to affect amendment proposing as a negative 
correlation.  To repeat, the “gelling period” may have arisen in two prior 
eras (Antebellum and Populist-Progressive) from a more reverential view 
of the amendment process in those eras, which translated to the longer run-
up time to propose an amendment.  It seems that, in turn, that run-up time 
disappears in the Suffrage–Prohibition era as reverence for the process 
diminishes as well. 
In sum, while Congress remained generally serious-minded about 
proposing amendments independent of general legislation, and optimism 
about the likelihood of success of those amendments peaked, reverence for 
the amendment process diminished as compared to the prior Populist-
Progressive Era. 
A final caveat to this era:  the amendment exuberance that marked the 
era diminished as we approached the Modern Era in 1931:  “In retrospect, 
it would become evident that 1920 did not represent an incoming flood tide 
of constitutional change but the crest of a wave soon to dissipate.”379  That 
is, Kyvig notes, enthusiasm for further amendment soured as unhappiness 
with national prohibition grew.380 
G.  The Modern Era, 1931 to Present (2004)381 
Two possible explanations come to mind for the mimicry between 
proposed amendment and bill totals in the Modern Era, which begins 
around 1931 with a strong, significant 0.755 correlation. 
First, the conclusion dictated by my working model suggests that the 
correlation indicates the dominance of promiscuous careerism.  That is, the 
anomalies characterizing the two prior eras—serious-mindedness towards 
legislation in general; a heightened view of the likelihood of success of 
proposed amendments; a high, though diminishing, prudential reverence 
for the amendment process—ceased in the Modern Era.  Therefore, the 
promiscuous careerism pattern first established in the Latter Reconstruction 
Era could reassert itself. 
The second is that the sustained correlation is not a sign that careerism is 
significantly more robust, but only that normal legislative activity has 
moved into spheres previously considered the province of only 
                                                          
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 261. 
 381. Bills-Prop. Amends. Correlation:  0.755 (high).  Significance:  0.000 (significant).  
N:  33. Mean Bills Per Congress/Per Member:  15,693/29.42.  Mean Proposed 
Amendments/Per Member:  233/0.44.  Amendment Passage Rate:  Historical, 0.32; For Era, 
0.21. 
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constitutional legislation.  That is, more policy topics are legitimately, 
independently amenable to separate legislation in the constitutional and 
non-constitutional spheres.  That explanation would allow for amendment 
totals’ mimicry of bill tallies to have arisen from serious policy pursuits 
rather than shallow reelectioneering.  A potential cause for that dynamic 
would be the Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause power in 1937, just after the beginning of the modern era.382 
That alternative hypothesis does not, however, seem supported in a 
cursory review of the substantive history of amendment proposing in the 
Modern Era.  The comparative length of the Modern Era demands more 
than a quick consideration of a handful of categories that comprise the 
major subjects of proposed amendments.  In this seventy-four year span, 
the major categories vary from sub-period to sub-period and generally 
repeat all the significant categories of proposals from the prior eras (except 
those where an amendment has already been passed).  But I can extract a 
general sense of the most prominent, repeating amendment subjects from 
Vile’s analysis, as follows: 
TABLE 6: 
Prominent Modern Era Legislation (through 2002) 
 
                                                          
 382. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (determining if 
Congress has the power to regulate commercial activity by looking at the activity’s effect 
upon commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (furthering the development 
of a broad definition of interstate commerce by holding that Congress can regulate labor 
conditions because they effect the overall competitiveness of businesses in different states); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (broadening congressional power to regulate 
commerce even more by deciding that Congress can regulate small, local activities if the 
aggregate effect will affect interstate commerce). The post-United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) partial retrenchment in Commerc Clause doctrine is both too limited and too 
recent to affect this part of the analysis. 
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Prominent 
Category of 
Proposed 
Amendments 
Years  
Prominent 
Also 
Amendable to 
General 
Legislation? 
If So, Does Legislative 
Power Come from Expanded 
Commerce Clause? 
Balanced Budget 
 
21 (1974–02) No n/a 
Equal Rights 
Amendment  
17 (1945–82) Yes Yes 
Electoral College 
 
17 (1949–02) No n/a 
Abortion  
(“Right to Life”) 
10 (1973–87) No n/a 
Prayer in Schools 
or Public Places 
10 (1962–84) No n/a 
Presidential Term 
Limits 
6 (1940–47) No n/a 
Congress Tenure 
and Term Limits 
6 (1976–97) No n/a 
Taxation 
 
7 (1933–98) Yes No 
School Busing 
 
4 (1970–73) Yes Yes 
Treaties 
 
6 (1945–57) Yes No 
ANALYSIS: 
Amenable to general legislation                           34      31.7% 
 —Due to expanded Commerce Clause               21      20.1% 
Not amenable to general legislation                     70      67.3%  
 
Table 6383 suggests that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the subjects 
that fall under Congress’s competence, through interpretative expansion of 
the Commerce Clause power, may explain only a portion of the correlation.  
(And, of course, even that Commerce Clause-enabled mimicry may contain 
some careerism.)  Hence, the strong 0.755 correlation likely shows the 
dominance of promiscuous careerism. 
That conclusion is consistent with other external conditions, such as the 
major historical events of the Modern Era:  the Great Depression, the New 
Deal and the rise of the administrative state, World War II, the Civil Rights 
Movement, the Cold War, and all the other significant events of the past 
seventy-four years.  Modern Congresses cannot be said simply to have 
lacked grist for the mills of serious and independent constitutional 
legislative activity. 
Those observations challenge Kyvig’s critique of FDR’s judgment not to 
pursue constitutionally enshrining the New Deal.  Kyvig first notes that 
                                                          
 383. VILE, supra note 55, app. at 550-58. “Appendix D:  Most Popular Amending 
Proposals by Year & Key Events and Publications Related to Constitutional Amendments” 
provides the source for the “Years Prominent” column. 
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while the first third of the twentieth century taught that the amendment 
process could be highly unpredictable and volatile, six amendments were 
added and another endorsed by Congress.384  The New Deal then presented 
a constitutional crisis similar to the Founding and Civil War. 
Kyvig argues that with Roosevelt’s huge 1936 landslide, including 
majorities of three hundred thirty-one to one hundred-two in the House and 
seventy-six to twenty in the Senate, he had the power to formally enshrine 
in the written Constitution:  “the notion of collective responsibility for the 
social welfare of the individual [that had been raised to] a higher level than 
ever before reached in the United States . . .  [and constituted] as close to a 
consensus as the American electorate achieved in the twentieth century.”385  
Kyvig laments that the changes brought by the transformative (to use 
Ackerman’s term)386 opinions of the Supreme Court altered the nature of 
American government at the time, but “lacked the clarity and specificity of 
constitutional amendments.”387  Hence, “[d]ebate over the nature of federal 
responsibility for domestic social conditions would continue, almost 
unabated, and serve as a focus of political contention over the subsequent 
half century.”388 
Kyvig’s conclusion, that Roosevelt was wrong to perceive “the 
amending process as impossibly difficult and amendment itself as 
unnecessary,”389 may itself be undercut by the change in congressional 
gatekeeping that my numerical data suggest may have been manifest as 
early as 1931.  Perhaps, instead, FDR was right about the chances for 
approval of the type of amendments he needed.  Consistent with that view, 
in the twenty years following Roosevelt’s 1937 Court Packing Plan, 
amendment proposals shifted to restrictions on federal power and the 
presidency, though they neither overturned nor confirmed the New Deal.390  
“Instead, the unsettled nature of American policies regarding government 
revealed itself.”391  And that certainly presented a broad platform from 
which New Deal opponents and supporters, and their political successors, 
could grandstand. 
                                                          
 384. See KYVIG, supra note 41, at 288 (noting that after the flurry of activity both 
conservatives and reformers regarded the amendment process with suspicion). 
 385. Id. at 313-14. 
 386. See id. at 476 (referencing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 
(1991)). 
 387. Id. at 289. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 290. 
 390. See VILE, supra note 55, at 122 (affirming the view that the Court Packing Plan 
caused significant constitutional ripples).  The proposed amendments in the decade 
following the Court Packing Plan included proposed presidential term limits, changes to the 
method of treaty ratification, judiciary reform, and alterations to the means of amending the 
Constitution.  Id. app. at 550-51. 
 391. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 316. 
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That the amendability ennui which seems emergent in the New Deal era 
was not transformed by the 1960s four amendment ratifications is likely 
because they fell into familiar patterns.  Three dealt with suffrage and to 
varying degrees responded to Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board 
of Education392 and voting rights cases:  the Twenty-Third Amendment 
(presidential electors for D.C.); the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (abolishing 
poll taxes); and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (right to vote for eighteen 
year olds).  The fourth, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,393 dealt with the 
highly topical concern of presidential succession in the wake of Kennedy’s 
assassination. 
Moreover, unlike the possible effect of the Sixteenth Amendment on the 
dynamic of the Prohibition–Suffrage Era, congressional expectations on the 
level of support for ratification were probably unaltered by the rapid 
ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the 1960s.394  The scope 
and effect of that amendment were narrow and it was soon followed by the 
failure to ratify the ERA in the 1970s.395  With the ERA, Kyvig concludes 
that the “liberal view lingered longer in Congress than in state legislatures,” 
which harbored relatively conservative views on gender, as well as race 
issues (explaining also the defeat of Congress’s proposal for D.C. 
congressional representation).396 
Finally, since the conservative ascendancy of the 1980s, amendments 
were frequently proposed; a balanced budget amendment was the most 
widely discussed reform of the 1980s and early 1990s.397  Kyvig notes that 
political conditions mirrored those of the end of the nineteenth century in 
that the contending parties were closely balanced but that, “[u]nlike a 
century earlier, however, when the view prevailed that the Constitution 
neared perfection, toward the end of the twentieth century discontent 
festered and serious reform schemes proliferated.”398 
                                                          
 392. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 393. See Dellinger, Legitimacy, supra note 118 (suggesting that these four amendments 
were adopted not because the amendment process is simple, but because they were 
uncontroversial measures which had already been more or less enacted, be it through 
legislation or Supreme Court decisions). 
 394. But see KYVIG, supra note 41, at 409 (discussing expectations for an easy 
ratification of the ERA).  Kyvig explains that congressional leaders’ experiences with the 
easy ratification process of the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth amendments accustomed 
them to think of the congressional approval process as difficult, but that once that hurdle had 
been overcome, the states would easily fall in line.  Id. 
 395. See id. at 409-25 (outlining the bitter battles waged over the ratification of the ERA, 
finally culminating in its defeat). 
 396. Id. at 425. 
 397. VILE, supra note 55, app. at 555-56.  According to Vile, from 1980 to 1994, a 
balanced budget amendment was proposed eight times.  Other popular amendments during 
the conservative ascendancy were amendments on right to life and congressional term 
limits.  Id. 
 398. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 426. 
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In sum, this analysis of the Modern Era suggests that the relationship 
between the levels of congressional bill and amendment proposing activity 
over this sustained and uninterrupted period signals that promiscuous 
careerism has become cemented as the major determinant of amendment 
proposing.399  As Kyvig observes, “Article V requirements [have] made it 
quite likely that no amendment of any sort could be adopted in a 
contentious political climate of balanced power.”400  And though he does 
not address the issue systematically throughout the narrative, Kyvig seems 
to agree with the entrenchment of grandstanding in the Modern Era.  That 
is, at least since the 1980s, “amendments, designed as much to articulate a 
position as to achieve adoption, [have] flourish[ed]” and “striking a 
constitutional posture [has] bec[o]me a popular means of dealing with 
besetting problems of government.”401 
The Zeitgeist analysis here is informed by the observation with which I 
began this Article, that we all already have a general sense of the character 
of contemporary amendability, as contemporary American citizens in 
general and as students of the American legal and political systems in 
particular.  Drawing on this shared knowledge, I simply claim that the 
current perceived likelihood of success of proposed amendments in 
Congress is relatively low and that there is no sweeping prudential 
reverence for the amendment process pervading Congress.  If that first 
observation is, in fact, correct, then as per my Table 2 model, we truly are 
in an era dominated by promiscuous careerism.  For if not, then we would 
see a relatively low number of proposed amendments per Congress rather 
then the historically-high rate of 233 mean proposed amendments per 
Congress and 0.44 per member that have characterized the modern era. 
VI.  TENTATIVE INFERENCES FROM THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS:  
DECLINE OF MOTIVATION INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE SEVEN ERAS 
The following table summarizes the findings and inferences of the 
preceding part, from which some additional speculations can be made. 
                                                          
 399. If so, we may next ask whether the loss of independence in amendment proposing 
activity is a sign of rational acceptance of or psychological resignation to the general 
unamendability of the Constitution in modern times. 
 400. KYVIG, supra note 41, at 425. 
 401. Id. 
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TABLE 7: 
Summary of Analysis and Inferences 
 
Era 
 
Correlation/  
Significance 
Special 
Conditions 
Tentative Conclusions 
Founding 
(1791-1812)  
Effectively 
Zero402 
 
 
Bill 
introduction 
difficulty. 
Serious proposals, optimism about 
amendment success, and prudential 
reverence for the process. 
Antebellum 
(1813-1858) 
 
-0.464/0.026 
at lag 1 -0.591/0.003 
Bill 
introduction 
difficulty. 
Negative correlation due to trade-off 
from difficulty; lagged due to gelling 
time, cause by reverence.  But both 
reverence and optimism are 
somewhat diminished. 
Civil War-
Early Recon. 
(1859-1868) 
Effectively 
Zero403 
Civil War. Sui generis due to Civil War.  But 
doesn’t destroy existing patterns of 
development in dynamics of 
congressional legislation. 
Latter 
Recon.–
Gilded Age 
(1869-1886)  
Strongest 
Positive 
 
0.826/0.006 
Introduction 
difficulty 
gone. 
 
Grandstanding takes hold.  
Pessimism towards success and low 
reverence (until the centennial 
enthusiasm takes effect). 
Populist--
Progressive 
(1887-1916) 
0.345/0.207 
 
 
 at lag 1 -0.638/0.011 
Legislative 
explosion. 
Negative trade-off despite no 
introduction difficulty; lagged 
relationship corresponds to increased 
reverence, though there is extreme 
pessimism about amendment success.   
Suffrage–
Prohibition 
(1917-1930) 
Very Strong 
Neg.         -
0.850/0.015 
Recent and 
contemporane
ous 
amendment 
success. 
Gelling time disappears, energy 
trade-off stronger; increased focus on 
amendments.  Peak optimism, but 
reverence diminishes. 
Modern 
(1931-2004) 
 
Strong Positive 
0.755/0.000 
Expansion of 
Commerce 
Clause power. 
Credit seeking dominates, though 
some correlation may be due to 
expansion of scope of legislation.  
Zeitgeist is pessimistic irreverence. 
 
 
In its first half century, Congress appears to have viewed the amendment 
                                                          
 402. -0.087/0.799. 
 403. 0.191/0.759. 
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process with serious optimism.  At that time, probably because introducing 
a bill was difficult, amendment proposing had not yet become a semi-
serious activity wedded to motivations underlying other legislative activity. 
But, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, an extreme 
difficulty in passing amendments emerged concurrently with Congress’s 
clarification of the general legislative process, which was designed to make 
it more accessible to individual members.  At that time, independent 
amendment proposing began its decline toward the Modern Era attitude of 
relative amendment impotence, pessimism about amendment success, and 
lack of reverence for the process. 
However, a few major political events temporarily interrupted that 
decline.  Foremost among those were the Civil War, the centennial of the 
Constitution, the Populist and Progressive responses to urbanization and 
modernization, the 1913 twin amendment successes of income tax and 
direct election of Senators, and Prohibition’s adoption and repeal. 
Amendability’s demise is reflected not only in the careerism-dependent 
character of amendment proposing activity, but also in the decline in 
number of already proposed amendments making it out of Congress to be 
ratified by the states:  the amendment-passing rate during the Constitution’s 
first eighty years was dramatically higher than the rate for the last 136.  
Between 1789 and 1869 there were sixteen amendments for an amendment 
rate of 0.2 per year, or one amendment every five years.404 Between 1869 
and 2005, there have been only eleven amendments405 (one of which was 
the repeal of another) for an amendment rate of 0.08, or one amendment 
every twelve years.406  And those eleven amendments do not mirror the 
breadth of scope of the first sixteen but, rather, are comprised of:  three 
relating to the franchise (extending it to women and young adults and 
eliminating poll taxes), one enacting and one repealing prohibition, one 
relating to income tax, and the remainder relating to presidential 
succession, direct election of senators, and presidential and congressional 
terms. 
                                                          
 404. But Congress passed two proposed amendments that were never ratified in this era:  
(1) an amendment related to titles of nobility (passed in 1810) and (2) the Corwin 
amendment (passed in 1861).  VILE, supra note 55, app. at 541, 544. 
 405. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (general suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (income 
tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (direct election of Senators); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII 
(prohibition); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (women’s suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XX (lame 
duck reduction and order of succession); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repeal of prohibition); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (presidential term limits); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (District of 
Columbia representation in electoral college); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibition of 
poll taxes); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (presidential disability); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI 
(set the voting age at eighteen); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (time limits for congressional 
pay raises).  
 406. Congress passed three proposed amendments that were never ratified in this era:  
(1) child labor (1924), (2) the ERA (1972), and (3) D.C. representation (1978). 
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VII.  AREAS FOR FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH                                         AND 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The history of motivation independence versus promiscuous careerism 
and the Zeitgeist of amendability in Congress outlined here is merely a 
rough roadmap for further inquiry into congressional responsiveness to 
amendment need.  Again, it is initially counterintuitive to have begun by 
looking at a congressional response without having first defined to what 
Congress has been responding.  But this approach makes sense as a matter 
of practical empirical methodology.  In order to identify what congressional 
activity has been in reaction to, looking at the readily accessible (though 
voluminous) congressional activity is a helpful starting point.  Of course, in 
that inquiry we must not forget that what Congress has not reacted to will 
be equally important in the responsiveness calculus. 
So, before going into too much detail examining congressional 
amendment-proposing activity, it is probably best to use some initial 
observations to develop a theory and empirically examine amendment 
need, the operationalization of which will require a thoughtful and 
searching analysis.  Only after doing that and then taking the congressional 
responsiveness inquiry to a more specific, substantive level can we begin to 
assess amendability. 
A.  Operationalizing Amendment Need 
Strauss’s irrelevance argument seems to start with the outer boundary of 
amendment need, over the course of our constitutional history, at no more 
than the thirty-three amendments that Congress offered up to the states for 
ratification.407  He then proceeds to whittle that down to zero actual 
amendment need, or close to it.  But it cannot be that simple.  A broader 
conception of amendment need is dictated by both simple Article V 
arithmetic and political theory.  And that broader conception of amendment 
need requires an inquiry that steps beyond the universe of the thirty-three, 
ratified or rejected, congressionally-proposed amendments. 
The arithmetic argument relates the quantum of support for an 
amendment on a particular topic among voters in state legislatures, or 
would-be state conventions, to the quantum of support in Congress.  The 
narrow view, that limits amendment need to only the thirty-three 
congressionally-passed amendments, seems to presume the following:  
whenever there has been support for a proposed amendment among 
                                                          
 407. See Strauss, supra note 131, at 1463-64 (arguing that only when three conditions 
are present will an amendment be significant:  when legislative or judicial means of change 
are unavailable, when society comes around to thinking or believing in line with the change 
brought by amendment, when it establishes “a precise rule” rather than “a vague norm”). 
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majorities of voters in three-fourths of the state legislatures, or would-be 
conventions, then there has also been support of two-thirds majorities in 
both the House and Senate (since two-thirds is less than three-fourths).  But 
that is not necessarily so. 
To see the flaw in the narrow conception of amendment need, consider 
the possible level of support in the Senate in the following scenario:  On 
some particular proposed amendment topic there is majority legislative 
support in a bare three-fourths majority of states (thirty-eight).  Suppose 
further that across the minority of twelve opposing states, the majorities 
opposing the amendment are so strong and vehement that no senator from 
one of those states would vote for it.  (That could be caused by some 
combination of careerism and—to the extent a senator’s genuine policy 
views reflect those of the vehement majority in his or her state on the 
topic—policy purism.)  Then, to pass the congressional gate and be 
proposed to the states for ratification, the amendment would need the votes 
of sixty-seven of the seventy-six senators from the supporting states.  That 
is, ten senators—just thirteen percent of the senators from the supporting 
states—could block the amendment.  And given congressional self-interest, 
possible policy-purist views, reverence for the amendment process, 
staggered senatorial tenures, et cetera, it is possible to imagine particular 
amendment topics and circumstances that would produce that quantum of 
opposition.  The consequence is that the arithmetic is not as simple as three 
fourths being greater than two thirds. 
In addition, political theory must interrogate Congress’s role with regard 
to amendment need.  Should it really be only passive and responsive?  Or, 
instead, should Congress, at times, lead ahead of a solidified supermajority 
of political will in the states?  That is, does amendment need sometimes 
need to be discovered by Congress, whose action in proposing an 
amendment to the states becomes the genesis of a popular movement for 
political support?  The six unratified amendments408 are a minor example of 
such affirmative action by Congress failing, which Strauss uses to support 
his thesis.  But that seems to overlook the spectacular success of something 
arguably analogous to a pro-active Congress:  the Philadelphia Convention 
                                                          
 408. See VILE, supra note 55, at 183 (describing the six failed amendments:  the first, in 
1789, was included in the original Bill of Rights and dealt with the size of Congress in 
proportion to the population; the second, introduced in 1810 and known as the Reed 
Amendment or the Phantom Amendment, would have removed U.S. citizenship from 
individuals who accepted titles of nobility; the Corwin Amendment, the third failed 
amendment was passed by Congress in 1861, and would have barred future amendments 
that limited the practice of slavery; the fourth was the Child Labor Amendment, introduced 
in 1924; the fifth was the ERA, passed by Congress in 1972; lastly, in 1978, Congress 
passed an amendment to treat the District of Columbia as a state for certain voting-related 
purposes). 
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of 1787.409  Did that hyper-creative, proactive, opinion-leading body really 
bequeath a national deliberative assembly utterly devoid of a role in 
constitutional leadership? 
It seems then, that additional evidence of amendment need, beyond that 
which produced the thirty-three amendments Congress proposed to the 
states, may be gleaned from the historical record.  It may be found either in 
issues that garnered supermajority popular support in the states but flunked 
the Article V arithmetic in Congress or in issues that were ripe for popular 
support but lacked congressional leadership.  Engaging this type of inquiry, 
Stephen Griffin has suggested that the historical inquiry will reveal there 
was little need for change in the nineteenth century: 
[T]he most important reason the Constitution did not experience 
significant change in the nineteenth century was that little was expected 
of the national government.  The Civil War Amendments were approved 
under special circumstances and their potential for expansion of national 
authority was quickly nullified by the profound localism and 
antigovernment attitudes typical of nineteenth-century politics.  The 
weight of the enormous social and economic changes of the late 
nineteenth century was borne by state governments . . . .410 
But though localism and anti-government attitudes may have been strong 
forces, they were not uniform across the entire century, and the amendment 
need calculus should attempt a more-detailed parsing. 
If such additional evidence of actual or potential popular support for 
amendments is discovered, then the last question is whether to deem that 
evidence of amendment need.  It is a question of normative constitutional 
theory about which I remain agnostic in this article.  The best starting point 
for speculation on criteria is probably the familiar, including the thirty-
three proposals from Congress and the prominent constitutional crises 
examined by Strauss and others.  Did the forces that led to the Eighteenth 
Amendment (instituting Prohibition) constitute amendment need?  What 
about the forces leading to the Corwin amendment?  Or do we just say a 
need was present but the Corwin amendment was the wrong response?  
And how about the New Deal?  The theoretical task, already engaged and 
partially completed by a variety of scholars—albeit indirectly, would seem 
                                                          
 409. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787:  A COMPREHENSIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 181-83 (2005) (explaining that in the late 
eighteenth century, it was common practice for state legislatures to write and pass 
constitutions).  Therefore, the very gathering of the Constitutional Convention was as novel 
an idea as its final output.  Id.  While the Constitutional Convention’s original purpose was 
simply to adjust the Articles of Confederation, the production of an entirely new 
Constitution was justified on the grounds that it was a mere proposal to the states.  Id. 
 410. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States:  From Theory to 
Practice, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 37, 50 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
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to be to first answer the question whether those and similar examples 
should constitute amendment need and then identify the more generalizable 
criteria that lead to those answers. 
Something like this has already been attempted, though only for 
prospective purposes to evaluate current and future amendment proposals.  
In 1999, a group called Citizens for Constitutional Change published a 
report entitled “Great and Extraordinary Occasions:  Developing 
Guidelines for Constitutional Change,” which sets forth eight “Guidelines 
for Constitutional Amendment.”411  Prepared in the wake of Republicans 
taking control of Congress in the 1990s and increased interest in 
amendments on topics such as a balanced budget,412 school prayer,413 and 
flag burning,414 the guidelines preach restraint.  Thus, they caution that 
amendments should:  focus on topics also important to subsequent 
generations, enhance political responsiveness or individual rights, only be 
used as a last resort, be “consistent with related constitutional doctrine,” not 
be purely aspirational, contemplate consequences for other constitutional 
principles, be fully and fairly debated, and have a nonextendable deadline 
for ratification to ensure a contemporaneous consensus.415  While lauding 
all the guidelines in general, Chemerinsky has noted the practical difficulty 
a current generation faces in judging the enduring importance of a proposed 
amendment to future generations.416 
While all the Guidelines seem generally suited to the historical inquiry as 
well, one in particular raises a final theoretical issue for amendment need.  
                                                          
 411. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180. 
 412. See id. at 2 (explaining the amendment passed in the House of Representatives and 
twice failed in the Senate by only one vote). 
 413. See id. (arguing that, if passed, the proposals on religion would substantially alter 
the present understanding of our system of religious liberty). 
 414. See id. (listing the flag burning amendment with the balanced budget amendment, 
as passing in the House and only narrowly failing the Senate by one vote).  In his 1998 
review of Kyvig’s book, Chemerinsky comments on an almost verbatim draft of the same 
principles that Citizens for Constitutional Change had circulated in 1997.  Chemerinsky, 
supra note 41, at 1572-75. 
 415. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 7.  In full, the “Guidelines for 
Constitutional Amendments” ask:  (1) Does the proposed amendment address matters that 
are of more than immediate concern and that are likely to be recognized as of abiding 
importance by subsequent generations?  (2) Does the proposed amendment make our system 
more politically responsive or protect individual rights?  (3) Are there significant practical 
or legal obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the proposed amendment by other 
means?  (4) Is the proposed amendment consistent with related constitutional doctrine that 
the amendment leaves intact?  (5) Does the proposed amendment embody enforceable, and 
not purely aspirational, standards?  (6) Have proponents of the proposed amendment 
attempted to think through and articulate the consequences of their proposal, including the 
ways in which the amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and 
principles?  (7) Has there been full and fair debate on the merits of the proposed 
amendment?  (8) Has Congress provided for a nonextendable deadline for ratification by the 
states so as to ensure that there is a contemporaneous consensus by Congress and the states 
that the proposed amendment is desirable? 
 416. Chemerinksy, supra note 41, at 1574. 
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Guideline Three asks, “[a]re there significant practical or legal obstacles to 
the achievement of the objectives of the proposed amendment by other 
means?”417  The commentary to Guideline Three explicitly equates the 
other means with those available in the “political realm.”418 Hence, it asks 
whether the objective of the proposed amendment could instead be 
achieved through “federal or state legislation or state constitutional 
amendment.”419  Examples of proposals that have first exhausted those 
particular means are given.  The commentary studiously avoids, however, 
any explicit reference to the judicial recognition of informal constitutional 
change.  But the implication is there.  It notes that after the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state flag-desecration statute, “Congress responded by 
attempting to draft a federal statute that proscribed desecration without 
violating the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment.”420  
Accordingly, “[n]ow that the Supreme Court has invalidated the federal 
statute,” an amendment would comport with Guideline Three unless a 
different statute could pass the Court’s test.421 
In sum, in addition to the necessary empirical inquiries I have described, 
there also remains the theoretical problem of determining the extent to 
which a need for constitutional change constitutes “amendment need” 
within my framework. 
B.  Micro-Analysis of Congressional Responsiveness 
The data from Modern, Founding, and Antebellum eras at least roughly 
match our general expectations; the Civil War Era is sui generis and 
difficult to pin down and the Latter Reconstruction-Gilded Age fits neatly 
into the general model by exhibiting the emergence of promiscuous 
careerism.422  That leaves the anomalous Populist-Progressive (1887-1916) 
and Suffrage-Prohibition (1917-1930) eras as the best first candidates for 
closer scrutiny.  The anomalies, again, are a strong, negative, lagged 
correlation in the Populist-Progressive era and a strong negative correlation 
in the Suffrage-Prohibition era.423 
                                                          
 417. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 7. 
 418. Id. at 14. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. at 16. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Tbl. 5, supra Part IV.B.2. 
 423. The first approach might challenge the validity of the numerical analysis directly. 
For instance, are the amendment “totals” for each Congress unreliable because of the 
frequent repetition of the same topic in many separate amendment-proposing resolutions in 
the same Congress?  See, e.g., Long, supra note 83, at 578 (explaining that while there have 
been around two thousand proposed amendments to the Constitution, the proposals cover 
relatively few topics).  Probably not, because my general assumption is that the repetition 
phenomenon is distributed across all the eras.  And it is difficult to understand how it only 
could contribute to either a positive or negative correlation.  At most, it would dampen the 
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In Part V, I have theorized the causes of the anomalies based on some 
additional, contextual historical data.  For the Populist-Progressive era the 
bills to proposed amendments relationship is negative because of a trade-
off in political energy and lagged due to a longer “gelling time” for the 
amendment proposals, perhaps due to greater reverence for the amendment 
process.  For the Suffrage-Prohibition era, I speculate that the negative 
aspect of the relationship continues based on the same cause and that the 
lagged aspect disappears with a diminution in reverence. 
It is difficult to assess the validity of my causal speculations when they 
are based mostly on psychological factors, and all the subjects are now 
dead.  Worse still, these eras predate the boom in the collection both of 
social science survey data in general and compilation of “vital statistics” 
and other studies of Congress in particular.  But as with any American 
historical era, there must at least be eclectic accumulations of relevant 
contemporaneous writings. 
A reasonable plan of research for either of the two anomalous eras might 
begin by selecting a subset of the Congresses spanning the era and then 
selecting a sample of proposed amendments from each Congress.  That 
should, of course, be done such that it would be reasonable to infer that the 
average accumulated characteristics of the sample are likely to match those 
of the whole population.  That may be difficult to structure given the 
potentially divergent relevant characteristics of topic categories of 
proposed amendments and their likely lack of normal or other statistically 
reliable distribution across the congressional record. 
But assuming a reasonable sample is amassed, the next step would be to 
closely investigate the characteristics of each proposed amendment in it.  
That would, at minimum include examining all that was said and written 
about the proposal in committee or on the floor.  Further, any particular 
statements or general characteristics of the sponsors might be considered.  
Data on any committee or floor votes on the proposed amendment should 
also be accumulated. 
Finally, the congressional analysis for the era should be compared 
against a more searching inquiry into potential amendment need (or at least 
the need felt for constitutional change), as I have described in section A 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems the character of amendment proposal has changed significantly 
since the Founding.  We appear to have moved from generally 
                                                          
strength of a correlation.  But, in any case, the degree to which the repetition phenomenon is 
equally distributed across all my eras is worth investigating. 
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independently-motivated amendment proposing to the stagnant modern era 
of promiscuous careerism.  Or in broader terms, I tentatively conclude that 
Congress has evolved to the Modern Era’s Zeitgeist of promiscuous, non-
prudential, irreverent amendability pessimism through the series of 
intervening, distinct Zeitgeists detailed in Part V.  That shift is just the 
beginning of the inquiry.  Further questions for constitutional history and 
theory are whether and to what degree that shift corresponded to a change 
from relative amendability to relative unamendability, at what stages our 
history that occurred, and its relevance to constitutional theory.  That 
analysis requires moving from the macro-level framework presented here 
to historical analyses of discrete amendment topics and their relationship to 
other events and causes.  Moreover, the core of interest for constitutional 
theory would seem to be the shift into, then between, and then away from 
the anomalous Populist-Progressive (1887-1916) and Suffrage-Prohibition 
(1917-1930) eras. 
APPENDIX A: 
The Thirty-Three Amendments Proposed by Congress for Ratification424 
 
Proposal Proposed Ratified 
Congressional Representation (to control growth of size of 
House)(this and next were first two of 12 amendments 
proposed as a bill of rights) 
1789  
Twenty-Seven Amendment (congressional compensation) 1789 1992 
First through Tenth Amendments (Bill of Rights) 1789 1791 
Eleventh Amendment (state sovereign immunity) 1794 1795 
Twelfth Amendment (election of President and V.P.) 1803 1804 
Titles of Nobility (to strip citizenship from those accepting 
foreign titles) 
1810  
Corwin Amendment (to protect institution of slavery) 1861  
Thirteenth Amendment (banning slavery) 1865 1865 
Fourteenth Amendment (various rights against state 
infringement, etc.) 
1866 1868 
Fifteenth Amendment (right to vote) 1869 1870 
Sixteenth Amendment (income tax) 1909 1913 
Seventeenth Amendment (direct election of Senators) 1912 1913 
Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) 1917 1919 
Nineteenth Amendment (women’s suffrage) 1919 1920 
Child Labor Amendment (to give Congress power to regulate 
child labor) 
1924  
Twentieth Amendment (reducing “lame duck” period post 
federal election) 
1932 1933 
Twenty-First Amendment (repealing Prohibition) 1933 1933 
Twenty-Second Amendment (presidential term limit) 1947 1951 
                                                          
 424. Compiled from PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 9, at li, 1718-19. 
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Twenty-Third Amendment (D.C.  presidential voting) 1960 1961 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment (banning poll taxes) 1962 1964 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment (succession to office of President 
and V.P.) 
1965 1967 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment (18-year-olds’ right to vote) 1971 1971 
Equal Rights Amendment (to ban discrimination on account of 
sex) 
1972  
D.C. Representation in Congress 1978  
APPENDIX B: 
Sources Consulted for Proposed Amendment Totals 
(1) For 1789-1889:  Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States During the First Century of Its History 
(1896), reprinted in PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
1787-2001, at 1 (John Vile ed., The Lawbook Exchange) (2003).  There 
were 1,300 amendments proposed between 1787 and 2001.  Ames 
chronicles all the amendment proposals during the first 100 years of 
Congress that he was able to discover.  The amendments are numbered 
consecutively, but with some lettered additions between numbers.  The list 
actually begins prior to the 1st Congress and covers amendments proposed 
during the Constitutional Convention.  The list also includes a few later 
amendments proposed by states directly instead of by bill.  Around 1,750 
amendments were proposed during this period when including the 
amendments proposed during the Constitutional Convention.  For the 
annual amendment totals spanning 1789 to 1889, I have drawn from 
Ames’s list of proposals actually introduced in Congress and excluded the 
few, anomalous, state proposals. 
(2) For 1889 to 1926:  CHARLES C. TANSILL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS 
FROM DECEMBER 4, 1889, TO JULY 2, 1926, (arranged by Tansill) Senate 
Documents, No. 93, 69th Congress, 1st Session, 1926.  (Cited in S. Prt. 99-
87, Appendix C) (Washington D.C.:  U.S.  Government Printing Office, 
1969) (providing a chronological enumeration of the proposed 
amendments, including date, sponsor, and subject). 
(3) For 1889 to 1928:  M.A. MUSMANNO, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION:  A MONOGRAPH ON THE RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED 
IN CONGRESS PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (WASHINGTON:  U.S. GOVERNMENT 
PRINTING OFFICE) (1929) (illustrating that another 1,300 Constitutional 
Amendments were proposed during this thirty-nine year period). 
(4) For 1947 to 1953: EVERETT S. BROWN, (80th through 82nd 
Congresses) Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
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of America, Introduced in Congress from the 69th Congress, 2d.  Session 
through the 87th Congress, 2d Session, December 6, 1926, to January 3, 
1963 (Cited in S.Prt. 99-87, Appendix C) (Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1963). 
(5) For 1969 to 1984:  RICHARD A. DAVIS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS 
FROM THE 91ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, THROUGH THE 98TH CONGRESS, 
2ND SESSION, JANUARY 1969-DECEMBER 1984 (Washington, DC:  
Congressional Research Service) (1985) (Congressional Research Service 
Report No.  85-36 GOV). 
(6) For All Congresses:  JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND 
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002 at Appendix D (2003). 
(7) For current congresses:  See Thomas website, supra note 278. 
 
